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D. G. Weber

dblp:46/5479 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 1988
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Operating systems · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security
distributed system security
0.011988
A secure distributed operating system · S&P 1988
Operating systems › distributed systems
distributed operating system
0.011988
A secure distributed operating system · S&P 1988

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

trusted network interpretation · 0.0formal verification · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
1988 Quantitative Formal Security Analysis
D. G. Weber
CSFW1
1988 A secure distributed operating system
abstract
Some issues in distributed system security are discussed in the context of the design of a secure distributed operating system (SDOS). The design is targeted for an A1 rating. Some developments in formal verification methods are reported. Distributed system security is contrasted with single-host and network security, and described in the context of the Trusted Network Interpretation. Problems unique to distributed system security are discussed. An argument is made for implementing security features in higher layers, corresponding roughly to the session through application layers of the OSI model. A security policy based on message-passing rather than reads and writes is described. The SDOS design is summarized.>
Thomas A. Casey Jr., Stephen T. Vinter, D. G. Weber, Rammohan Varadarajan, David Rosenthal
S&P3