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Duane E. Olawsky

dblp:55/2725 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
0since 2021 · last 1996
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-authorSecurity and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Information extraction and text analysis · 77% Question answering and dialogue systems · 23%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Natural language and speech › Information extraction and text analysis › natural language semantics
semantic interpretation
0.011989
The Lexical Semantics of Comparative Expressions in a Multi-Level Semantic Processor · ACL 1989
Natural language and speech › Question answering and dialogue systems › natural language interface
natural language database interface
0.011989
The Lexical Semantics of Comparative Expressions in a Multi-Level Semantic Processor · ACL 1989

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

multi-level semantic processing · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
1996 Developing and using a "policy neutral" access control policy
abstract
The foundation for security enforcement is access control.Resources must be protected against access by unauthorized entities.Furthermore, authorized entities must be prevented from accessing resources in inappropriate ways.A major challenge to the developer of an access control policy is to provide users the flexibility to protect their resources as they see fit; system policies that am inconsistent with user needs are inadequate.In particular, systems that enforce a single, hard-coded policy cannot satisfy the needs of all users.As part of the Distributed Trusted Operating System (DTOS) program, we have developed and implemented a flexible security architecture using the Mach microkemel.In this architecture, the security rules enforced by the system are defined by a system component outside the microkemel.This reduces the problem of sup porting other security policies to redefining this system component; the same microkemel can be used to support a wide range of policies.Formal methods were used to provide a rigorous approach for the development of the policy.Recognizing that most people are uninterested in reading security requirements stated in formal specification languages, an approach was developed for representing and maintaining the policy in a tabular format.This paper describes the flexibility of the DTOS security architecture and the approach used in developing the access control policy for this flexible architecture.It also gives examples of how to detine a component that makes security decisions for the microkernel.''This work was suppxted in patt by the Maryland F'mcurement Office, contract MDA904-93C-4209 and was performed in cooperation with mscarchers at the Information Security Computer Science Rcseaxh Division of the Department of Jkfense.
Duane E. Olawsky, Todd Fine, Edward A. Schneider, Ray Spencer
NSPW1
1989 The Lexical Semantics of Comparative Expressions in a Multi-Level Semantic Processor
abstract
Comparative expressions (CEs) such as "bigger than" and "more oranges than" are highly ambiguous, and their meaning is context dependent. Thus, they pose problems for the semantic interpretation algorithms typically used in natural language database interfaces. We focus on the comparison attribute ambiguities that occur with CEs. To resolve these ambiguities our natural language interface interacts with the user, finding out which of the possible interpretations was intended. Our multi-level semantic processor facilitates this interaction by recognizing the occurrence of comparison attribute ambiguity and then calculating and presenting a list of candidate comparison attributes from which the user may choose.
Duane E. Olawsky
ACL1