Shared memory concurrency is pervasive in modern programming, including in systems that must protect highly sensitive data. Recently, verification has finally emerged as a practical tool for proving interesting security properties of real programs, particularly information flow control (IFC) security. Yet there remain no general logics for verifying IFC security of shared-memory concurrent programs. In this paper we present the first such logic, COVERN (Compositional Verification of Noninterference) and its proof of soundness via a new generic framework for general rely-guarantee IFC reasoning. We apply COVERN to model and verify the security-critical software functionality of the Cross Domain Desktop Compositor, an embedded device that facilitates simultaneous and intuitive user interaction with multiple classified networks while preventing leakage between them. To our knowledge this is the first foundational, machine-checked proof of IFC security for a non-trivial shared-memory concurrent program in the literature.

We report on a machine-checked verification of safety for a state-of-the-art, on-the-fly, concurrent, mark-sweep garbage collector that is designed for multi-core architectures with weak memory consistency. The proof explicitly incorporates the relaxed memory semantics of x86 multiprocessors. To our knowledge, this is the first fully machine-checked proof of safety for such a garbage collector. We couch the proof in a framework that system implementers will find appealing, with the fundamental components of the system specified in a simple and intuitive programming language. The abstract model is detailed enough for its correspondence with an assembly language implementation to be straightforward.

This paper addresses the question of how TA-security, a semantics for intransitive information-flow policies in deterministic systems, can be generalized to nondeterministic systems. Various definitions are proposed, including definitions that state that the system enforces as much of the policy as possible in the context of attacks in which groups of agents collude by sharing information through channels that lie outside the system. Relationships between the various definitions proposed are characterized, and an unwinding-based proof technique is developed. Finally, it is shown that on a specific class of systems, access control systems with local non-determinism, the strongest definition can be verified by checking a simple static property.

Complete formal verification is the only known way to guarantee that a system is free of programming errors.We present our experience in performing the formal, machine-checked verification of the seL4 microkernel from an abstract specification down to its C implementation. We assume correctness of compiler, assembly code, and hardware, and we used a unique design approach that fuses formal and operating systems techniques. To our knowledge, this is the first formal proof of functional correctness of a complete, general-purpose operating-system kernel. Functional correctness means here that the implementation always strictly follows our high-level abstract specification of kernel behaviour. This encompasses traditional design and implementation safety properties such as the kernel will never crash, and it will never perform an unsafe operation. It also proves much more: we can predict precisely how the kernel will behave in every possible situation.seL4, a third-generation microkernel of L4 provenance, comprises 8,700 lines of C code and 600 lines of assembler. Its performance is comparable to other high-performance L4 kernels.

Abstract Our own basic intuitions are presented when introducing the method developed by Abadi and Lamport in [AbL88a] for proving refinement between specifications of nondeterministic programs correct to people unacquainted with it. The example we use to illustrate this method is a nontrivial communication protocol that provides a mechanism analogous to message passing between migrating processes within a fixed finite network of nodes due to Kleinman, Moscowitz, Pnueli and Shapiro [KMP91]. Especially the cruel last step of a three step refinement proof of that protocol gives rise to a deeper understanding of, and some small enhancements to, Abadi and Lamport's 1988 method.