János Flesch

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4ranked-venue papers
2as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
0000-0001-9599-4615ORCID · verified

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Theory of computation · 3 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 Games Characterizing Limsup Functions and Baire Class 1 Functions
abstract
Abstract We consider a real-valued function f defined on the set of infinite branches X of a countably branching pruned tree T. The function f is said to be a limsup function if there is a function $u \colon T \to \mathbb {R}$ such that $f(x) = \limsup _{t \to \infty } u(x_{0},\dots ,x_{t})$ for each $x \in X$ . We study a game characterization of limsup functions, as well as a novel game characterization of functions of Baire class 1.
Márton Elekes 0002, János Flesch, Viktor Kiss, Donát Nagy, Márk Poór, Arkadi Predtetchinski
J. Symb. Log.2
2018 Simplifying optimal strategies in limsup and liminf stochastic games
János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski, William D. Sudderth
Discret. Appl. Math.1
2016 Online Learning and Blackwell Approachability in Quitting Games
abstract
We consider the sequential decision problem known as regret minimization, or more precisely its generalization to the vectorial or multi-criteria setup called Blackwell approachability. We assume that Nature, the decision maker, or both, might have some quitting (or terminating) actions so that the stream of payoffs is constant whenever they are chosen. We call those environments “quitting games”. We characterize convex target sets \cC that are Blackwell approachable, in the sense that the decision maker has a policy ensuring that the expected average vector payoff converges to \cC at some given horizon known in advance. Moreover, we also compare these results to the cases where the horizon is not known and show that, unlike in standard online learning literature, the necessary or sufficient conditions for the anytime version of this problem are drastically different than those for the fixed horizon.
János Flesch, Rida Laraki, Vianney Perchet
COLT1
2014 Existence of Secure Equilibrium in Multi-player Games with Perfect Information
Julie De Pril, János Flesch, Jeroen Kuipers, Gijs Schoenmakers, Koos Vrieze
MFCS (2)2