We implement an agent-based simulation of the response threshold model of reproductive division of labor. Ants in our simulation must perform two tasks in their environment: forage and reproduce. The colony is capable of allocating ant resources to these roles using different division of labor strategies via genetic architectures and plasticity mechanisms. We find that the deterministic allocation strategy of the response threshold model is more robust than the probabilistic allocation strategy. The deterministic allocation strategy is also capable of evolving complex solutions to colony problems like niche construction and recovery from the loss of the breeding caste. In addition, plasticity mechanisms had both positive and negative influence on the emergence of reproductive division of labor. The combination of plasticity mechanisms has an additive and sometimes emergent impact.

We describe the questions and discussions raised at the First Workshop on Social Learning and Cultural Evolution held at theArtificial Life Conference 2016 in Cancún, Mexico in July 2016. The purpose of the workshop was to assemble artificial life researchers interested in social learning and cultural evolution into one group so that we could focus on recent work and interesting open questions. Our discussion related to both the mechanisms of social learning and cultural evolution and the consequences and influence of social learning and cultural evolution on living systems. We present the contributions of our workshop presenters and conclude with a discussion of the more important open questions in this area.

Sexual reproductive behavior has a necessary social coordination component as willing and capable partners must both be in the right place at the right time. It has recently been demonstrated that many social organizations that support sexual reproduction can evolve in the absence of social coordination between agents (e.g. herding, assortative mating, and natal philopatry). In this paper we explore these results by including social transfer mechanisms to our agents and contrasting their reproductive behavior with a control group without social transfer mechanisms. We conclude that similar behaviors emerge in our social learning agents as those that emerged in the non-social learning agents. Social learners were more inclined towards natal philopatry. Social learners also evolved a culture of eusociality including reproductive division of labor.

We present a model for evolving agents using both genetic and cultural inheritance mechanisms. Within each agent our model maintains two distinct information stores we call the genome and the memome. Processes of adaptation are modeled as evolutionary processes at each level of adaptation (phylogenetic, ontogenetic, sociogenetic). We review relevant competing models and we show how our model improves on previous attempts to model genetic and cultural evolutionary processes. In particular we argue our model can achieve divergent gene-culture co-evolution.

Divergent cumulative cultural evolution occurs when the cultural evolutionary trajectory diverges from the biological evolutionary trajectory.We consider the conditions under which divergent cumulative cultural evolution can occur.We hypothesize that two conditions are necessary.First that genetic and cultural information are stored separately in the agent.Second cultural information must be transferred horizontally between agents of different generations.We implement a model with these properties and show evidence of divergent cultural evolution under both cooperative and competitive selection pressures.

Sexual reproductive behavior has a necessary social coordination component as willing and capable partners must both be in the right place at the right time. While there are many known social behavioral adaptations to support solutions to this problem, we explore the possibility and likelihood of solutions that rely only on non-social mechanisms. We find three kinds of social organization that help solve this social coordination problem (herding, assortative mating, and natal philopatry) emerge in populations of simulated agents with no social mechanisms available to support these organizations. We conclude that the non-social origins of these social organizations around sexual reproduction may provide the environment for the development of social solutions to the same and different problems.

We study the effects of an imitation mechanism on a population of animats capable of individual ontogenetic learning. An urge to imitate others augments a network-based reinforcement learning strategy used in the control system of the animats. We test populations of animats with imitation against populations without for their ability to find, and maintain over generations, successful foraging behavior in an environment containing three necessary resources: food, water, and shelter. We conclude that even simple imitation mechanisms are effective at increasing the frequency of success when measured over time and over populations of animats.

This paper studies quantum Arthur–Merlin games, which are Arthur–Merlin games in which Arthur and Merlin can perform quantum computations and Merlin can send Arthur quantum information. As in the classical case, messages from Arthur to Merlin are restricted to be strings of uniformly generated random bits. It is proved that for one-message quantum Arthur–Merlin games, which correspond to the complexity class QMA, completeness and soundness errors can be reduced exponentially without increasing the length of Merlin’s message. Previous constructions for reducing error required a polynomial increase in the length of Merlin’s message. Applications of this fact include a proof that logarithmic length quantum certificates yield no increase in power over BQP and a simple proof that $$ {\text{QMA}} \subseteq {\text{PP}}. $$ Other facts that are proved include the equivalence of three (or more) message quantum Arthur–Merlin games with ordinary quantum interactive proof systems and some basic properties concerning two-message quantum Arthur–Merlin games.

This paper studies quantum Arthur-Merlin games, which are a restricted form of quantum interactive proof system in which the verifier's messages are given by unbiased coin-flips. The following results are proved. For one-message quantum Arthur-Merlin games, which correspond to the complexity class QMA, completeness and soundness errors can be reduced exponentially without increasing the length of Merlin's message. Previous constructions for reducing error required a polynomial increase in the length of Merlin's message. Applications of this fact include a proof that logarithmic length quantum certificates yield no increase in power over BQP and a simple proof that QMA /spl sube/ PP. In the case of three or more messages, quantum Arthur-Merlin games are equivalent in power to ordinary quantum interactive proof systems. In fact, for any language having a quantum interactive proof system there exists a three-message quantum Arthur-Merlin game in which Arthur's only message consists of just a single coin-flip that achieves perfect completeness and soundness error exponentially close to 1/2. Any language having a two-message quantum Arthur-Merlin game is contained in BP /spl middot/ PP. This gives some suggestion that three messages are stronger than two in the quantum Arthur-Merlin setting.