Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of stability, has attracted a lot of attention. However, the natural process by which players, starting from any feasible state, strive to reach an equilibrium after a series of unilateral improving deviations, has been less studied. We investigate the convergence of dynamics towards individually stable outcomes under the following perspective: what are the most general classes of preferences and graph topologies guaranteeing convergence? To this aim, on the one hand, we cover a hierarchy of preferences, ranging from the most general to a subcase of additively separable preferences, including individually rational and monotone cases. On the other hand, given that convergence may fail in graphs admitting a cycle even in our most restrictive preference class, we analyze acyclic graph topologies such as trees, paths, and stars.

Many allocation and matching problems (e.g., student-school assignments, job allocation, organ donation) involve coupling agents based on mutual preferences. A central requirement in matching problems is that of stability, that is classically defined as follows: a matching is stable if no blocking pair exists, where a blocking pair is a pair of agents preferring each other over their assigned partners. We assume that matchings are constrained by a given undirected acceptability graph: two agents may be matched only if they are connected by an edge. While stable matchings are guaranteed for specific graph topologies, such as bipartite graphs, stability is not always achievable in more general scenarios. In this paper, we introduce a relaxed notion of stability, yielding to the study of approximately stable matching. Specifically, we define a matching as approximately stable if there exists no k-blocking pair, i.e., no pair of agents who could both improve their assigned partners by at least k positions in their respective preference rankings, by forming a new match together. This refinement captures the idea that small agent gains may not justify a deviation. We provide some theoretical results about the existence and computability of approximately stable matchings, revealing their strengths as well as their inherent limitations. We believe that the introduced notion of approximate stability, along with our foundational findings, constitute a solid basis for future research on matching problems.

The core is a well-known and fundamental notion of stability in games intended to model coalition formation such as hedonic games: an outcome is core stable if there exists no blocking coalition , i.e., no set of agents that may profit by forming a coalition together. The fact that the cardinality of a blocking coalition, i.e., the number of deviating agents that have to coordinate themselves, can be arbitrarily high, and the fact that agents may benefit only by a tiny amount from their deviation, while they could incur in a higher cost for deviating, suggest that the core is not able to suitably model practical scenarios in large and highly distributed multi-agent systems. For this reason, we consider relaxed core stable outcomes where the notion of permissible deviations is modified along two orthogonal directions: the former takes into account the size q of the deviating coalition, and the latter the amount of utility gain, in terms of a multiplicative factor k , for each member of the deviating coalition. These changes result in two different notions of stability, namely, the q-size core and k-improvement core . We consider fractional hedonic games, that is a well-known subclass of hedonic games for which core stable outcomes are not guaranteed to exist and it is computationally hard to decide non-emptiness of the core; we investigate these relaxed concepts of stability with respect to their existence, computability and performance in terms of price of anarchy and price of stability, by providing in many cases tight or almost tight bounds. Interestingly, the considered relaxed notions of core also possess the appealing property of recovering, in some notable cases, the convergence, the existence and the possibility of computing stable solutions in polynomial time.

The core is a well-known and fundamental notion of stability in games intended to model coalition formation such as hedonic games. The fact that the number of deviating agents (that have to coordinate themselves) can be arbitrarily high, and the fact that agents may benefit only by a tiny amount from their deviation (while they could incur in a cost for deviating), suggest that the core is not able to suitably model many practical scenarios in large and highly distributed multi-agent systems. For this reason, we consider relaxed core stable outcomes where the notion of permissible deviations is modified along two orthogonal directions: the former takes into account the size of the deviating coalition, and the latter the amount of utility gain for each member of the deviating coalition. These changes result in two different notions of stability, namely, the q-size core and k-improvement core. We investigate these concepts of stability in fractional hedonic games, that is a well-known subclass of hedonic games for which core stable outcomes are not guaranteed to exist and it is computationally hard to decide nonemptiness of the core. Interestingly, the considered relaxed notions of core also possess the appealing property of recovering, in some notable cases, the convergence, the existence and the possibility of computing stable solutions in polynomial time.

