In relational verification, judicious alignment of computational steps facilitates proof of relations between programs using simple relational assertions. Relational Hoare logics (RHL) provide compositional rules that embody various alignments of executions. Seemingly more flexible alignments can be expressed in terms of product automata based on program transition relations. A single degenerate alignment rule (sequential composition), atop a complete Hoare logic, comprises a RHL for $\forall\forall$ properties that is complete in the sense of Cook. The notion of alignment completeness was previously proposed as an additional measure, and some rules were shown to be alignment complete with respect to a few ad hoc forms of alignment automata. This paper proves alignment completeness with respect to a general class of $\forall\forall$ alignment automata, for a RHL comprised of standard rules together with a rule of semantics-preserving rewrites based on Kleene algebra with tests. A new logic for $\forall\exists$ properties is introduced and shown to be sound and alignment complete for a new general class of automata. The $\forall\forall$ and $\forall\exists$ automata are shown to be semantically complete. Thus both logics are complete in the sense of Cook. The paper includes discussion of why alignment is not the only important principle for relational reasoning and proposes entailment completeness as further means to evaluate RHLs.

Abstract Verifying relations between programs arises as a task in various verification contexts such as optimizing transformations, relating new versions of programs with older versions (regression verification), and noninterference. However, relational verification for programs acting on dynamically allocated mutable state is not well supported by existing tools, which provide a high level of automation at the cost of restricting the programs considered. Auto-active tools, on the other hand, require more user interaction but enable verification of a broader class of programs. This article presents WhyRel, a tool for the auto-active verification of relational properties of pointer programs based on relational region logic. WhyRel is evaluated through verification case studies, relying on SMT solvers orchestrated by the Why3 platform on which it builds. Case studies include establishing representation independence of ADTs, showing noninterference, and challenge problems from recent literature.

We present Zar: a formally verified compiler pipeline from discrete probabilistic programs with unbounded loops in the conditional probabilistic guarded command language (cpGCL) to proved-correct executable samplers in the random bit model. We exploit the key idea that all discrete probability distributions can be reduced to unbiased coin-flipping schemes. The compiler pipeline first translates cpGCL programs into choice-fix trees, an intermediate representation suitable for reduction of biased probabilistic choices. Choice-fix trees are then translated to coinductive interaction trees for execution within the random bit model. The correctness of the composed translations establishes the sampling equidistribution theorem: compiled samplers are correct wrt. the conditional weakest pre-expectation semantics of cpGCL source programs. Zar is implemented and fully verified in the Coq proof assistant. We extract verified samplers to OCaml and Python and empirically validate them on a number of illustrative examples.

Dedicated to Tony Hoare. In a paper published in 1972, Hoare articulated the fundamental notions of hiding invariants and simulations. Hiding: invariants on encapsulated data representations need not be mentioned in specifications that comprise the API of a module. Simulation: correctness of a new data representation and implementation can be established by proving simulation between the old and new implementations using a coupling relation defined on the encapsulated state. These results were formalized semantically and for a simple model of state, though the paper claimed this could be extended to encompass dynamically allocated objects. In recent years, progress has been made toward formalizing the claim, for simulation, though mainly in semantic developments. In this article, hiding and simulation are combined with the idea in Hoare’s 1969 paper: a logic of programs. For an object-based language with dynamic allocation, we introduce a relational Hoare logic with stateful frame conditions that formalizes encapsulation, hiding of invariants, and couplings that relate two implementations. Relations and other assertions are expressed in first-order logic. Specifications can express a wide range of relational properties such as conditional equivalence and noninterference with declassification. The proof rules facilitate relational reasoning by means of convenient alignments and are shown sound with respect to a conventional operational semantics. A derived proof rule for equivalence of linked programs directly embodies representation independence. Applicability to representative examples is demonstrated using an SMT-based implementation.

We present a formal proof in Lean of probably approximately correct (PAC) learnability of the concept class of decision stumps. This classic result in machine learning theory derives a bound on error probabilities for a simple type of classifier. Though such a proof appears simple on paper, analytic and measure-theoretic subtleties arise when carrying it out fully formally. Our proof is structured so as to separate reasoning about deterministic properties of a learning function from proofs of measurability and analysis of probabilities.

