Strategic diffusion encourages participants to take active roles in promoting stakeholders’ agendas by rewarding successful referrals. As social media continues to transform the way people communicate, strategic diffusion has become a powerful tool for stakeholders to influence people’s decisions or behaviors for desired objectives. Existing reward mechanisms for strategic diffusion are usually either vulnerable to falsename attacks or not individually rational for participants that have made successful referrals. Here, we introduce a novel multi-winner contests (MWC) mechanism for strategic diffusion in social networks. The MWC mechanism satisfies several desirable properties, including false-name-proofness, individual rationality, budget constraint, monotonicity, and subgraph constraint. Numerical experiments on four real-world social network datasets demonstrate that stakeholders can significantly boost participants’ aggregated efforts with proper design of competitions. Our work sheds light on how to design manipulation-resistant mechanisms with appropriate contests.

The extreme learning machine (ELM) is famous for its single hidden-layer feed-forward neural network which results in much faster learning speed comparing with traditional machine learning techniques. Moreover, extensions of ELM achieve stable classification performances for imbalanced data. In this paper, we introduce a hybrid method combining the extended Kalman filter (EKF) with cost-sensitive dissimilar ELM (CS-D-ELM). The raw data are preprocessed by EKF to produce inputs for the CS-D-ELM classifier. Experimental results show that the proposed method is more suitable for real-time fault diagnosis of air handling units than traditional approaches.

Highly automated robot ecologies (HARE), or societies of independent autonomous robots or agents, are rapidly becoming an important part of much of the world's critical infrastructure. As with human societies, regulation, wherein a governing body designs rules and processes for the society, plays an important role in ensuring that HARE meet societal objectives. However, to date, a careful study of interactions between a regulator and HARE is lacking. In this paper, we report on three user studies which give insights into how to design systems that allow people, acting as the regulatory authority, to effectively interact with HARE. As in the study of political systems in which governments regulate human societies, our studies analyze how interactions between HARE and regulators are impacted by regulatory power and individual (robot or agent) autonomy. Our results show that regulator power, decision support, and adaptive autonomy can each diminish the social welfare of HARE, and hint at how these seemingly desirable mechanisms can be designed so that they become part of successful HARE.