Since 2011, the private ride-hailing companies Didi (2019), Uber (2019) and Lyft (2021) have expanded into more and more cities. These ride-hailing services (RHS) bring convenience to our life; however, at the same time they, also raise security concerns for users. For example, several recent news items show that a considerable number of registered drivers whose licenses have been revoked are still taking RHS orders on the respective platforms; this phenomenon directly leads to insecurity on part of its users and the bad reputation of the ride-hailing service provider (SP). The traditional solution to solve this problem is to periodically check the validity of the drivers’ licenses; however, it is a considerably time-consuming and costly process since the SPs have to manually interact with the governing authorities. Therefore, in this paper, we have presented an auditable self-sovereign identity system (named AudiSSI), which provides an efficient approach for the SPs to manage their registered drivers’ qualifications in a decentralized and automatic manner. Further, using smart contract technology, we propose a safety guarantee insurance in the form of an auditing contract to enable the RHS rider to check their driver's qualifications before the trip starts and get incentives once they detect a disqualified driver. We designed an incentive mechanism and have provided a game theoretical analysis. Finally, we implemented a prototype of AudiSSI and deployed it on Hyperledger Indy and Fabric to show that self-sovereign identity system for RHS driver with qualification auditing is efficient and technically feasible.

In this article, we propose Double Edged (DE)-Sword, an incentivized verifiable tag path query scheme. DE-Sword queries tag records stored across a path of participants within an RFID-enabled supply chain in a verifiable way. Different with previous works, DE-Sword works in a dishonest-data owner model in which participants are the owners of tag records and may be dishonest. DE-Sword introduces a novel double-edged reputation incentive mechanism to encourage participants to behave honestly; and couples it with cryptographic primitives to ensure query verifiability. We evaluate DE-Sword through game theory, security analysis, and performance evaluation. The game theory and security analysis shows that DE-Sword guarantees query verifiability. The evaluation results show that DE-Sword incurs low overhead in supply chain systems.

As the most successful application of the sharing economy, ride-hailing service is popular worldwide and serves millions of users per day worldwide. Ride-hailing service providers (SPs) usually collect users’ personal data to improve their services via big data technologies. However, SPs may also use the collected user data to apply personalized prices to different users, which raises price fairness concerns. In this paper, we propose a smart price auditing system named Spas. Spas allows a user to purchaseFair Price Insurancein the form ofPrice Auditing Contract, then the price of ride-hailing service (RHS) order will be audited automatically once completed. According to the auditing result, the contract punishes misbehaving SPs and also compensates affected users automatically. By replacing an untrustworthy centralized auditor with carefully designed smart contracts, we construct a decentralized price auditing system which is trustworthy and transparent. We demonstrate a theoretical model for practical payment flows based on real RHS user data and we implement Spas in Hyperledger Fabric to show that decentralizing and automating price auditing for RHS with financial incentives is technically feasible.