Concurrent separation logic is distinguished by transfer of state ownership upon parallel composition and framing. The algebraic structure that underpins ownership transfer is that of partial commutative monoids (PCMs). Extant research considers ownership transfer primarily from the logical perspective while comparatively less attention is drawn to the algebraic considerations. This paper provides an algebraic formalization of ownership transfer in concurrent separation logic by means of structure-preserving partial functions (i.e., morphisms) between PCMs, and an associated notion of separating relations. Morphisms of structures are a standard concept in algebra and category theory, but haven't seen ubiquitous use in separation logic before. Separating relations. are binary relations that generalize disjointness and characterize the inputs on which morphisms preserve structure. The two abstractions facilitate verification by enabling concise ways of writing specs, by providing abstract views of threads' states that are preserved under ownership transfer, and by enabling user-level construction of new PCMs out of existing ones.

Dedicated to the memory of Sebastian Danicic. We present a theory for slicing imperative probabilistic programs containing random assignments and “observe” statements for conditioning. We represent such programs as probabilistic control-flow graphs (pCFGs) whose nodes modify probability distributions. This allows direct adaptation of standard machinery such as data dependence, postdominators, relevant variables, and so on, to the probabilistic setting. We separate the specification of slicing from its implementation: (1) first, we develop syntactic conditions that a slice must satisfy (they involve the existence of another disjoint slice such that the variables of the two slices are probabilistically independent of each other); (2) next, we prove that any such slice is semantically correct; (3) finally, we give an algorithm to compute the least slice. To generate smaller slices, we may in addition take advantage of knowledge that certain loops will terminate (almost) always. Our results carry over to the slicing of structured imperative probabilistic programs, as handled in recent work by Hur et al. For such a program, we can define its slice, which has the same “normalized” semantics as the original program; the proof of this property is based on a result proving the adequacy of the semantics of pCFGs w.r.t. the standard semantics of structured imperative probabilistic programs.

In addition to pre- and postconditions, program specifications in recent separation logics for concurrency have employed an algebraic structure of resources —a form of state transition systems—to describe the state-based program invariants that must be preserved, and to record the permissible atomic changes to program state. In this paper we introduce a novel notion of resource morphism , i.e. structure-preserving function on resources, and show how to effectively integrate it into separation logic, using an associated notion of morphism-specific simulation . We apply morphisms and simulations to programs verified under one resource, to compositionally adapt them to operate under another resource, thus facilitating proof reuse.

For specifying and reasoning about object-based programs, it is often attractive for contracts to be expressed using calls to pure methods. It is useful for pure methods to have contracts, including read effects, to support local reasoning based on frame conditions. This leads to puzzles such as the use of a pure method in its own contract. These ideas have been explored in connection with verification tools based on axiomatic semantics, guided by the need to avoid logical inconsistency, and focusing on encodings that cater for first-order automated provers. This article adds pure methods and read effects to region logic, a first-order program logic that features frame-based local reasoning and provides modular reasoning principles for end-to-end correctness. Modular reasoning is embodied in a proof rule for linking a module’s method implementations with a client that relies on the method contracts. Soundness is proved with respect to conventional operational semantics and uses an extensional (i.e, relational) interpretation of read effects. Applicability to tools based on SMT solvers is demonstrated through machine-checked verification of examples. The developments in this article can guide the implementations of linking as used in modular verifiers and serve as a basis for studying observationally pure methods and encapsulation.

