Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Josyula R. Rao
dblp:62/6198
· DBLP profile ↗
19ranked-venue papers
5as first author
0since 2021 · last 2018
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 14 · 2 first-authorSystems, architecture and hardware · 3 · 1 first-authorTheory of computation · 2 · 1 first-authorSoftware engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-authorDatabases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
11 papers |
Network security · 60% Hardware security and side channels · 26% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 6% | |
| Computer networks
3 papers |
Internet architecture and protocols · 94% Cellular and mobile networks · 6% | |
| Artificial intelligence
1 paper |
Knowledge representation and reasoning · 100% | |
| Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper |
Graph data management · 100% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
3 papers |
Program verification · 54% Programming languages and type systems · 31% Compilers and program optimization · 16% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper |
Integrated circuit design · 100% |
Topics — the 29 heaviest of 34, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention › intrusion detection › network intrusion detection
threat detection |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Threat Intelligence Computing · CCS 2018 |
Network security
threat hunting |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Threat Intelligence Computing · CCS 2018 |
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel attack |
0.2 | 6 | 2005 | Templates as Master Keys · CHES 2005 Multi-channel Attacks · CHES 2003 Partitioning Attacks: Or How to Rapidly Clone Some GSM Cards · S&P 2002 |
Internet architecture and protocols › domain name system
DNS security |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | Practical Comprehensive Bounds on Surreptitious Communication over DNS · USENIX Security Symposium 2013 |
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention
covert channel detection |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | Practical Comprehensive Bounds on Surreptitious Communication over DNS · USENIX Security Symposium 2013 |
Graph data management › graph database
distributed graph database |
0.1 | 1 | 2018 | Threat Intelligence Computing · CCS 2018 |
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel attack › profiled side-channel attack
template attack |
0.1 | 2 | 2005 | Templates as Master Keys · CHES 2005 Template Attacks · CHES 2002 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › cryptanalysis
key recovery attack |
0.1 | 2 | 2005 | Partitioning Attacks: Or How to Rapidly Clone Some GSM Cards · S&P 2002 Templates as Master Keys · CHES 2005 |
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel attack
electromagnetic side channel |
0.0 | 1 | 2002 | The EM Side-Channel(s) · CHES 2002 |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security › blockchain network security
network partitioning attack |
0.0 | 1 | 2002 | Partitioning Attacks: Or How to Rapidly Clone Some GSM Cards · S&P 2002 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › cryptographic implementation
block cipher implementation |
0.0 | 1 | 2001 | Efficient Rijndael Encryption Implementation with Composite Field Arithmetic · CHES 2001 |
Integrated circuit design
digital circuit design |
0.0 | 1 | 2001 | Efficient Rijndael Encryption Implementation with Composite Field Arithmetic · CHES 2001 |
Integrated circuit design › finite field arithmetic
finite field arithmetic circuit |
0.0 | 1 | 2001 | Efficient Rijndael Encryption Implementation with Composite Field Arithmetic · CHES 2001 |
Privacy and data protection
anonymity |
0.0 | 1 | 2000 | Can Pseudonymity Really Guarantee Privacy? · USENIX Security Symposium 2000 |
Network security › secure communication › network-layer security
IPsec |
0.0 | 1 | 2000 | An IPSec-based Host Architecture for Secure Internet Multicast · NDSS 2000 |
Privacy and data protection
pseudonymity |
0.0 | 1 | 2000 | Can Pseudonymity Really Guarantee Privacy? · USENIX Security Symposium 2000 |
Network security › secure communication › secure group communication
secure multicast |
0.0 | 1 | 2000 | An IPSec-based Host Architecture for Secure Internet Multicast · NDSS 2000 |
Program verification
predicate transformers |
