Recruiting users in mobile crowdsensing (MCS) can make the platform obtain high-quality data to provide better services. Although the privacy leakage during the process of user recruitment has received a lot of research attention, none of the existing work considers the evaluation of the sensing quality of privacy-preserving data submitted by users, which makes the platform incapable of recruiting users suitably to obtain high-quality sensing data, thereby reducing the reliability of MCS services. To solve this problem, we first propose a sensing quality evaluation method based on the deviation and variance of sensing data. According to it, the platform can obtain the sensing quality of privacy-preserving data for each user during the recruitment. Then we model the user recruitment with a limited budget platform as aCombinatorial Multi-Armed Bandit (CMAB)game to determine the recruited users based on the sensing quality of data obtained by evaluation. Finally, we theoretically prove that our algorithm satisfies differential privacy and the upper bound on theregretof rewards is restricted. Experimental results show that our proposal is superior in various properties, and our method has a 73.67% advantage in accumulated sensing qualities compared with comparison schemes.

To motivate data owners’ (DOs’) trading willingness, the existing incentive mechanisms allow DOs to independently disturb data following data consumer's (DC’s) availability requirement. However, they cannot motivate DOs’ honest disturbance, which is attributed to DOs’ independent disturbance without any supervision. Thus, we implement an incentive mechanism for privacy preserved data trading with verifiable data disturbance where an honest-but-curious disturbance generator (DG) is additionally introduced to supervise DOs’ local disturbance and assist disturbance verification between DOs and DC. Specifically, DG generates the disturbance strategies and secretly distributes to DOs following private information retrieval, guaranteeing DOs's local disturbance's privacy and verifiability with our proposed three-level verification algorithm. Subsequently, we model the trading as a game and disturbance verification results determine the compensation and punishment for trading bilateral utilities following Nash Equilibrium where DOs honestly disturb data. Theoretical analysis shows that DOs are motivated to honestly disturb data and their raw data privacy is preserved. Extensive experiments using the real-world dataset demonstrate that the deviating DOs in our scheme can be verified with a probability of more than 90% and the statistical result accuracy can be improved by more than 80% compared with the existing works.

Perturbation-based privacy-preserving truth discovery requires the Service Provider (SP) to calculate the truthful aggregation result from perturbed data of the Data Sources (DSs), which inevitably damages the aggregation accuracy due to perturbation noise added in the data. Thus, the existing works attempt to relieve the perturbation errors by reducing noise amounts or adjusting aggregation weights of DSs. However, the former sacrifices DSs' privacy preservation and the latter has the limited accuracy recovery performance. Aiming at it, we propose an accuracy-enabling differential privacy-preserving truth discovery consisting of an independence-guaranteed data perturbation module and a progressive-private noise elimination module. Specifically, in the first module, SP generates mass of noises following DS's desired perturbation parameters and DS privately obtains one of noise based on private information retrieval. Meanwhile, to realize the perturbation's traceability, SP preserves the ciphertext of DSs' acquired noises, assisting the following noise elimination. In the second module, SP first removes his preserved DS's encrypted noise from perturbed truth according to homomorphic encryption, and then requires DS to decrypt this cleaned truth. The above two processes are progressively and iteratively implemented until all DSs have been involved. Theoretical analysis shows that our scheme can protect DSs' raw data privacy in both truth discovery process and noise elimination process. Extensive experiments using the real-world dataset demonstrate that our scheme can effectively eliminate more than 90% of the perturbation noise effects on the truth discovery accuracy.

To motivate data owner (DO) to trade data, the existing data trading allows DO to sell the disturbed data to the data consumer (DC), where the disturbance parameter and the data price are negotiated by them, and DO independently adds the disturbance noise to data (usually continuous type) following the negotiation result. However, DOs may violate the negotiated parameter and add more noise to data while obtaining the negotiated price, which damages DC's disturbed data availability. This deficiency is rooted in the absence of supervision and verifiability on DOs' independent disturbances. Aiming at the above problem, we devise a privacy-preserved data trading via verifiable data disturbance. Specifically, the honest-but-curious disturbance server (DS) is introduced to generate encrypted verifiable disturbance noises, and secretly distribute noises to DOs referring to the method of private information retrieval. Using homomorphic encryption, DOs finish data disturbance without knowing noises' specific sizes. Subsequently, DC selects DOs to verify with our proposed anti-forgery verification, where the anti-forgery on both disturbance noise and original data guarantees verification correctness. Theoretical analysis proves that DOs' original data is preserved in data trading. Extensive experiments using the real-world dataset demonstrate that our scheme can detect more than 80% of malicious DOs and decrease their utilities to punish malicious disturbance compared with existing works.

Federated Learning (FL) is an emerging distributed machine learning paradigm crucial for ensuring privacy-preserving learning. In FL, a fair incentive mechanism is indispensable for inspiring more clients to participate in FL training. Nevertheless, achieving a fair incentive mechanism in FL is an arduous endeavor, underscored by two significant challenges that persistently elude resolution within existing methodologies. Firstly, existing works overlook the issue of category distribution heterogeneity in contribution evaluation, leading to incomplete contribution evaluations. Secondly, the fact that malicious servers will dishonestly allocate rewards to save costs is not considered in existing work, which can be a barrier to client participation in FL. This paper introduces FDFL (Fair andDiscrepancy-aware incentive mechanism forFederatedLearning), a novel system addressing these concerns. FDFL encompasses two key elements: 1) Discrepancy-aware contribution evaluation approach; 2) Provable reward allocation approach. Extensive experiments on four model-dataset combinations demonstrate that, under the heterogeneous setting, our scheme improves accuracy by an average of 9.85% and 11.97% compared to FedAvg and FAIR, respectively.

