Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) enable promising solutions in assisting data collection in wide-area distributed sensor networks, leveraging their advanced properties of high mobility and line-of-sight communication links. However, existing UAV-assisted data collection methods mainly focus on unilaterally maximizing the utility of UAVs or sensors. Unfortunately, the problem driven by the market economy is ignored, namely the game between buyer and seller, in the process of sensors competing for UAV services. To address this problem, we propose a group-buying coalition auction method that encourages sensors to form coalitions to bid for UAV data collection services. Then, a parallel variable neighborhood ascent search algorithm is designed to quickly search the approximately optimal group-buying coalition structure. We further propose a novel group-buying coalition auction method, named TRUST, which can ensure the economical properties, i.e., truthfulness, individual rationality, and maximization of social welfare. Numerical results show that the sensors' average age of information (AoI) under the proposed method is reduced by 16.7% and 44.5% compared with the coalition formation game (CFG) and joint trajectory design-task scheduling (TDTS) UAV-to-community methods. To our best knowledge, this is the first effort on truthful coalition formation-based group-buying auction.

With their high mobility, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) become appealing data collectors in hard-to-reach wide-area distributed sensor networks. Different from existing works focusing on the perspective of UAVs for service order optimization and UAV utility maximization, we consider the utilities of both sensors and UAVs, and innovatively model the competition among sensors (buyers) for the service of UAVs (sellers) as an auction game. A “unity makes strength” strategy is exploited. That is, to strengthen the bidding competitiveness, a group-buying coalition auction method that encourages sensors to form coalitions to bid for UAV service is proposed. Besides, we propose a parallel variable neighborhood ascent search algorithm, we can quickly determine the approximately optimal group-buying coalition structure. Numerical results show that the proposed method outperforms the joint trajectory design-task scheduling (TDTS) UAV-to-community method and the single coalition formation game (CFG) method.