Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Alexey Kurakin
dblp:56/9834 · also Alex Kurakin
· DBLP profile ↗
15ranked-venue papers
1as first author
7since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0008-5952-9394ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 14 · 1 first-author · 7 since 2021Security and privacy · 1Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
10 papers |
Trustworthy machine learning · 40% Learning paradigms · 22% Optimization for machine learning · 15% | |
| Network and information security
4 papers |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 60% Privacy and data protection · 40% |
Topics — the 26 heaviest of 28, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness |
1.6 | 4 | 2023 | RETVec: Resilient and Efficient Text Vectorizer · NeurIPS 2023 Enabling certification of verification-agnostic networks via memory-efficient semidefinite programming · NeurIPS 2020 Adversarial Examples that Fool both Computer Vision and Time-Limited Humans · NeurIPS 2018 |
Machine learning › Learning paradigms
semi-supervised learning |
1.4 | 3 | 2022 | AdaMatch: A Unified Approach to Semi-Supervised Learning and Domain Adaptation · ICLR 2022 FixMatch: Simplifying Semi-Supervised Learning with Consistency and Confidence · NeurIPS 2020 ReMixMatch: Semi-Supervised Learning with Distribution Matching and Augmentation Anchoring · ICLR 2020 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › adversarial robustness
adversarial transferability |
0.7 | 2 | 2018 | Adversarial Examples that Fool both Computer Vision and Time-Limited Humans · NeurIPS 2018 Ensemble Adversarial Training: Attacks and Defenses · ICLR (Poster) 2018 |
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy
differentially private learning |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | How to DP-fy ML: A Practical Tutorial to Machine Learning with Differential Privacy · KDD 2023 |
Privacy and data protection
differential privacy |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | How to DP-fy ML: A Practical Tutorial to Machine Learning with Differential Privacy · KDD 2023 |
Machine learning › Transfer learning and domain adaptation
domain adaptation |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | AdaMatch: A Unified Approach to Semi-Supervised Learning and Domain Adaptation · ICLR 2022 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Handcrafted Backdoors in Deep Neural Networks · NeurIPS 2022 |
Machine learning › Learning paradigms › semi-supervised learning
consistency regularization |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | FixMatch: Simplifying Semi-Supervised Learning with Consistency and Confidence · NeurIPS 2020 |
Machine learning › Optimization for machine learning
convex relaxation |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Enabling certification of verification-agnostic networks via memory-efficient semidefinite programming · NeurIPS 2020 |
Machine learning › Deep learning architectures and training
data augmentation |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | ReMixMatch: Semi-Supervised Learning with Distribution Matching and Augmentation Anchoring · ICLR 2020 |
Machine learning › Transfer learning and domain adaptation
distribution matching |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | ReMixMatch: Semi-Supervised Learning with Distribution Matching and Augmentation Anchoring · ICLR 2020 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
neural network verification |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Enabling certification of verification-agnostic networks via memory-efficient semidefinite programming · NeurIPS 2020 |
Machine learning › Learning paradigms › semi-supervised learning
pseudo-labeling |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | FixMatch: Simplifying Semi-Supervised Learning with Consistency and Confidence · NeurIPS 2020 |
Machine learning › Optimization for machine learning › convex optimization
semidefinite programming |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Enabling certification of verification-agnostic networks via memory-efficient semidefinite programming · NeurIPS 2020 |
Machine learning › Optimization for machine learning › convex relaxation
semidefinite programming relaxation |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Enabling certification of verification-agnostic networks via memory-efficient semidefinite programming · NeurIPS 2020 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
model stealing |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | High Accuracy and High Fidelity Extraction of Neural Networks · USENIX Security Symposium 2020 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › model stealing
neural network extraction |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | High Accuracy and High Fidelity Extraction of Neural Networks · USENIX Security Symposium 2020 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial attack |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Ensemble Adversarial Training: Attacks and Defenses · ICLR (Poster) 2018 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial examples |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Adversarial Examples that Fool both Computer Vision and Time-Limited Humans · NeurIPS 2018 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial robustness |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Ensemble Adversarial Training: Attacks and Defenses · ICLR (Poster) 2018 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › adversarial robustness