We consider weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree d ≥ 1 . For these games, we investigate the existence and efficiency of approximate pure Nash equilibria which are obtained through sequences of unilateral improvement moves by the players. By exploiting a simple technique, we firstly show that these games admit an infinite set of d -approximate potential functions. This implies that there always exists a d -approximate pure Nash equilibrium which can be reached through any sequence of d -approximate improvement moves by the players. As a corollary, we also obtain that, under mild assumptions on the structure of the players' strategies, these games also admit a constant approximate potential function. Secondly, using a simple potential function argument, we are able to show that a ( d + δ ) -approximate pure Nash equilibrium of cost at most ( d + 1 ) / ( d + δ ) times the cost of an optimal state always exists, for every δ ∈ [ 0 , 1 ] .

Friedkin and Johnsen (1990) modeled opinion formation in social networks as a dynamic process which evolves in rounds: at each round each agent updates her expressed opinion to a weighted average of her innate belief and the opinions expressed in the previous round by her social neighbors. The stubbornness level of an agent represents the tendency of the agent to express an opinion close to her innate belief. Motivated by the observation that innate beliefs, stubbornness levels and even social relations can co-evolve together with the expressed opinions, we present a new model of opinion formation where the dynamics runs in a co-evolving environment. We assume that agents’ stubbornness and social relations can vary arbitrarily, while their innate beliefs slowly change as a function of the opinions they expressed in the past. We prove that, in our model, the opinion formation dynamics converges to a consensus if reasonable conditions on the structure of the social relationships and on how the personal beliefs can change are satisfied. Moreover, we discuss how this result applies in several simpler (but realistic) settings.

The generalized group activity selection problem (GGASP) consists in assigning agents to activities according to their preferences, which depend on both the activity and the set of its participants. We consider additively separable GGASPs, where every agent has a separate valuation for each activity as well as for any other agent, and her overall utility is given by the sum of the valuations she has for the selected activity and its participants. Depending on the nature of the agents' valuations, nine different variants of the problem arise. We completely characterize the complexity of computing a social optimum and provide approximation algorithms for the NP-hard cases. We also focus on Nash stable outcomes, for which we give some complexity results and a full picture of the related performance by providing tights bounds on both the price of anarchy and the price of stability.

We consider fractional hedonic games, a subclass of coalition formation games that can be succinctly modeled by means of a graph in which nodes represent agents and edge weights the degree of preference of the corresponding endpoints. The happiness or utility of an agent for being in a coalition is the average value she ascribes to its members. We adopt Nash stable outcomes as the target solution concept; that is we focus on states in which no agent can improve her utility by unilaterally changing her own group. We provide existence, efficiency and complexity results for games played on both general and specific graph topologies. As to the efficiency results, we mainly study the quality of the best Nash stable outcome and refer to the ratio between the social welfare of an optimal coalition structure and the one of such an equilibrium as to the price of stability. In this respect, we remark that a best Nash stable outcome has a natural meaning of stability, since it is the optimal solution among the ones which can be accepted by selfish agents. We provide upper and lower bounds on the price of stability for different topologies, both in case of weighted and unweighted edges. Beside the results for general graphs, we give refined bounds for various specific cases, such as triangle-free, bipartite graphs and tree graphs. For these families, we also show how to efficiently compute Nash stable outcomes with provable good social welfare.

We revisit fundamental problems in undirected and directed graphs, such as the problems of computing spanning trees, shortest paths, steiner trees, and spanning arborescences of minimum cost. We assume that there are d different cost functions associated with the edges of the input graph and seek for solutions to the resulting multidimensional graph problems so that the p-norm of the different costs of the solution is minimized. We present combinatorial algorithms that achieve very good approximations for this objective. The main advantage of our algorithms is their simplicity: they are as simple as classical combinatorial graph algorithms of Dijkstra and Kruskal, or the greedy algorithm for matroids.

We investigate the issues of existence and efficiency of lookahead equilibria in congestion games. Lookahead equilibria, whose study has been initiated by Mirrokniet al.(2012), correspond to the natural extension of pure Nash equilibria in which the players, when making use of global information in order to predict subsequent reactions of the other ones, have computationally limited capabilities.