Arguments about correctness of a concurrent data structure are typically carried out by using the notion of linearizability and specifying the linearization points of the data structure's procedures. Such arguments are often cumbersome as the linearization points' position in time can be dynamic (depend on the interference, run-time values and events from the past, or even future), non-local (appear in procedures other than the one considered), and whose position in the execution trace may only be determined after the considered procedure has already terminated. In this paper we propose a new method, based on a separation-style logic, for reasoning about concurrent objects with such linearization points. We embrace the dynamic nature of linearization points, and encode it as part of the data structure's auxiliary state, so that it can be dynamically modified in place by auxiliary code, as needed when some appropriate run-time event occurs. We name the idea linking-in-time, because it reduces temporal reasoning to spatial reasoning. For example, modifying a temporal position of a linearization point can be modeled similarly to a pointer update in separation logic. Furthermore, the auxiliary state provides a convenient way to concisely express the properties essential for reasoning about clients of such concurrent objects. We illustrate the method by verifying (mechanically in Coq) an intricate optimal snapshot algorithm due to Jayanti, as well as some clients.

Relational properties arise in many settings: relating two versions of a program that use different data representations, noninterference properties for security, etc. The main ingredient of relational verification, relating aligned pairs of intermediate steps, has been used in numerous guises, but existing relational program logics are narrow in scope. This paper introduces a logic based on novel syntax that weaves together product programs to express alignment of control flow points at which relational formulas are asserted. Correctness judgments feature hypotheses with relational specifications, discharged by a rule for the linking of procedure implementations. The logic supports reasoning about program-pairs containing both similar and dissimilar control and data structures. Reasoning about dynamically allocated objects is supported by a frame rule based on frame conditions amenable to SMT provers. We prove soundness and sketch how the logic can be used for data abstraction, loop optimizations, and secure information flow.

Designing efficient concurrent objects often requires abandoning the standard specification technique of linearizability in favor of more relaxed correctness conditions. However, the variety of alternatives makes it difficult to choose which condition to employ, and how to compose them when using objects specified by different conditions.

Efficient concurrent programs and data structures rarely employ coarse-grained synchronization mechanisms (i.e., locks); instead, they implement custom synchronization patterns via fine-grained primitives, such as compare-and-swap. Due to sophisticated interference scenarios between threads, reasoning about such programs is challenging and error-prone, and can benefit from mechanization. In this paper, we present the first completely formalized framework for mechanized verification of full functional correctness of fine-grained concurrent programs. Our tool is based on the recently proposed program logic FCSL. It is implemented as an embedded DSL in the dependently-typed language of the Coq proof assistant, and is powerful enough to reason about programming features such as higher-order functions and local thread spawning. By incorporating a uniform concurrency model, based on state-transition systems and partial commutative monoids, FCSL makes it possible to build proofs about concurrent libraries in a thread-local, compositional way, thus facilitating scalability and reuse: libraries are verified just once, and their specifications are used ubiquitously in client-side reasoning. We illustrate the proof layout in FCSL by example, outline its infrastructure, and report on our experience of using FCSL to verify a number of concurrent algorithms and data structures.

First order logic with transitive closure, and separation logic enable elegant interactive verification of heap-manipulating programs. However, undecidabilty results and high asymptotic complexity of checking validity preclude complete automatic verification of such programs, even when loop invariants and procedure contracts are specified as formulas in these logics. This paper tackles the problem of procedure-modular verification of reachability properties of heap-manipulating programs using efficient decision procedures that are complete: that is, a SAT solver must generate a counterexample whenever a program does not satisfy its specification. By (a) requiring each procedure modifies a fixed set of heap partitions and creates a bounded amount of heap sharing, and (b) restricting program contracts and loop invariants to use only deterministic paths in the heap, we show that heap reachability updates can be described in a simple manner. The restrictions force program specifications and verification conditions to lie within a fragment of first-order logic with transitive closure that is reducible to effectively propositional logic, and hence facilitate sound, complete and efficient verification. We implemented a tool atop Z3 and report on preliminary experiments that establish the correctness of several programs that manipulate linked data structures.