0.0 | 3 | 1994 | Reasoning about Probabilistic Parallel Programs · ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst. 1994 Reasoning About Probabilistic Algorithms · PODC 1990 A Predicate Transformer Approach to Semantics of Parallel Programs · PODC 1989 |
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel attack
power analysis |
0.0 | 1 | 1999 | Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks · CRYPTO 1999 |
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel countermeasures |
0.0 | 1 | 1999 | Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks · CRYPTO 1999 |
Programming languages and type systems
probabilistic programs |
0.0 | 1 | 1994 | Reasoning about Probabilistic Parallel Programs · ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst. 1994 |
Compilers and program optimization › program transformation
program derivation |
0.0 | 1 | 1994 | Reasoning about Probabilistic Parallel Programs · ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst. 1994 |
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel attack
physical side channel |
0.0 | 1 | 2002 | The EM Side-Channel(s) · CHES 2002 |
Program verification › program logic
UNITY |
0.0 | 2 | 1994 | Reasoning About Probabilistic Algorithms · PODC 1990 Reasoning about Probabilistic Parallel Programs · ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst. 1994 |
Algorithms and data structures
randomized algorithms |
0.0 | 2 | 1994 | Reasoning About Probabilistic Algorithms · PODC 1990 Reasoning about Probabilistic Parallel Programs · ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst. 1994 |
Internet architecture and protocols
multicast |
0.0 | 1 | 2000 | An IPSec-based Host Architecture for Secure Internet Multicast · NDSS 2000 |
Programming languages and type systems › language semantics
fixpoint semantics |
0.0 | 1 | 1989 | A Predicate Transformer Approach to Semantics of Parallel Programs · PODC 1989 |
Programming languages and type systems
language semantics |
0.0 | 1 | 1989 | A Predicate Transformer Approach to Semantics of Parallel Programs · PODC 1989 |
Program verification
temporal logic |
0.0 | 1 | 1989 | A Predicate Transformer Approach to Semantics of Parallel Programs · PODC 1989 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
interactive visualization · 1.0graph computation · 1.0information-theoretic bounds · 0.3template attack · 0.1statistical classification · 0.1profiling · 0.1predicate transformers · 0.0power analysis · 0.0electromagnetic analysis · 0.0combination of leakage channels · 0.0UNITY · 0.0table lookup countermeasure · 0.0electromagnetic emanation analysis · 0.0chosen plaintext attack · 0.0composite field arithmetic · 0.0proof methodology · 0.0fixpoint equations · 0.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | Threat Intelligence ComputingabstractCyber threat hunting is the process of proactively and iteratively formulating and validating threat hypotheses based on security-relevant observations and domain knowledge. To facilitate threat hunting tasks, this paper introduces threat intelligence computing as a new methodology that models threat discovery as a graph computation problem. It enables efficient programming for solving threat discovery problems, equipping threat hunters with a suite of potent new tools for agile codifications of threat hypotheses, automated evidence mining, and interactive data inspection capabilities. A concrete realization of a threat intelligence computing platform is presented through the design and implementation of a domain-specific graph language with interactive visualization support and a distributed graph database. The platform was evaluated in a two-week DARPA competition for threat detection on a test bed comprising a wide variety of systems monitored in real time. During this period, sub-billion records were produced, streamed, and analyzed, dozens of threat hunting tasks were dynamically planned and programmed, and attack campaigns with diverse malicious intent were discovered. The platform exhibited strong detection and analytics capabilities coupled with high efficiency, resulting in a leadership position in the competition. Additional evaluations on comprehensive policy reasoning are outlined to demonstrate the versatility of the platform and the expressiveness of the language. Xiaokui Shu, Frederico Araujo, Douglas Lee Schales, Marc Ph. Stoecklin, Jiyong Jang, Heqing Huang 0001, Josyula R. Rao |
