We provide optimal solutions to an institution that has distributional objectives when choosing from a set of applications based on merit (or priority). For example, in college admissions, administrators may want to admit a diverse class in addition to choosing students with the highest qualifications. We provide a family of choice rules that maximize merit subject to attaining a level of the distributional objective. We study the desirable properties of choice rules in this family and use them to find all subsets of applications on the Pareto frontier of the distributional objective and merit. In addition, we provide two novel characterizations of matroids. A full version is available at https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.00237.

Path independence is arguably one of the most important choice rule properties in economic theory. We show that a choice rule is path independent if and only if it is rationalizable by a utility function satisfying ordinal concavity, a concept closely related to concavity notions in discrete mathematics. We also provide a rationalization result for choice rules that satisfy path independence and the law of aggregate demand. A full version is available at https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.00892.

In a matching market with distributional objectives, we study the existence of mechanisms that weakly improve the distributional objective (compared to a status-quo matching), and satisfy constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.