We consider verification of information flow and erasure properties in programs with heterogeneous heap-based data structures, in the presence of procedures with local state. A heterogeneous data structure, such as a hash table implementing a medical record database, may store both secret and public data simultaneously. In contrast, extant work primarily focuses on homogeneous data structures which store data of a uniform security level. Heterogeneity, however, does not come for free. For example, standard implementations of hash tables do not support heterogeneity, and may leak sensitive information easily owing to hash collisions. In this paper we identify unique representation as a sufficient condition for a heterogeneous data structure to be leak-free, while simultaneously supporting abstraction and modularity in verification. As a case study, we implement and verify a novel uniquely-represented variant of heterogeneous hash tables. Furthermore, we demonstrate modular reasoning by showing how specifications of the hash table methods can be used in a client application; we thereby obtain abstract and concise formal proofs of erasure. We formalize our work in Relational Hoare Type Theory (RHTT), an expressive, higher-order imperative language and program logic embedded in the Coq proof assistant.

Dedicated to the memory of John C. Reynolds (1935--2013). The hiding of internal invariants creates a mismatch between procedure specifications in an interface and proof obligations on the implementations of those procedures. The mismatch is sound if the invariants depend only on encapsulated state, but encapsulation is problematic in contemporary software due to the many uses of shared mutable objects. The mismatch is formalized here in a proof rule that achieves flexibility via explicit restrictions on client effects, expressed using ghost state and ordinary first order assertions. The restrictions amount to a stateful frame condition that must be satisfied by any client; this dynamic encapsulation boundary complements conventional scope-based encapsulation. The technical development is based on a companion article, Part I, that presents Region Logic---a programming logic with stateful frame conditions for commands.

Dedicated to the memory of Stephen L. Bloom (1940--2010). Shared mutable objects pose grave challenges in reasoning, especially for information hiding and modularity. This article presents a novel technique for reasoning about error-avoiding partial correctness of programs featuring shared mutable objects, and investigates the technique by formalizing a logic. Using a first-order assertion language, the logic provides heap-local reasoning about mutation and separation, via ghost fields and variables of type “region” (finite sets of object references). A new form of frame condition specifies write, read, and allocation effects using region expressions; this supports a frame rule that allows a command to read state on which the framed predicate depends. Soundness is proved using a standard program semantics. The logic facilitates heap-local reasoning about object invariants, as shown here by examples. Part II of this article extends the logic with second-order framing which formalizes the hiding of data invariants.

Dedicated to the memory of John C. Reynolds (1935--2013). We present Relational Hoare Type Theory (RHTT), a novel language and verification system capable of expressing and verifying rich information flow and access control policies via dependent types. We show that a number of security policies which have been formalized separately in the literature can all be expressed in RHTT using only standard type-theoretic constructions such as monads, higher-order functions, abstract types, abstract predicates, and modules. Example security policies include conditional declassification, information erasure, and state-dependent information flow and access control. RHTT can reason about such policies in the presence of dynamic memory allocation, deallocation, pointer aliasing and arithmetic.

This paper describes frontiers in verification of the software barrier synchronization primitive. So far most software barrier algorithms have not been mechanically verified. We show preliminary results in automatically proving the correctness of the major software barriers.

We present Relational Hoare Type Theory (RHTT), a novel language and verification system capable of expressing and verifying rich information flow and access control policies via dependent types. We show that a number of security policies which have been formalized separately in the literature can all be expressed in RHTT using only standard type-theoretic constructions such as monads, higher-order functions, abstract types, abstract predicates, and modules. Example security policies include conditional declassification, information erasure, and state-dependent information flow and access control. RHTT can reason about such policies in the presence of dynamic memory allocation, deallocation, pointer aliasing and arithmetic. The system, theorems and examples have all been formalized in Coq.

This paper explores a three dimensional characterisation of a declassification-based non-interference policy and its consequences. Two of the dimensions consist of specifying: (a) the power of the attacker, that is, what public information a program has that an attacker can observe; and (b) what secret information a program has that needs to be protected. Both these dimensions are regulated by the third dimension: (c) the choice of program semantics, for example, trace semantics or denotational semantics, or any semantics in Cousot's semantics hierarchy. To check whether a program satisfies a non-interference policy, one can compute an abstract domain that over-approximates the information released by the policy and then check whether program execution can release more information than permitted by the policy. Counterexamples to a policy can be generated by using a variant of the Paige–Tarjan algorithm for partition refinement. Given the counterexamples, the policy can be refined so that the least amount of confidential information required for making the program secure is declassified.