CCS | 7 |
| 2016 | BAYWATCH: Robust Beaconing Detection to Identify Infected Hosts in Large-Scale Enterprise NetworksabstractSophisticated cyber security threats, such as advanced persistent threats, rely on infecting end points within a targeted security domain and embedding malware. Typically, such malware periodically reaches out to the command and control infrastructures controlled by adversaries. Such callback behavior, called beaconing, is challenging to detect as (a) detection requires long-term temporal analysis of communication patterns at several levels of granularity, (b) malware authors employ various strategies to hide beaconing behavior, and (c) it is also employed by legitimate applications (such as updates checks). In this paper, we develop a comprehensive methodology to identify stealthy beaconing behavior from network traffic observations. We use an 8-step filtering approach to iteratively refine and eliminate legitimate beaconing traffic and pinpoint malicious beaconing cases for in-depth investigation and takedown. We provide a systematic evaluation of our core beaconing detection algorithm and conduct a large-scale evaluation of web proxy data (more than 30 billion events) collected over a 5-month period at a corporate network comprising over 130,000 end-user devices. Our findings indicate that our approach reliably exposes malicious beaconing behavior, which may be overlooked by traditional security mechanisms. Xin Hu 0001, Jiyong Jang, Marc Ph. Stoecklin, Ting Wang 0006, Douglas Lee Schales, Dhilung Kirat, Josyula R. Rao |
DSN | 7 |
| 2013 | Practical Comprehensive Bounds on Surreptitious Communication over DNS
Vern Paxson, Mihai Christodorescu, Mobin Javed, Josyula R. Rao, Reiner Sailer, Douglas Lee Schales, Marc Ph. Stoecklin, Kurt Thomas, Wietse Z. Venema, Nicholas Weaver |
USENIX Security Symposium | 4 |
| 2010 | Designing a Side Channel Resistant Random Number Generator
Suresh Chari, Vincenzo DiLuoffo, Paul A. Karger, Elaine R. Palmer, Tal Rabin, Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi, Helmut Scherzer, Michael Steiner 0001, David C. Toll |
CARDIS | 6 |
| 2005 | Templates as Master Keys
Dakshi Agrawal, Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi, Kai Schramm |
CHES | 2 |
| 2003 | Multi-channel Attacks
Dakshi Agrawal, Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi |
CHES | 2 |
| 2002 | The EM Side-Channel(s)
Dakshi Agrawal, Bruce Archambeault, Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi |
CHES | 3 |
| 2002 | Template Attacks
Suresh Chari, Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi |
CHES | 2 |
| 2002 | Partitioning Attacks: Or How to Rapidly Clone Some GSM CardsabstractIn this paper, we introduce a new class of side-channel attacks called partitioning attacks. We have successfully launched a version of the attack on several implementations of COMP128, the popular GSM authentication algorithm that has been deployed by different service providers in several types of SIM cards, to retrieve the 128 bit key using as few as 8 chosen plaintexts. We show how partitioning attacks can be used effectively to attack implementations that have been equipped with ad hoc and inadequate countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Such ad hoc countermeasures are systemic in implementations of cryptographic algorithms, such as COMP128, which require the use of large tables since there has been a mistaken belief that sound countermeasures require more resources than are available. To address this problem, we describe a new resource-efficient countermeasure for protecting table lookups in cryptographic implementations and justify its correctness rigorously. Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi, Helmut Scherzer, Stéphane Tinguely |
S&P | 1 |
| 2001 | Efficient Rijndael Encryption Implementation with Composite Field Arithmetic
Atri Rudra, Pradeep K. Dubey, Charanjit S. Jutla, Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi |
CHES | 5 |
| 2001 | On the role of formal methods in security
Josyula R. Rao |
Inf. Process. Lett. | 1 |
| 2000 | An IPSec-based Host Architecture for Secure Internet Multicast
Ran Canetti, Pau-Chen Cheng, Frederique Giraud, Dimitrios E. Pendarakis, Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi, Debanjan Saha |
NDSS | 5 |
| 2000 | Can Pseudonymity Really Guarantee Privacy?
Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |
| 1999 | Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks
Suresh Chari, Charanjit S. Jutla, Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi |
CRYPTO | 3 |
| 1997 | A Flexible Security Model for Using Internet ContentabstractJava applets, Netscape plug-ins and ActiveX controls have led to the popularization of a new paradigm: extensive downloading of executable code into applications to enhance the functionality of the desktop. One of the problems with this paradigm is the need to control the access rights of the downloaded content. In this paper, we describe a system for downloading content from the Internet and controlling its actions on a client machine. Our system generates a protection domain for the downloaded content dynamically rising the content's requested domain and a policy database that describes the user's trust in the content's manufacturer and type. Our system ensures that this protection domain is enforced throughout the execution of the content. We have modified the Java Virtual Machine to implement our security model. Our implementation, called Flexxguard, is freely available at http://www.alphaworks.ibm.com. Rangachari Anand, Nayeem Islam, Trent Jaeger, Josyula R. Rao |
SRDS | 4 |
| 1997 | A Methodology for Designing Proof Rules for Fair Parallel ProgramsabstractAbstract We propose a methodology for designing sound and complete proof systems for proving progress properties of parallel programs under various fairness assumptions. Our methodology begins with a branching time temporal logic formula (CTL*) formula that expresses progress under a fairness assumption. The next step obtains an equivalent fixpoint characterization of this CTL*formula in theμ-calculus. The final step uses the fixpoint characterizations to extract proof systems for proving progress under the fairness constraint. The methodology guarantees that the proof rules so obtained are sound and relatively complete in the sense of Cook. Charanjit S. Jutla, Josyula R. Rao |
Formal Aspects Comput. | 2 |
| 1994 | Reasoning about Probabilistic Parallel ProgramsabstractThe use of randomization in the design and analysis of algorithms promises simple and efficient algorithms to difficult problems, some of which may not have a deterministic solution. This gain in simplicity, efficiency, and solvability results in a trade-off of the traditional notion of absolute correctness of algorithms for a more quantitative notion: correctness with a probability between 0 and 1. The addition of the notion of parallelism to the already unintuitive idea of randomization makes reasoning about probabilistic parallel programs all the more tortuous and difficult. In this paper we address the problem of specifying and deriving properties of probabilistic parallel programs that either hold deterministically or with probability 1. We present a proof methodology based on existing proof systems for probabilistic algorithms, the theory of the predicate transformer, and the theory of UNITY. Although the proofs of probabilistic programs are slippery at best, we show that such programs can be derived with the same rigor and elegance that we have seen in the derivation of sequential and parallel programs. By applying this methodology to derive probabilistic programs, we hope to develop tools and techniques that would make randomization a useful paradigm in algorithm design. Josyula R. Rao |
ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst. | 1 |
| 1990 | Reasoning About Probabilistic AlgorithmsabstractThe use of randomization in the design and analysis of algorithms promises simple and efficient algorithms to difficult problems, some of which may not have a deterministic solution.This gain in simplicity, efficiency and solvability results in a tradeoff of the traditional notion of absolute correctness of algorithms for a more quantitative notion: correctness with a probability between 0 and 1.The addition of the notion of parallelism to the already unintuitive idea of randomization makes reasoning about probabilistic parallel programs all the more tortuous and difficult.In this paper, we address the problem of specifying and deriving properties of probabilistic parallel programs that either hold deterministically or with probability one.We present a proof methodology based on existing proof systems for probabilistic algorithms, the theory of the predicate transformer and the theory of UNITY.Although the proofs of probabilistic programs are slippery at best, we show that such programs can be derived with the same rigor and elegance that we have seen in the derivation of sequential and parallel programs.By applying this methodology to derive probabilistic programs, we hope to develop tools and techniques that would make randomization a useful paradigm in algorithm design. Josyula R. Rao |
PODC | 1 |
| 1989 | A Predicate Transformer Approach to Semantics of Parallel ProgramsabstractWe present an extensional semantics for parallel programs based on predicate transformers.We identify the meaning of a parallel program with three concepts: a set of initial conditions, a predicate transformer, called wlt, characterizing progress properties of the program, and a predicate transformer wsafe concerned with safety aspects.For a given program, these predicate transformers are defined in terms of fixpoints of recursive equations. Charanjit S. Jutla, Edgar Knapp, Josyula R. Rao |
PODC | 3 |