adversarial training |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Ensemble Adversarial Training: Attacks and Defenses · ICLR (Poster) 2018 |
Machine learning › Optimization for machine learning
evolutionary computation |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Large-Scale Evolution of Image Classifiers · ICML 2017 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning › automated machine learning
neural architecture search |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Large-Scale Evolution of Image Classifiers · ICML 2017 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Adversarial Machine Learning at Scale · ICLR (Poster) 2017 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial defense |
0.3 | 1 | 2017 | Adversarial Machine Learning at Scale · ICLR (Poster) 2017 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › privacy
privacy-preserving machine learning |
0.2 | 1 | 2023 | How to DP-fy ML: A Practical Tutorial to Machine Learning with Differential Privacy · KDD 2023 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
differential privacy · 1.3weight manipulation · 1.1backdoor injection · 1.1metric learning · 0.7character encoding · 0.7relative confidence thresholding · 0.6distribution alignment · 0.6mixmatch · 0.4auto-differentiation · 0.4augmentation anchoring · 0.4
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | How to DP-Fy Your Data: A Practical Guide to Generating Synthetic Data With Differential PrivacyabstractHigh quality data is of vital importance for unlocking the full potential of AI for end users. Villalobos et al. stated in 2024 that finding new sources of such data is getting harder as most publicly-available human generated data will soon have been used. Additionally, publicly available data often is not representative of users of a particular system — for example, a research speech dataset of contractors interacting with an AI assistant will likely be more homogeneous, well articulated and self-censored that real world commands that end users will issue. Therefore unlocking high-quality data grounded in real user interactions is of vital interest to both system creators and end users themselves. However, the direct use of user data comes with significant privacy risks, which must be addressed before the data can be used. Differential Privacy (DP) is a well established framework for reasoning about and limiting information leakage, and is a gold standard for protecting user privacy. The focus of this work, Differentially Private Synthetic data, refers to synthetic data that preserves the overall trends of source data (often user-generated), while providing strong privacy guarantees to individuals that contributed to the source dataset. DP synthetic data can unlock the value of datasets that have previously been inaccessible due to privacy concerns. Additionally, DP synthetic data can replace the use of sensitive datasets that previously have only had rudimentary protections like ad-hoc rule-based anonymization. In this survey we explore the full suite of techniques surrounding DP synthetic data, the types of privacy protections different generation approaches can offer, and the state-of-the-art for various modalities including image, tabular, text and federated (decentralized) data. We outline all the components needed in a system that generates DP synthetic data, from sensitive data handling and preparation, to tracking the use of synthetic data and empirical privacy testing. We hope that work will result in increased adoption of DP synthetic data, spur additional research in still underexplored domains, and additionally increase trust in DP synthetic data approaches. Natalia Ponomareva 0001, Zheng Xu 0002, H. Brendan McMahan, Peter Kairouz, Lucas Rosenblatt, Vincent Cohen-Addad, Cristóbal Guzmán, Ryan McKenna, Galen Andrew, Alex Bie, Alexey Kurakin, Morteza Zadimoghaddam, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Andreas Terzis |
J. Artif. Intell. Res. | 12 |
| 2024 | Synthetic Query Generation for Privacy-Preserving Deep Retrieval Systems using Differentially Private Language ModelsabstractAldo Carranza, Rezsa Farahani, Natalia Ponomareva, Alexey Kurakin, Matthew Jagielski, Milad Nasr. Proceedings of the 2024 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (Volume 1: Long Papers). 2024. Aldo G. Carranza, Rezsa Farahani, Natalia Ponomareva 0001, Alexey Kurakin, Matthew Jagielski, Milad Nasr |
NAACL-HLT | 4 |
| 2023 | How to DP-fy ML: A Practical Tutorial to Machine Learning with Differential PrivacyabstractMachine Learning (ML) models are ubiquitous in real world applications and are a constant focus of research. At the same time, the community has started to realize the importance of protecting the privacy of models' training data. Natalia Ponomareva 0001, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Zheng Xu 0002, H. Brendan McMahan, Alexey Kurakin, Chiyaun Zhang |
KDD | 5 |
