The ability to rapidly estimate non-symbolic numerical quantities is a well-conserved sense across species with clear evolutionary advantages. However, despite its importance, this sense is surprisingly imprecise and biased, and a formal explanation for this seemingly irrational behavior remains unclear. We develop a unified normative theory of numerosity estimation that parsimoniously incorporates in a single framework information processing constraints alongside (i) Brownian diffusion noise to capture the effects of time exposure of sensory information, (ii) logarithmic encoding of numerosity representations, and (iii) optimal inference via Bayesian decoding. We show that for a given allowable biological capacity constraint our model naturally endogenizes time perception during noisy efficient encoding to predict the complete posterior distribution of numerosity estimates. This model accurately predicts many features of human numerosity estimation as a function of temporal exposure, indicating that humans can rapidly and efficiently sample numerosity information over time. Additionally, we demonstrate how our model fundamentally differs from a thermodynamically-inspired formalization of bounded rationality, where information processing is modeled as acting to shift away from default states. The mechanism we propose is the likely origin of a variety of numerical cognition patterns observed in humans and other animals.

The efficient coding approach proposes that neural systems represent as much sensory information as biological constraints allow. It aims at formalizing encoding as a constrained optimal process. A different approach, that aims at formalizing decoding, proposes that neural systems instantiate a generative model of the sensory world. Here, we put forth a normative framework that characterizes neural systems as jointly optimizing encoding and decoding. It takes the form of a variational autoencoder: sensory stimuli are encoded in the noisy activity of neurons to be interpreted by a flexible decoder; encoding must allow for an accurate stimulus reconstruction from neural activity. Jointly, neural activity is required to represent the statistics of latent features which are mapped by the decoder into distributions over sensory stimuli; decoding correspondingly optimizes the accuracy of the generative model. This framework yields in a family of encoding-decoding models, which result in equally accurate generative models, indexed by a measure of the stimulus-induced deviation of neural activity from the marginal distribution over neural activity. Each member of this family predicts a specific relation between properties of the sensory neurons-such as the arrangement of the tuning curve means (preferred stimuli) and widths (degrees of selectivity) in the population-as a function of the statistics of the sensory world. Our approach thus generalizes the efficient coding approach. Notably, here, the form of the constraint on the optimization derives from the requirement of an accurate generative model, while it is arbitrary in efficient coding models. Moreover, solutions do not require the knowledge of the stimulus distribution, but are learned on the basis of data samples; the constraint further acts as regularizer, allowing the model to generalize beyond the training data. Finally, we characterize the family of models we obtain through alternate measures of performance, such as the error in stimulus reconstruction. We find that a range of models admits comparable performance; in particular, a population of sensory neurons with broad tuning curves as observed experimentally yields both low reconstruction stimulus error and an accurate generative model that generalizes robustly to unseen data.

Base-rate neglect is a pervasive bias in judgment that is conceptualized as underweighting of prior information and can have serious consequences in real-world scenarios. This bias is thought to reflect variability in inferential processes but empirical support for a cohesive theory of base-rate neglect with sufficient explanatory power to account for longer-term and real-world beliefs is lacking. A Bayesian formalization of base-rate neglect in the context of sequential belief updating predicts that belief trajectories should exhibit dynamic patterns of dependence on the order in which evidence is presented and its consistency with prior beliefs. To test this, we developed a novel 'urn-and-beads' task that systematically manipulated the order of colored bead sequences and elicited beliefs via an incentive-compatible procedure. Our results in two independent online studies confirmed the predictions of the sequential base-rate neglect model: people exhibited beliefs that are more influenced by recent evidence and by evidence inconsistent with prior beliefs. We further found support for a noisy-sampling inference model whereby base-rate neglect results from rational discounting of noisy internal representations of prior beliefs. Finally, we found that model-derived indices of base-rate neglect-including noisier prior representation-correlated with propensity for unusual beliefs outside the laboratory. Our work supports the relevance of Bayesian accounts of sequential base-rate neglect to real-world beliefs and hints at strategies to minimize deleterious consequences of this pervasive bias.

Perception, in theoretical neuroscience, has been modeled as the encoding of external stimuli into internal signals, which are then decoded. The Bayesian mean is an important decoder, as it is optimal for purposes of both estimation and discrimination. We present widely-applicable approximations to the bias and to the variance of the Bayesian mean, obtained under the minimal and biologically-relevant assumption that the encoding results from a series of independent, though not necessarily identically-distributed, signals. Simulations substantiate the accuracy of our approximations in the small-noise regime. The bias of the Bayesian mean comprises two components: one driven by the prior, and one driven by the precision of the encoding. If the encoding is 'efficient', the two components have opposite effects; their relative strengths are determined by the objective that the encoding optimizes. The experimental literature on perception reports both 'Bayesian' biases directed towards prior expectations, and opposite, 'anti-Bayesian' biases. We show that different tasks are indeed predicted to yield such contradictory biases, under a consistently-optimal encoding-decoding model. Moreover, we recover Wei and Stocker's "law of human perception", a relation between the bias of the Bayesian mean and the derivative of its variance, and show how the coefficient of proportionality in this law depends on the task at hand. Our results provide a parsimonious theory of optimal perception under constraints, in which encoding and decoding are adapted both to the prior and to the task faced by the observer.

In recent studies of humans estimating non-stationary probabilities, estimates appear to be unbiased on average, across the full range of probability values to be estimated. This finding is surprising given that experiments measuring probability estimation in other contexts have often identified conservatism: individuals tend to overestimate low probability events and underestimate high probability events. In other contexts, repulsive biases have also been documented, with individuals producing judgments that tend toward extreme values instead. Using extensive data from a probability estimation task that produces unbiased performance on average, we find substantial biases at the individual level; we document the coexistence of both conservative and repulsive biases in the same experimental context. Individual biases persist despite extensive experience with the task, and are also correlated with other behavioral differences, such as individual variation in response speed and adjustment rates. We conclude that the rich computational demands of our task give rise to a variety of behavioral patterns, and that the apparent unbiasedness of the pooled data is an artifact of the aggregation of heterogeneous biases.