VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Ron Kupfer
dblp:59/10042
· DBLP profile ↗
7ranked-venue papers
2as first author
3since 2021 · last 2023
0009-0004-1491-8020ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 4 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Theory of computation · 2 · 2 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 2 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Computer networks · 1Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Simplicity in Auctions Revisited: The Primitive ComplexityabstractIn this paper we revisit the notion of simplicity in mechanisms. We consider a seller of m heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer with valuation v. We observe that previous attempts to define complexity measures often fail to classify mechanisms that are intuitively considered simple (e.g., the "selling separately" mechanism) as such. We suggest to view a menu as simple if a bundle that maximizes the buyer's profit can be found by conducting a few primitive operations that are considered simple. The primitive complexity of a menu is the number of primitive operations needed to (adaptively) find a profit-maximizing entry in the menu. In this paper, the primitive operation that we study is essentially computing the outcome of the "selling separately" mechanism. Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Kupfer |
EC | 3 |
| 2021 | On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred SelectionsabstractWe study the secretary problem in multi-agent environments. In the standard secretary problem, a sequence of arbitrary awards arrive online, in a random order, and a single decision maker makes an immediate and irrevocable decision whether to accept each award upon its arrival. The requirement to make immediate decisions arises in many cases due to an implicit assumption regarding competition. Namely, if the decision maker does not take the offered award immediately, it will be taken by someone else. We introduce a novel multi-agent secretary model, in which the competition is explicit. In our model, multiple agents compete over the arriving awards, but the decisions need not be immediate; instead, agents may select previous awards as long as they are available (i.e., not taken by another agent). If an award is selected by multiple agents, ties are broken either randomly or according to a global ranking. This induces a multi-agent game in which the time of selection is not enforced by the rules of the games, rather it is an important component of the agent's strategy. We study the structure and performance of equilibria in this game. For random tie breaking, we characterize the equilibria of the game, and show that the expected social welfare in equilibrium is nearly optimal, despite competition among the agents. For ranked tie breaking, we give a full characterization of equilibria in the 3-agent game, and show that as the number of agents grows, the winning probability of every agent under non-immediate selections approaches her winning probability under immediate selections. Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer |
IJCAI | 3 |
| 2021 | Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer |
SAGT | 3 |
| 2020 | An Optimal Elimination Algorithm for Learning a Best ArmabstractWe consider the classic problem of $(\epsilon,\delta)$-\texttt{PAC} learning a best arm where the goal is to identify with confidence $1-\delta$ an arm whose mean is an $\epsilon$-approximation to that of the highest mean arm in a multi-armed bandit setting. This problem is one of the most fundamental problems in statistics and learning theory, yet somewhat surprisingly its worst case sample complexity is not well understood. In this paper we propose a new approach for $(\epsilon,\delta)$-\texttt{PAC} learning a best arm. This approach leads to an algorithm whose sample complexity converges to \emph{exactly} the optimal sample complexity of $(\epsilon,\delta)$-learning the mean of $n$ arms separately and we complement this result with a conditional matching lower bound. More specifically: \begin{itemize} \item The algorithm's sample complexity converges to \emph{exactly} $\frac{n}{2\epsilon^2}\log \frac{1}{\delta}$ as $n$ grows and $\delta \geq \frac{1}{n}$; % \item We prove that no elimination algorithm obtains sample complexity arbitrarily lower than $\frac{n}{2\epsilon^2}\log \frac{1}{\delta}$. Elimination algorithms is a broad class of $(\epsilon,\delta)$-\texttt{PAC} best arm learning algorithms that includes many algorithms in the literature. \end{itemize} When $n$ is independent of $\delta$ our approach yields an algorithm whose sample complexity converges to $\frac{2n}{\epsilon^2} \log \frac{1}{\delta}$ as $n$ grows. In comparison with the best known algorithm for this problem our approach improves the sample complexity by a factor of over 1500 and over 6000 when $\delta\geq \frac{1}{n}$. Avinatan Hassidim, Ron Kupfer, Yaron Singer |
NeurIPS | 2 |
| 2020 | The Adaptive Complexity of Maximizing a Gross Substitutes ValuationabstractIn this paper, we study the adaptive complexity of maximizing a monotone gross substitutes function under a cardinality constraint. Our main result is an algorithm that achieves a 1-epsilon approximation in O(log n) adaptive rounds for any constant epsilon > 0, which is an exponential speedup in parallel running time compared to previously studied algorithms for gross substitutes functions. We show that the algorithmic results are tight in the sense that there is no algorithm that obtains a constant factor approximation in o(log n) rounds. Both the upper and lower bounds are under the assumption that queries are only on feasible sets (i.e., of size at most k). We also show that under a stronger model, where non-feasible queries are allowed, there is no non-adaptive algorithm that obtains an approximation better than 1/2 + epsilon. Both lower bounds extend to the class of OXS functions. Additionally, we conduct experiments on synthetic and real data sets to demonstrate the near-optimal performance and efficiency of the algorithm in practice. Ron Kupfer, Sharon Qian, Eric Balkanski, Yaron Singer |
NeurIPS | 1 |
| 2020 | The Influence of One Strategic Agent on the Core of Stable Matchings
Ron Kupfer |
WINE | 1 |
| 2011 | C-SMART: Efficient seamless cellular phone based patient monitoring systemabstractThis work describes the design of a new mobile health (mHealth) platform for a continuous real time remote patient monitoring named C-SMART. The platform is based on a set of sensors for patient's physiological condition assessment, a mobile phone, and a centralized healthcare utility. C-SMART is implemented on application layer and thus can be compatible to different existing telemedicine and medical data base standards in particular to IEEE 11073. A major concern in the design of the system is given to exploit existing hardware and software resources and thus reduce the platform overhead with minimal user intervention and minimal cost. Another main concern in the design is to make the platform working in a plug and play manner, but yet to give the user maximum control on the system operation. It is enabled by forming a dedicated remote control and installation center and by using an operation menu at the mobile phone. A feasibility test to the platform demonstrated human activity monitoring through a standard mobile phone and a set of accelerometers, and programming of the sensors through the mobile phone. Gaddi Blumrosen, Netanell Avisdris, Ron Kupfer, Boris Rubinsky |
WOWMOM | 3 |