| 2023 | RETVec: Resilient and Efficient Text VectorizerabstractThis paper describes RETVec, an efficient, resilient, and multilingual text vectorizer designed for neural-based text processing. RETVec combines a novel character encoding with an optional small embedding model to embed words into a 256-dimensional vector space. The RETVec embedding model is pre-trained using pair-wise metric learning to be robust against typos and character-level adversarial attacks. In this paper, we evaluate and compare RETVec to state-of-the-art vectorizers and word embeddings on popular model architectures and datasets. These comparisons demonstrate that RETVec leads to competitive, multilingual models that are significantly more resilient to typos and adversarial text attacks. RETVec is available under the Apache 2 license at https://github.com/google-research/retvec. Elie Bursztein, Marina Zhang, Owen Vallis, Alexey Kurakin |
NeurIPS | 5 |
| 2023 | How to DP-fy ML: A Practical Guide to Machine Learning with Differential PrivacyabstractMachine Learning (ML) models are ubiquitous in real-world applications and are a constant focus of research. Modern ML models have become more complex, deeper, and harder to reason about. At the same time, the community has started to realize the importance of protecting the privacy of the training data that goes into these models. Differential Privacy (DP) has become a gold standard for making formal statements about data anonymization. However, while some adoption of DP has happened in industry, attempts to apply DP to real world complex ML models are still few and far between. The adoption of DP is hindered by limited practical guidance of what DP protection entails, what privacy guarantees to aim for, and the difficulty of achieving good privacy-utility-computation trade-offs for ML models. Tricks for tuning and maximizing performance are scattered among papers or stored in the heads of practitioners, particularly with respect to the challenging task of hyperparameter tuning. Furthermore, the literature seems to present conflicting evidence on how and whether to apply architectural adjustments and which components are “safe” to use with DP. In this survey paper, we attempt to create a self-contained guide that gives an in-depth overview of the field of DP ML. We aim to assemble information about achieving the best possible DP ML model with rigorous privacy guarantees. Our target audience is both researchers and practitioners. Researchers interested in DP for ML will benefit from a clear overview of current advances and areas for improvement. We also include theory-focused sections that highlight important topics such as privacy accounting and convergence. For a practitioner, this survey provides a background in DP theory and a clear step-by-step guide for choosing an appropriate privacy definition and approach, implementing DP training, potentially updating the model architecture, and tuning hyperparameters. For both researchers and practitioners, consistently and fully reporting privacy guarantees is critical, so we propose a set of specific best practices for stating guarantees. With sufficient computation and a sufficiently large training set or supplemental nonprivate data, both good accuracy (that is, almost as good as a non-private model) and good privacy can often be achievable. And even when computation and dataset size are limited, there are advantages to training with even a weak (but still finite) formal DP guarantee. Hence, we hope this work will facilitate more widespread deployments of DP ML models. Natalia Ponomareva 0001, Hussein Hazimeh 0001, Alexey Kurakin, Zheng Xu 0002, Carson Denison, H. Brendan McMahan, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Steve Chien, Abhradeep Thakurta |
J. Artif. Intell. Res. | 3 |
| 2022 | AdaMatch: A Unified Approach to Semi-Supervised Learning and Domain Adaptation
David Berthelot, Rebecca Roelofs, Kihyuk Sohn, Nicholas Carlini, Alexey Kurakin |
ICLR | 5 |
| 2022 | Handcrafted Backdoors in Deep Neural NetworksabstractWhen machine learning training is outsourced to third parties, $backdoor$ $attacks$ become practical as the third party who trains the model may act maliciously to inject hidden behaviors into the otherwise accurate model. Until now, the mechanism to inject backdoors has been limited to $poisoning$. We argue that a supply-chain attacker has more attack techniques available by introducing a $handcrafted$ attack that directly manipulates a model's weights. This direct modification gives our attacker more degrees of freedom compared to poisoning, and we show it can be used to evade many backdoor detection or removal defenses effectively. Across four datasets and four network architectures our backdoor attacks maintain an attack success rate above 96%. Our results suggest that further research is needed for understanding the complete space of supply-chain backdoor attacks. Sanghyun Hong 0001, Nicholas Carlini, Alexey Kurakin |
NeurIPS | 3 |
| 2020 | ReMixMatch: Semi-Supervised Learning with Distribution Matching and Augmentation Anchoring
David Berthelot, Nicholas Carlini, Ekin Dogus Cubuk, Alexey Kurakin, Kihyuk Sohn, Han Zhang 0010, Colin Raffel |
ICLR | 4 |
