VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
David A. Molnar
dblp:69/3116
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2013
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
2 papers |
Software testing · 87% Program analysis · 13% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Systems and software security · 100% |
Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Software testing
fuzzing |
0.2 | 2 | 2013 | Billions and billions of constraints: whitebox fuzz testing in production · ICSE 2013 Automated Whitebox Fuzz Testing · NDSS 2008 |
Software testing › fuzzing
whitebox fuzzing |
0.2 | 2 | 2013 | Billions and billions of constraints: whitebox fuzz testing in production · ICSE 2013 Automated Whitebox Fuzz Testing · NDSS 2008 |
Software testing › test generation
constraint-based test generation |
0.2 | 1 | 2013 | Billions and billions of constraints: whitebox fuzz testing in production · ICSE 2013 |
Program analysis › symbolic execution
dynamic symbolic execution |
0.0 | 1 | 2013 | Billions and billions of constraints: whitebox fuzz testing in production · ICSE 2013 |
Program analysis
symbolic execution |
0.0 | 1 | 2013 | Billions and billions of constraints: whitebox fuzz testing in production · ICSE 2013 |
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery |
0.0 | 1 | 2008 | Automated Whitebox Fuzz Testing · NDSS 2008 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
constraint solving · 0.2SMT solving · 0.2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | Billions and billions of constraints: whitebox fuzz testing in productionabstractWe report experiences with constraint-based whitebox fuzz testing in production across hundreds of large Windows applications and over 500 machine years of computation from 2007 to 2013. Whitebox fuzzing leverages symbolic execution on binary traces and constraint solving to construct new inputs to a program. These inputs execute previously uncovered paths or trigger security vulnerabilities. Whitebox fuzzing has found one-third of all file fuzzing bugs during the development of Windows 7, saving millions of dollars in potential security vulnerabilities. The technique is in use today across multiple products at Microsoft. We describe key challenges with running whitebox fuzzing in production. We give principles for addressing these challenges and describe two new systems built from these principles: SAGAN, which collects data from every fuzzing run for further analysis, and JobCenter, which controls deployment of our whitebox fuzzing infrastructure across commodity virtual machines. Since June 2010, SAGAN has logged over 3.4 billion constraints solved, millions of symbolic executions, and tens of millions of test cases generated. Our work represents the largest scale deployment of whitebox fuzzing to date, including the largest usage ever for a Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solver. We present specific data analyses that improved our production use of whitebox fuzzing. Finally we report data on the performance of constraint solving and dynamic test generation that points toward future research problems. Ella Bounimova, Patrice Godefroid, David A. Molnar |
ICSE | 3 |
| 2008 | Active property checkingabstractRuntime property checking (as implemented in tools like Purify or Valgrind) checks whether a program execution satisfies a property. Active property checking extends runtime checking by checking whether the property is satisfied by all program executions that follow the same program path. This check is performed on a symbolic execution of the given program path using a constraint solver. If the check fails, the constraint solver generates an alternative program input triggering a new program execution that follows the same program path but exhibits a property violation. Combined with systematic dynamic test generation, which attempts to exercise all feasible paths in a program, active property checking defines a new form of dynamic software model checking (program verification). In this paper, we formalize and study active property checking. We show how static and dynamic type checking can be extended with active type checking. Then, we discuss how to implement active property checking efficiently. Finally, we discuss results of experiments with media playing applications on Windows, where active property checking was able to detect several new security-related bugs. Patrice Godefroid, Michael Y. Levin, David A. Molnar |
EMSOFT | 3 |
| 2008 | Automated Whitebox Fuzz Testing
Patrice Godefroid, Michael Y. Levin, David A. Molnar |
NDSS | 3 |