Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) leverages quantum effects to address the key distribution problem. Traditionally, its use has been limited to high-tech specialist networks for dedicated, trusted partners. However, advancements in hybrid quantum-classical networks now suggest the potential for QKD-level security on a wider scale.The Isabelle Infrastructure and Insider Framework (IIIf) has demonstrated the ability to formally verify security properties in proof-of-concept QKD models. In this paper, we build on these foundations to extend the formal analysis to real-world multi-photon QKD implementations. We enhance the existing model and show how IIIf’s attack tree analysis exposes threats such as the intercept-and-resend attack and the photon-number splitting (PNS) attack. Furthermore, refinement in IIIf enables the extraction of a formal specification for decoy-state QKD, strengthening security against vulnerabilities.

In this paper, we address security and privacy of air-traffic control systems. Classically these systems are closed proprietary systems. However, air-traffic monitoring systems like flight-radars are decentralized public applications risking loss of confidential information thereby creating security and privacy risks. We propose the use of the Isabelle Insider and Infrastructure framework (IIIf) to alleviate the security specification and verification of air traffic control systems. This paper summarizes the IIIf and then illustrates the use of the framework on the application of a flight path monitoring system. Using the idea of blurring visual data to obfuscate privacy critical data used in GIS systems, we observe that for dynamic systems like flightradars, implicit information flows exist. We propose information hiding as a solution. To show the security of this approach, we present the extension of the IIIf by a formal notion of indistinguishability and prove the central noninterference property for the flight path monitoring application with hiding.

Abstract We present a programming language for describing and analysing concurrent quantum systems. We have an interpreter for programs in the language, using a symbolic rather than a numeric calculator, and we give its performance on examples from quantum communication and cryptography.

In this paper, we investigate the implications of the General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR) on the design of an IoT healthcare system. From 26th May 2018, the GDPR will become mandatory within the European Union and hence also for any supplier of IT products. Breaches of the regulation will be fined with penalties of 20 Million EUR. This is a strong motivation for system designers to enable the proof of compliance to the GDPR. We propose the use of formal modeling and analysis using interactive theorem proving. Based on previous work on modeling infrastructures and security policies for insider attacks, we demonstrate the use of logical modeling and machine assisted verification to support data protection (privacy) by design. We illustrate this process on the case study of IoT based monitoring of Alzheimer's patients that we work on in the CHIST-ERA project SUCCESS.

In this paper, we combine a framework for ethical requirement elicitation eFRIEND with automated reasoning. To provide trustworthy and secure IoT for vulnerable users in healthcare scenarios, we need to apply ethics to arrive at suitable system requirements. In order to map those to technical system requirements, we employ high level logical modeling using dedicated Isabelle frameworks for (1) infrastructures with human actors and security policies, (2) attack tree analysis, and (3) security protocol analysis. Following this outline, we apply these frameworks to a case study for supporting Security and Privacy when diagnosing Alzheimer's patients with smartphone and sensor technology.

In this paper we present a concept for controlling the way information flows in a network by labeling packets and controlling the way they flow inside the network. We introduce the security model which is a simple Distributed Information Flow Control (DIFC) model enabling the definition of security classes for the labels and the security policy. We provide a proof of concept of the proposed Network Information Flow Control using an implementation based on labeling mechanisms that are readily available for Quality of Service (QoS) of VLAN network management devices.

In this paper, we present a formal model and analysis for the security extensions of the Domain Name System (DNSsec) in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. Based on the inductive approach of security protocol analysis by Paulson in Isabelle/HOL, we show how the protocol can be modelled and important properties are proved. We prove that origin authentication works securely. In order to illustrate that the model is adequate, we show that previous domain name requests can be replayed - as in the classical DNS -by an attacker. These replays luckily can be uniquely identified in DNSsec due to the origin authentication mechanism that we establish to enhance security.

We use the technique of interactive theorem proving to develop the theory and an enumeration technique for finite idempotent relations. Starting from a short mathematical characterization of finite idempotents defined and proved in Isabelle/HOL, we derive first an iterative procedure to generate all instances of idempotents over a finite set. From there, we develop a more precise theoretical characterization giving rise to an efficient predicate that can be executed in the programming language ML. Idempotent relations represent a very basic, general mathematical concept but the steps taken to develop their theory with the help of Isabelle/HOL are representative for developing algorithms from a mathematical specification.

Abstract In this paper, we describe the application of the interactive theorem prover Coq to the security analysis of bytecode as used in Java. We provide a generic specification and proof of non-interference for bytecode languages using the Coq module system. We illustrate the use of this formalization by applying it to a small subset of Java bytecode. The emphasis of the paper is on modularity of a language formalization and its analysis in a machine proof.

We present an extension of the development method Fusion/ UML that translates the results of analysis and design into the formal specification language Object-Z. The extended process establishes a consistency relationship between analysis and design. Furthermore, a formal specification for the implementation is produced.