The property of being true in almost all finite, initial segments of the standard model of arithmetic is ∑20 –complete. Thus, it admits a kind of a truth definition. We define such an arithmetical predicate. Then, we define its modal logic SL and prove a completeness theorem with respect to finite models semantics. The proof that SL is the modal logic of the approximate truth definition for finite arithmetical models is based on an extension of SL by a fixed-point construction.

We prove that there are single Henkin quantifiers such that first order logic augmented by one of these quantifiers is undecidable in the empty vocabulary. We estimate the size of such quantifiers proving undecidability of L0(H12) and L0(E10).

Abstract We characterize the effective content and the proof-theoretic strength of a Ramsey-type theorem for bi-colorings of so-called exactly large sets. An exactly large set is a set $X \subset {\bf{N}}$ such that ${\rm{card}}\left( X \right) = {\rm{min}}\left( X \right) + 1$ . The theorem we analyze is as follows. For every infinite subset M of N, for every coloring C of the exactly large subsets of M in two colors, there exists and infinite subset L of M such that C is constant on all exactly large subsets of L. This theorem is essentially due to Pudlák and Rödl and independently to Farmaki. We prove that—over RCA0 —this theorem is equivalent to closure under the ωth Turing jump (i.e., under arithmetical truth). Natural combinatorial theorems at this level of complexity are rare. In terms of Reverse Mathematics we give the first Ramsey-theoretic characterization of ${\rm{ACA}}_0^ +$ . Our results give a complete characterization of the theorem from the point of view of Computability Theory and of the Proof Theory of Arithmetic. This nicely extends the current knowledge about the strength of Ramsey’s Theorem. We also show that analogous results hold for a related principle based on the Regressive Ramsey’s Theorem. We conjecture that analogous results hold for larger ordinals.

Abstract We examine second order intuitionistic propositional logic, IPC2. Let ℱ∃ a be the set of formulas with no universal quantification. We prove Glivenko's theorem for formulas in ℱ∃ that is, for φ ∈ ℱ∃, φ is a classical tautology if and only if ┐┐φ is a tautology of IPC2. We show that for each sentence φ ∈ ℱ∃ (without free variables), φ is a classical tautology if and only if φ is an intuitionistic tautology. As a corollary we obtain a semantic argument that the quantifier ∀ is not definable in IPC2 from ⊥, ⋁, ⋀, →, ∃.

Abstract We investigate theories of initial segments of the standard models for arithmetics. It is easy to see that if the ordering relation is definable in the standard model then the decidability results can be transferred from the infinite model into the finite models. On the contrary we show that the Σ2–theory of multiplication is undecidable in finite models. We show that this result is optimal by proving that the Σ1–theory of multiplication and order is decidable in finite models as well as in the standard model. We show also that the exponentiation function is definable in finite models by a formula of arithmetic with multiplication and that one can define in finite models the arithmetic of addition and multiplication with the concatenation operation. We consider also the spectrum problem. We show that the spectrum of arithmetic with multiplication and arithmetic with exponentiation is strictly contained in the spectrum of arithmetic with addition and multiplication.