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Yinghui Huang 0001

dblp:48/7765-1 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Trustworthy machine learning · 100%
Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › adversarial machine learning
jailbreak attack
0.912025
ProAdvPrompter: A Two-Stage Journey to Effective Adversarial Prompting for LLMs · ICLR 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › large language model attack
adversarial prompts
0.912025
ProAdvPrompter: A Two-Stage Journey to Effective Adversarial Prompting for LLMs · ICLR 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

two-stage fine-tuning · 1.7perplexity-based defense · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 ProAdvPrompter: A Two-Stage Journey to Effective Adversarial Prompting for LLMs
abstract
As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various real-world applications, the identification of their vulnerabilities to jailbreaking attacks becomes an essential component of ensuring the safety and reliability of LLMs. Previous studies have developed LLM assistants, known as the adversarial prompter, to automatically generate suffixes that manipulate target LLMs into generating harmful and undesirable outputs. However, these approaches often suffer from low performance or generate semantically meaningless prompts, which can be easily identified by perplexity-based defenses. In this paper, we introduce a novel two-stage method, $\texttt{ProAdvPrompter}$, that significantly improves the performance of adversarial prompters. In $\texttt{ProAdvPrompter}$, the first stage (Exploration) utilizes the loss information to guide the adversarial prompter in generating suffixes that are more likely to elicit harmful responses. Then the second stage (Exploitation) iteratively fine-tunes the prompter using high-quality generated adversarial suffixes to further boost performance. Additionally, we incorporate the prompt template to aid in the Exploration stage and propose a filtering mechanism to accelerate the training process in the Exploitation stage. We evaluate $\texttt{ProAdvPrompter}$ against the well-aligned LLMs (i.e., Llama2-Chat-7B and Llama3-chat-8B), achieving attack success rates of 99.68% and 97.12% respectively after 10 trials on the AdvBench dataset, thereby enhancing performance by $\sim 2$ times compared to previous works. Moreover, $\texttt{ProAdvPrompter}$ reduces training time by 20% on Llama3-Instruct-8B, generates more generalized adversarial suffixes, and demonstrates resilience against the perplexity defense. An ablation study further evaluates the effects of key components in $\texttt{ProAdvPrompter}$ (the prompt template and the filtering mechanism).
Hao Di, Haishan Ye, Yinghui Huang 0001, Xiangyu Chang, Guang Dai, Ivor W. Tsang
ICLR4