The last several years have seen a proliferation of static and runtime analysis tools for finding security violations that are caused by explicit information flow in programs. Much of this interest has been caused by the increase in the number of vulnerabilities such as cross-site scripting and SQL injection. In fact, these explicit information flow vulnerabilities commonly found in Web applications now outnumber vulnerabilities such as buffer overruns common in type-unsafe languages such as C and C++. Tools checking for these vulnerabilities require a specification to operate. In most cases the task of providing such a specification is delegated to the user. Moreover, the efficacy of these tools is only as good as the specification. Unfortunately, writing a comprehensive specification presents a major challenge: parts of the specification are easy to miss, leading to missed vulnerabilities; similarly, incorrect specifications may lead to false positives.

This paper provides a way to specify expressive declassification policies, in particular, when, what, and where policies that include conditions under which downgrading is allowed. Secondly, an end-to-end semantic property is introduced, based on a model that allows observations of intermediate low states as well as termination. An attacker's knowledge only increases at explicit declassification steps, and within limits set by policy. Thirdly, static enforcement is provided by combining type-checking with program verification techniques applied to the small subprograms that carry out declassifications. Enforcement is proved sound for a simple programming language and the extension to object-oriented programs is described.

Modern component-based systems, such as Java and Microsoft .NET common language runtime (CLR), have adopted stack-based access control (SBAC). Its purpose is to use stack inspection to verify that all the code responsible for a security-sensitive action is sufficiently authorized to perform that action. Previous literature has shown that the security model enforced by SBAC is flawed in that stack inspection may allow unauthorized code no longer on the stack to influence the execution of security-sensitive code. A different approach, history-based access control (HBAC), is safe but may prevent authorized code from executing a security-sensitive operation if less trusted code was previously executed. In this paper, we formally introduce information-based access control (IBAC), a novel security model that verifies that all and only the code responsible for a security-sensitive operation is sufficiently authorized. Given an access-control policy a, we present a mechanism to extract from it an implicit integrity policy i, and we prove that IBAC enforces i. Furthermore, we discuss large-scale application code scenarios to which IBAC can be successfully applied.

The notion of control dependence underlies many program analysis and transformation techniques. Despite being widely used, existing definitions and approaches to calculating control dependence are difficult to apply directly to modern program structures because these make substantial use of exception processing and increasingly support reactive systems designed to run indefinitely. This article revisits foundational issues surrounding control dependence, and develops definitions and algorithms for computing several variations of control dependence that can be directly applied to modern program structures. To provide a foundation for slicing reactive systems, the article proposes a notion of slicing correctness based on weak bisimulation, and proves that some of these new definitions of control dependence generate slices that conform to this notion of correctness. This new framework of control dependence definitions, with corresponding correctness results, is even able to support programs with irreducible control flow graphs. Finally, a variety of properties show that the new definitions conservatively extend classic definitions. These new definitions and algorithms form the basis of the Indus Java slicer, a publicly available program slicer that has been implemented for full Java.

This paper specifies, via a Hoare-like logic, an interprocedural and flow sensitive (but termination insensitive) information flow analysis for object-oriented programs. Pointer aliasing is ubiquitous in such programs, and can potentially leak confidential information. Thus the logic employs independence assertions to describe the noninterference property that formalizes confidentiality, and employs region assertions to describe possible aliasing. Programmer assertions, in the style of JML, are also allowed, thereby permitting a more fine-grained specification of information flow policy.The logic supports local reasoning about state in the style of separation logic. Small specifications are used; they mention only the variables and addresses relevant to a command. Specifications are combined using a frame rule. An algorithm for the computation of postconditions is described: under certain assumptions, there exists a strongest postcondition which the algorithm computes.

