Offline goal-conditioned reinforcement learning (GCRL) is a promising approach for pretraining generalist policies on large datasets of reward-free trajectories, akin to the self-supervised objectives used to train foundation models for computer vision and natural language processing. However, scaling GCRL to longer horizons remains challenging due to the combination of sparse rewards and discounting, which obscures the comparative advantages of primitive actions with respect to distant goals. Hierarchical RL methods achieve strong empirical results on long-horizon goal-reaching tasks, but their reliance on modular, timescale-specific policies and subgoal generation introduces significant additional complexity and hinders scaling to high-dimensional goal spaces. In this work, we introduce an algorithm to train a flat (non-hierarchical) goal-conditioned policy by bootstrapping on subgoal-conditioned policies with advantage-weighted importance sampling. Our approach eliminates the need for a generative model over the (sub)goal space, which we find is key for scaling to high-dimensional control in large state spaces. We further show that existing hierarchical and bootstrapping-based approaches correspond to specific design choices within our derivation. Across a comprehensive suite of state- and pixel-based locomotion and manipulation benchmarks, our method matches or surpasses state-of-the-art offline GCRL algorithms and scales to complex, long-horizon tasks where prior approaches fail. Project page: https://johnlyzhou.github.io/saw/

Cooperation between self-interested individuals is a widespread phenomenon in the natural world, but remains elusive in interactions between artificially intelligent agents. Instead, naïve reinforcement learning algorithms typically converge to Pareto-dominated outcomes in even the simplest of social dilemmas. An emerging literature on opponent shaping has demonstrated the ability to reach prosocial outcomes by influencing the learning of other agents. However, such methods differentiate through the learning step of other agents or optimize for meta-game dynamics, which rely on privileged access to opponents' learning algorithms or exponential sample complexity, respectively. To provide a learning rule-agnostic and sample-efficient alternative, we introduce Reciprocators, reinforcement learning agents which are intrinsically motivated to reciprocate the influence of opponents' actions on their returns. This approach seeks to modify other agents' $Q$-values by increasing their return following beneficial actions (with respect to the Reciprocator) and decreasing it after detrimental actions, guiding them towards mutually beneficial actions without directly differentiating through a model of their policy. We show that Reciprocators can be used to promote cooperation in temporally extended social dilemmas during simultaneous learning. Our code is available at https://github.com/johnlyzhou/reciprocator/.