A transient hardware fault occurs when an energetic particle strikes a transistor, causing it to change state. Although transient faults do not permanently damage the hardware, they may corrupt computations by altering stored values and signal transfers. In this paper, we propose a new scheme for provably safe and reliable computing in the presence of transient hardware faults. In our scheme, software computations are replicated to provide redundancy while special instructions compare the independently computed results to detect errors before writing critical data. In stark contrast to any previous efforts in this area, we have analyzed our fault tolerance scheme from a formal, theoretical perspective. To be specific, first, we provide an operational semantics for our assembly language, which includes a precise formal definition of our fault model. Second, we develop an assembly-level type system designed to detect reliability problems in compiled code. Third, we provide a formal specification for program fault tolerance under the given fault model and prove that all well-typed programs are indeed fault tolerant. In addition to the formal analysis, we evaluate our detection scheme and show that it only takes 34% longer to execute than the unreliable version.

As chip densities and clock rates increase, processors are becoming more susceptible to transient faults that can affect program correctness. Computer architects have typically addressed reliability issues by adding redundant hardware, but these techniques are often too expensive to be used widely. Software-only reliability techniques have shown promise in their ability to protect against soft-errors without any hardware overhead. However, existing low-level software-only fault tolerance techniques have only addressed the problem of detecting faults, leaving recovery largely unaddressed. In this paper, we present the concept, implementation, and evaluation of automatic, instruction-level, software-only recovery techniques, as well as various specific techniques representing different trade-offs between reliability and performance. Our evaluation shows that these techniques fulfill the promises of instruction-level, software-only fault tolerance by offering a wide range of flexible recovery options

A transient hardware fault occurs when an energetic particle strikes a transistor, causing it to change state. These faults do not cause permanent damage, but may result in incorrect program execution by altering signal transfers or stored values. While the likelihood that such transient faults will cause any significant damage may seem remote, over the last several years transient faults have caused costly failures in high-end machines at America Online, eBay, and the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center, among others [6, 44, 15]. Because susceptibility to transient faults is proportional to the size and density of transistors, the problem of transient faults will become increasingly important in the coming decades.This paper defines the first formal, type-theoretic framework for studying reliable computation in the presence of transient faults. More specifically, it defines λzap, a lambda calculus that exhibits intermittent data faults. In order to detect and recover from these faults, λzap programs replicate intermediate computations and use majority voting, thereby modeling software-based fault tolerance techniques studied extensively, but informally [10, 20, 30, 31, 32, 33, 41].To ensure that programs maintain the proper invariants and use λzap primitives correctly, the paper defines a type system for the language. This type system guarantees that well-typed programs can tolerate any single data fault. To demonstrate that λzap can serve as an idealized typed intermediate language, we define a type-preserving translation from a standard simply-typed lambda calculus into λzap.

To improve performance and reduce power, processor designers employ advances that shrink feature sizes, lower voltage levels, reduce noise margins, and increase clock rates. However, these advances make processors more susceptible to transient faults that can affect correctness. While reliable systems typically employ hardware techniques to address soft-errors, software techniques can provide a lower-cost and more flexible alternative. This paper presents a novel, software-only, transient-fault-detection technique, called SWIFT. SWIFT efficiently manages redundancy by reclaiming unused instruction-level resources present during the execution of most programs. SWIFT also provides a high level of protection and performance with an enhanced control-flow checking mechanism. We evaluate an implementation of SWIFT on an Itanium 2 which demonstrates exceptional fault coverage with a reasonable performance cost. Compared to the best known single-threaded approach utilizing an ECC memory system, SWIFT demonstrates a 51% average speedup.

As chip densities and clock rates increase, processors are becoming more susceptible to transient faults that can affect program correctness. Up to now, system designers have primarily considered hardware-only and software-only fault-detection mechanisms to identify and mitigate the deleterious effects of transient faults. These two fault-detection systems, however, are extremes in the design space, representing sharp trade-offs between hardware cost, reliability, and performance. In this paper, we identify hybrid hardware/software fault-detection mechanisms as promising alternatives to hardware-only and software-only systems. These hybrid systems offer designers more options to fit their reliability needs within their hardware and performance budgets. We propose and evaluate CRAFT, a suite of three such hybrid techniques, to illustrate the potential of the hybrid approach. For fair, quantitative comparisons among hardware, software, and hybrid systems, we introduce a new metric, mean work to failure, which is able to compare systems for which machine instructions do not represent a constant unit of work. Additionally, we present a new simulation framework which rapidly assesses reliability and does not depend on manual identification of failure modes. Our evaluation illustrates that CRAFT, and hybrid techniques in general, offer attractive options in the fault-detection design space.

Traditional fault-tolerance techniques typically utilize resources ineffectively because they cannot adapt to the changing reliability and performance demands of a system. This paper proposes software-controlled fault tolerance, a concept allowing designers and users to tailor their performance and reliability for each situation. Several software-controllable fault-detection techniques are then presented: SWIFT, a software-only technique, and CRAFT, a suite of hybrid hardware/software techniques. Finally, the paper introduces PROFiT, a technique which adjusts the level of protection and performance at fine granularities through software control. When coupled with software-controllable techniques like SWIFT and CRAFT, PROFiT offers attractive and novel reliability options.

Even as modern computing systems allow the manipulation and distribution of massive amounts of information, users of these systems are unable to manage the confidentiality of their data in a practical fashion. Conventional access control security mechanisms cannot prevent the illegitimate use of privileged data once access is granted. For example, information provided by a user during an online purchase may be covertly delivered to malicious third parties by an untrustworthy web browser. Existing information-flow security mechanisms do provide this assurance, but only for programmer-specified policies enforced during program development as a static analysis on special-purpose type-safe languages. Not only are these techniques not applicable to many commonly used programs, but they leave the user with no defense against malicious programmers or altered binaries. In this paper, we propose RIFLE, a runtime information-flow security system designed from the user's perspective. By addressing information-flow security using architectural support, RIFLE gives users a practical way to enforce their own information-flow security policy on all programs. We prove that, contrary to statements in the literature, run-time systems like RIFLE are no less secure than existing language-based techniques. Using a model of the architectural framework and a binary translator, we demonstrate RIFLE's correctness and illustrate that the performance cost is reasonable.