Representation independence formally characterizes the encapsulation provided by language constructs for data abstraction and justifies reasoning by simulation. Representation independence has been shown for a variety of languages and constructs but not for shared references to mutable state; indeed it fails in general for such languages. This article formulates representation independence for classes, in an imperative, object-oriented language with pointers, subclassing and dynamic dispatch, class oriented visibility control, recursive types and methods, and a simple form of module. An instance of a class is considered to implement an abstraction using private fields and so-called representation objects. Encapsulation of representation objects is expressed by a restriction, called confinement, on aliasing. Representation independence is proved for programs satisfying the confinement condition. A static analysis is given for confinement that accepts common designs such as the observer and factory patterns. The formalization takes into account not only the usual interface between a client and a class that provides an abstraction but also the interface (often called “protected”) between the class and its subclasses.

Access control mechanisms are often used with the intent of enforcing confidentiality and integrity policies, but few rigorous connections have been made between information flow and runtime access control. The Java virtual machine and the .NET runtime system provide a dynamic access control mechanism in which permissions are granted to program units and a runtime mechanism checks permissions of code in the calling chain. We investigate a design pattern by which this mechanism can be used to achieve confidentiality and integrity goals: a single interface serves callers of more than one security level and dynamic access control prevents release of high information to low callers. Programs fitting this pattern would be rejected by previous flow analyses. We give a static analysis that admits them, using permission-dependent security types. The analysis is given for a class-based object-oriented language with features including inheritance, dynamic binding, dynamically allocated mutable objects, type casts and recursive types. The analysis is shown to ensure a noninterference property formalizing confidentiality and integrity.

Access control mechanisms are widely used with the intent of enforcing confidentiality and other policies, but few formal connections have been made between information flow and access control. Java and C# are object-oriented languages that provide fine-grained access control. An access control list specifies local policy by authorizing permissions for principals (code sources) associated with class declarations; a mechanism called stack inspection checks permissions at run time. An example is given to show how this mechanism can be used to achieve confidentiality goals in situations where a single system call serves callers of differing confidentiality levels and dynamic access control prevents release of high information to low callers. A static analysis is given which applies to such examples. The analysis is shown to ensure a noninterference property formalizing confidentiality.

We show how the principal typing property of the rank 2 intersection type system enables the specification of a modular and polyvariant control-flow analysis.

We consider a sequential object-oriented language with pointers and mutable state, private fields and class-based visibility, dynamic binding and inheritance, recursive classes, casts and type tests, and recursive methods. Programs are annotated with security levels, constrainedby security typing rules. A noninterference theorem shows how the rules ensure pointer confinement and secure information flow.

Denotational semantics is given for a Java-like language with pointers, subclassing and dynamic dispatch, class oriented visibility control, recursive types and methods, and privilege-based access control. Representation independence (relational parametricity) is proved, using a semantic notion of confinement similar to ones for which static disciplines have been recently proposed.

We show how to translate the region calculus of M. Tofte and J.P. Talpin (1997), a typed lambda calculus that can statically delimit the lifetimes of objects, into an extension of the polymorphic lambda calculus called F/sub #/. We give a denotational semantics of F/sub #/, and use it to give a simple and abstract proof of the correctness of memory deallocation.

Notions of program dependency arise in many settings: security, partial evaluation, program slicing, and call-tracking. We argue that there is a central notion of dependency common to these settings that can be captured within a single calculus, the Dependency Core Calculus (DCC), a small extension of Moggi's computational lambda calculus. To establish this thesis, we translate typed calculi for secure information flow, binding-time analysis, slicing, and call-tracking into DCC. The translations help clarify aspects of the source calculi. We also define a semantic model for DCC and use it to give simple proofs of noninterference results for each case.

We observe that the principal typing property of a type system is the enabling technology for modularity and separate compilation [10]. We use this technology to formulate a modular and polyvariant closure analysis, based on the rank 2 intersection types annotated with control-flow information.Modularity manifests itself in a syntax-directed, annotated-type inference algorithm that can analyse program fragments containing free variables: a principal typing property is used to formalise it. Polyvariance manifests itself in the separation of different behaviours of the same function at its different uses: this is formalised via the rank 2 intersection types. As the rank 2 intersection type discipline types at least all (core) ML programs, our analysis can be used in the separate compilation of such programs.