The advanced data trading allows data generator’s (DG) disturbed data to be traded as both initial and reselling trading modes, which meets DG’s raw data privacy and data consumers’ (DCs) vast data requirement. However, the traded data truthfulness verifiability cannot be guaranteed in the privacy-preserved way. Firstly, due to DG’s independent and random disturbance, DC cannot verify whether the traded data is disturbed under his required disturbance parameter without carrying privacy leakage on DG. Secondly, because the reselling trading is allowed, DC can hardly verify the traded data’s origin truthfulness under the deceiving of data reseller (DR) while protecting his purchase privacy. Aiming at the above problems, we propose the privacy-preserved data disturbance and truthfulness verification for data trading. Specifically, an honest-but-curious trading server (TS) is introduced to assist our devised private-verifiable imprint-embedded disturbance method where imprint is blinding. Subsequently, TS implements the adaptive truthfulness verification by constructing imprint-embedded individual verification formula and requiring verified participants to decrypt the formula result. The verified participants cannot inform the blinding imprint value to forge the correct result, ensuring the accuracy of the devised verification method. Theoretical analysis proves that participants’ privacy is preserved and the traded data’s truthfulness can be guaranteed. Extensive experiments using the real-world dataset demonstrate that without any extra privacy cost, our scheme verifies 100% untruthful traded data compared with the existing solutions’ 50%.

To motivate users' assistance for protecting others' location privacy by distributedK-anonymity in Location-Based Service (LBS), many incentive mechanisms have been proposed, where users obtain monetary compensation for their assistance. However, most existing distributedK-anonymity incentive mechanisms rely on trusted third parties and ignore users' malicious strategies, which destroys LBS's distributed structure as well as leads to users' privacy leakage and incentive ineffectiveness. To solve the above problems, we propose aPrivacy-Enhanced incentive mechAnism for distributedK-anonymity (PEAK). With determining the monetary transaction relationship and location transmission between users, PEAK enables the anonymous cloaking region construction without the trusted server. Meanwhile, PEAK devises role identification mechanism and accountability mechanism to restrain and punish malicious users, which protects users' location privacy and implements effective motivation on users' assistance. Theoretical analysis based on the game theory shows that PEAK constrains users' malicious strategies while satisfying individual rationality, computational efficiency, and satisfaction ratio. Extensive experiments based on the real-world dataset demonstrate that PEAK improves security and feasibility, especially reaching the success rate of anonymous cloaking region construction to more than 90$\%$and decreasing the malicious users' utilities significantly.

Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) has been applied in various fields to realize data sharing, where multiple platforms and multiple Mobile Users () have appeared recently. However, aiming at mutual selection, the existing works ignore making ’ utilities with the limited resources and platforms’ utilities while achieving the desired sensing data quality maximum as far as possible. Thus, they cannot motivate both and platforms to participate. To address this problem, standing on both sides of and platforms with conflicting interests, we propose a Progressive two-stage Auction-based Multi-platform Multi-user Mutual Selection scheme (). Specifically, in, we treat mutual selection as a two-stage auction and devise the auction models for and platform using forward and reverse auction ideas, presenting and maximizing the utilities from their respective perspectives. Then, based on the proposed progressive two-stage auction structure, we adopt 0-1 knapsack and Myerson’s price theory to construct the first stage -oriented auction and the second stage platform-oriented auction, achieving devised models. Theoretical analysis shows that is economically robust. Extensive experiments on the real dataset demonstrate that respectively promotes platforms’ and ’ utilities by 76.23% and 10.74 times, compared with the existing works.

To motivate users to submit high quality data for mobile crowdsensing (MCS), some quality-aware incentive mechanisms have been proposed, which recruit and pay users strategically. However, in the existing mechanisms, the recruitment based only on tasks matching degree leads to the ineffective insistent data quality incentive. Meanwhile, the absence of the reasonable payment strategy cannot motivate users to submit high quality data in the current task. To address the above problems, we propose anOnlineall-phase quality-awareincentive mechanism (Oasis) to realize the quality incentive in both recruitment and payment phases. With the knapsack secretary, Oasis first devises a quality-aware pre-budgeting recruitment strategy, which decides whether the arriving user's long-term data quality and bid satisfy the recruited criterion. Then, in the payment phase, Oasis evaluates and updates the current and long-term data qualities of users. Based on the evaluation results, a two-level payment strategy is devised employing the Myerson theorem, where users submitting higher quality data can obtain more utilities under the budget constraint. Theoretical analysis proves that Oasis satisfies economic feasibility and constant competitiveness while achieving quality incentive in recruitment and payment phases. Extensive experiments using the real-world dataset demonstrate that the sensing result accuracy of Oasis increases 67% compared with the existing works.

Distributed spatial cloaking (DSC) enables users to enjoy precise location-based service (LBS) with location privacy preserving. An incentive mechanism is necessary to encourage users to cooperate. However, due to the inappropriate design of incentive mechanisms, the existing works cause low user benefits and fail to encourage users, ruining the expected incentive effect. Moreover, introducing a third party to manage users’ information also causes the existing works to disclose users’ privacy and be unpractical. To address these issues, we propose a utility-aware incentive mechanism-based distributed spatial cloaking (RESAT). By the idea of utility theory and optimization theory, RESAT devises basic and extended incentive mechanisms. The two mechanisms for assuming that all users are honest and that malicious users provide unreasonable locations. RESAT proposes an incentive mechanism-based cloaking cooperation without a third party, incorporating the developed mechanisms based on the blind signature. Theoretical analysis indicates that RESAT achieves incentive compatibility and is secure. Extensive experiments on the real data set show that compared with the existing works, RESAT enables 1 time more users to cooperate at best while eliminating the malicious behaviors that provide unreasonable locations. The required DSC construction time delay is limited.