| 2020 | Enabling certification of verification-agnostic networks via memory-efficient semidefinite programmingabstractConvex relaxations have emerged as a promising approach for verifying properties of neural networks, but widely used using Linear Programming (LP) relaxations only provide meaningful certificates when networks are specifically trained to facilitate verification. This precludes many important applications which involve \emph{verification-agnostic} networks that are not trained specifically to promote verifiability. On the other hand, semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxations have shown success on verification-agnostic networks, such as adversarially trained image classifiers without additional regularization, but do not currently scale beyond small networks due to poor time and space asymptotics. In this work, we propose a first-order dual SDP algorithm that provides (1) any-time bounds (2) requires memory only linear in the total number of network activations and (3) has per-iteration complexity that scales linearly with the complexity of a forward/backward pass through the network. By exploiting iterative eigenvector methods, we express all solver operations in terms of forward and backward passes through the network, enabling efficient use of hardware optimized for deep learning. This allows us to dramatically improve the magnitude of $\ell_\infty$ perturbations for which we can verify robustness verification-agnostic networks ($1\% \to 88\%$ on MNIST, $6\%\to 40\%$ on CIFAR-10). We also demonstrate tight verification for a quadratic stability specification for the decoder of a variational autoencoder. Sumanth Dathathri, Krishnamurthy Dvijotham, Alexey Kurakin, Aditi Raghunathan, Jonathan Uesato, Rudy Bunel, Shreya Shankar, Jacob Steinhardt, Ian J. Goodfellow, Percy Liang, Pushmeet Kohli |
NeurIPS | 3 |
| 2020 | FixMatch: Simplifying Semi-Supervised Learning with Consistency and ConfidenceabstractSemi-supervised learning (SSL) provides an effective means of leveraging unlabeled data to improve a model’s performance. This domain has seen fast progress recently, at the cost of requiring more complex methods. In this paper we propose FixMatch, an algorithm that is a significant simplification of existing SSL methods. FixMatch first generates pseudo-labels using the model’s predictions on weakly-augmented unlabeled images. For a given image, the pseudo-label is only retained if the model produces a high-confidence prediction. The model is then trained to predict the pseudo-label when fed a strongly-augmented version of the same image. Despite its simplicity, we show that FixMatch achieves state-of-the-art performance across a variety of standard semi-supervised learning benchmarks, including 94.93% accuracy on CIFAR-10 with 250 labels and 88.61% accuracy with 40 – just 4 labels per class. We carry out an extensive ablation study to tease apart the experimental factors that are most important to FixMatch’s success. The code is available at https://github.com/google-research/fixmatch. Kihyuk Sohn, David Berthelot, Nicholas Carlini, Han Zhang 0010, Colin Raffel, Ekin Dogus Cubuk, Alexey Kurakin, Chun-Liang Li |
NeurIPS | 8 |
| 2020 | High Accuracy and High Fidelity Extraction of Neural Networks
Matthew Jagielski, Nicholas Carlini, David Berthelot, Alexey Kurakin, Nicolas Papernot |
USENIX Security Symposium | 4 |
| 2018 | Ensemble Adversarial Training: Attacks and Defenses
Florian Tramèr, Alexey Kurakin, Nicolas Papernot, Ian J. Goodfellow, Dan Boneh, Patrick D. McDaniel |
ICLR (Poster) | 2 |
| 2018 | Adversarial Examples that Fool both Computer Vision and Time-Limited HumansabstractMachine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples: small changes to images can cause computer vision models to make mistakes such as identifying a school bus as an ostrich. However, it is still an open question whether humans are prone to similar mistakes. Here, we address this question by leveraging recent techniques that transfer adversarial examples from computer vision models with known parameters and architecture to other models with unknown parameters and architecture, and by matching the initial processing of the human visual system. We find that adversarial examples that strongly transfer across computer vision models influence the classifications made by time-limited human observers. Gamaleldin F. Elsayed, Shreya Shankar, Brian Cheung, Nicolas Papernot, Alexey Kurakin, Ian J. Goodfellow, Jascha Sohl-Dickstein |
NeurIPS | 5 |
| 2017 | Adversarial Machine Learning at Scale
Alexey Kurakin, Ian J. Goodfellow, Samy Bengio |
ICLR (Poster) | 1 |
| 2017 | Large-Scale Evolution of Image ClassifiersabstractNeural networks have proven effective at solving difficult problems but designing their architectures can be challenging, even for image classification problems alone. Our goal is to minimize human participation, so we employ evolutionary algorithms to discover such networks automatically. Despite significant computational requirements, we show that it is now possible to evolve models with accuracies within the range of those published in the last year. Specifically, we employ simple evolutionary techniques at unprecedented scales to discover models for the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets, starting from trivial initial conditions and reaching accuracies of 94.6\% (95.6\% for ensemble) and 77.0\%, respectively. To do this, we use novel and intuitive mutation operators that navigate large search spaces; we stress that no human participation is required once evolution starts and that the output is a fully-trained model. Throughout this work, we place special emphasis on the repeatability of results, the variability in the outcomes and the computational requirements. Esteban Real, Sherry Moore, Andrew Selle, Saurabh Saxena, Yutaka I. Leon-Suematsu, Jie Tan 0001, Quoc V. Le, Alexey Kurakin |
ICML | 8 |