Patrick Lacharme

dblp:46/3206 · DBLP profile ↗
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15ranked-venue papers
5as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0003-1186-750XORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 12 · 4 first-author · 2 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 first-author
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Cryptanalysis of Cancelable Biometrics Vault
Patrick Lacharme, Kevin Thiry-Atighehchi
J. Inf. Secur. Appl.1
2022 Biometric masterkeys
Tanguy Gernot, Patrick Lacharme
Comput. Secur.2
2020 A Cryptanalysis of Two Cancelable Biometric Schemes Based on Index-of-Max Hashing
abstract
Cancelable biometric schemes generate secure biometric templates by combining user specific tokens and biometric data. The main objective is to create irreversible, unlinkable, and revocable templates, with high accuracy of comparison. In this paper, we cryptanalyze two recent cancelable biometric schemes based on a particular locality sensitive hashing function, index-of-max (IoM): Gaussian Random Projection-IoM (GRP-IoM) and Uniformly Random Permutation-IoM (URP-IoM). As originally proposed, these schemes were claimed to be resistant against reversibility, authentication, and linkability attacks under the stolen token scenario. We propose several attacks against GRP-IoM and URP-IoM, and argue that both schemes are severely vulnerable against authentication and linkability attacks. We also propose better, but not yet practical, reversibility attacks against GRP-IoM. The correctness and practical impact of our attacks are verified over the same dataset provided by the authors of these two schemes.
Loubna Ghammam, Koray Karabina, Patrick Lacharme, Kevin Thiry-Atighehchi
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.3
2019 Performance of Password Guessing Enumerators Under Cracking Conditions
Mathieu Valois, Patrick Lacharme, Jean-Marie Le Bars
SEC2
2018 How to Break CaptchaStar
Thomas Gougeon, Patrick Lacharme
ICISSP2
2018 A comparative study of card-not-present e-commerce architectures with card schemes: What about privacy?
Aude Plateaux, Patrick Lacharme, Sylvain Vernois, Vincent Coquet, Christophe Rosenberger
J. Inf. Secur. Appl.2
2017 Memory carving can finally unveil your embedded personal data
abstract
Smart cards are involved in most of activities, and they gather and record plenty of personal data. A manual interpretation of these raw data is difficult without specifications. This task becomes really tedious applied to plenty of devices. The paper introduces the first method to automatically retrieve textual information from memory dumps of smart cards. Given the data structure and encoding are assumed to be unknown, the method is based on text statistics and characteristics of smart cards to discard false positives. The experiments performed on more than 350 memory dumps revealed that the method can automatically retrieve more than 99% of textual information available in a dump, while keeping the false positive rate as low as 5.5%.
Thomas Gougeon, Morgan Barbier, Patrick Lacharme, Gildas Avoine, Christophe Rosenberger
ARES3
2016 Synchronous One Time Biometrics with Pattern Based Authentication
abstract
One time passwords are commonly used for authentication purposes in electronic transactions. Nevertheless, providing such a one time password is not really a strong authentication proof %as it can be given by an impostor. because the token generating the passwords can be given by an impostor. In order to cope with this problem, biometric recognition is more and more employed. Even if biometric data are strongly linked with the user, their revocability nor diversity is possible, without an adapted post-processing. Biometric template protection schemes, including the BioHashing algorithm, are used to manage the underlying privacy and security issues. These schemes are used for the protection of several biometric modalities, but are not necessary adapted for all of them. In this paper, we propose a new protocol combining protected biometric data and a classical synchronous one time password to enhance the security of user authentication while preserving usability and privacy. Behavioral biometrics is used to provide a fast and a usable solution for users. We show through experimental results the efficiency of the proposed method.
Patrick Lacharme, Christophe Rosenberger
ARES1
2016 Memory Carving in Embedded Devices: Separate the Wheat from the Chaff
Thomas Gougeon, Morgan Barbier, Patrick Lacharme, Gildas Avoine, Christophe Rosenberger
ACNS3
2015 Vulnerabilities of fuzzy vault schemes using biometric data with traces
abstract
Biometric cryptosystems represent emerging techniques for biometric template protection. These cryptosystems are vulnerable to different types of attacks, as brute force attacks or correlation attacks if several templates are compromised. Another biometric security issue comes from certain biometric data (as fingerprint or face image) that can leave traces, but are, in the same time, the most commonly biometric modalities used in mobile security. In this paper, a new attack based on the alteration of original user data is investigated on fuzzy Vault biometric cryptosystems. We assume that the attacker uses a modified version of the real user image to gain unauthorized access to the system (mobile phone). Experimental results carried out using fingerprint and face modalities show that this assumption has serious impact on the security of this type of biometric cryptosystems.
Maryam Lafkih, Patrick Lacharme, Christophe Rosenberger, Mounia Mikram, Sanaa Ghouzali, Mohamed El Haziti, Driss Aboutajdine
IWCMC2
2013 A contactless e-health information system with privacy
abstract
E-health information systems give rise to many security and privacy concerns. Security of these systems involves a large amount of sensitive data shared by several actors, such as doctors or nurses in various institutions. However, the privacy preserving issue, including data minimization and data sovereignty, is not necessary treated. This paper presents an e-health infrastructure intended to minimize personal data disclosure, with an access to right system based on a secret sharing. We analyze the security of the proposed infrastructure in accordance with medical constraints through contactless transactions.
Aude Plateaux, Patrick Lacharme, Christophe Rosenberger, Kumar Murty
IWCMC2
2013 Preimage Attack on BioHashing
Patrick Lacharme, Estelle Cherrier, Christophe Rosenberger
SECRYPT1
2013 An e-payment Architecture Ensuring a High Level of Privacy Protection
Aude Plateaux, Patrick Lacharme, Vincent Coquet, Sylvain Vernois, Kumar Murty, Christophe Rosenberger
SecureComm2
2009 Analysis and construction of correctors
abstract
A post-processing function is used to reduce or eliminate statistical weaknesses of physical random number generators. The output bias of a n-bit input m-bit output function is examined, when the input bits are biased. For this purpose, the definition of (n, m, t)-corrector is introduced; many characterizations and properties of a corrector are presented. It appears as a generalization of the notion of resilience for a vectorial function. Several constructions of correctors from old correctors are also proposed.
Patrick Lacharme
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory1
2008 Post-Processing Functions for a Biased Physical Random Number Generator
Patrick Lacharme
FSE1