Price of Anarchy measures the welfare loss caused by selfish behavior: it is defined as the ratio of the social welfare in a socially optimal outcome and in a worst Nash equilibrium. A similar measure can be derived for other classes of stable outcomes. In this paper, we argue that Pareto optimality can be seen as a notion of stability, and introduce the concept of Price of Pareto Optimality: this is an analogue of the Price of Anarchy, where the maximum is computed over the class of Pareto optimal outcomes, i.e., outcomes that do not permit a deviation by the grand coalition that makes all players weakly better off and some players strictly better off. As a case study, we focus on hedonic games, and provide lower and upper bounds of the Price of Pareto Optimality in three classes of hedonic games: additively separable hedonic games, fractional hedonic games, and modified fractional hedonic games; for fractional hedonic games on trees our bounds are tight.

A ride sharing problem is considered where we are given a graph, whose edges are equipped with a travel cost, plus a set of objects, each associated with a transportation request given by a pair of origin and destination nodes. A vehicle travels through the graph, carrying each object from its origin to its destination without any bound on the number of objects that can be simultaneously transported. The vehicle starts and terminates its ride at given nodes, and the goal is to compute a minimum-cost ride satisfying all requests. This ride sharing problem is shown to be tractable on paths by designing a O(h*log(h)+n) algorithm, with h being the number of distinct requests and with n being the number of nodes in the path. The algorithm is then used as a subroutine to efficiently solve instances defined over cycles, hence covering all graphs with maximum degree 2. This traces the frontier of tractability, since NP-hard instances are exhibited over trees whose maximum degree is 3.

We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of pure Nash equilibria is guaranteed by potential function arguments. Unfortunately, this proof of existence is inefficient and computing pure Nash equilibria in such games is a PLS-hard problem even when all players have unit weights. The situation gets worse when superlinear (e.g., quadratic) latency functions come into play; in this case, the Nash dynamics of the game may contain cycles and pure Nash equilibria may not even exist. Given these obstacles, we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria as alternative solution concepts. Do such equilibria exist? And if so, can we compute them efficiently?

The efficient design of networks has been an important engineering task that involves challenging combinatorial optimization problems. Typically, a network designer has to select among several alternatives which links to establish so that the resulting network satisfies a given set of connectivity requirements and the cost of establishing the network links is as low as possible. The Minimum Spanning Tree problem, which is well-understood, is a nice example. In this paper, we consider the natural scenario in which the connectivity requirements are posed by selfish users who have agreed to share the cost of the network to be established according to a well-defined rule. The design proposed by the network designer should now be consistent not only with the connectivity requirements but also with the selfishness of the users. Essentially, the users are players in a so-called network design game and the network designer has to propose a design that is an equilibrium for this game. As it is usually the case when selfishness comes into play, such equilibria may be suboptimal. In this paper, we consider the following question: can the network designer enforce particular designs as equilibria or guarantee that efficient designs are consistent with users' selfishness by appropriately subsidizing some of the network links? In an attempt to understand this question, we formulate corresponding optimization problems and present positive and negative results.

We investigate the speed of convergence of best response dynamics to approximately optimal solutions in congestion games with linear delay functions. In Ackermann et al. [2008] it has been shown that the convergence time of such dynamics to Nash equilibrium may be exponential in the number of playersn. Motivated by such a negative result, we focus on the study of the states (not necessarily being equilibria) reached after a limited number of players' selfish moves, and we show that Θ(nlog logn) best responses are necessary and sufficient to achieve states that approximate the optimal solution by a constant factor, under the assumption that everyO(n) steps each player performs a constant (and nonnull) number of best responses. We show that such result is tight also for the simplest case of singleton congestion games.

Congestion games constitute an important class of games in which computing an exact or even approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general PLS-complete. We present a surprisingly simple polynomial-time algorithm that computes O(1)-approximate Nash equilibria in these games. In particular, for congestion games with linear latency functions, our algorithm computes (2 +ε)-approximate pure Nash equilibria in time polynomial in the number of players, the number of resources and 1/ε. It also applies to games with polynomial latency functions with constant maximum degree d: there, the approximation guarantee is do(d). The algorithm essentially identifies a polynomially long sequence of best-response moves that lead to an approximate equilibrium; the existence of such short sequences is interesting in itself. These are the first positive algorithmic results for approximate equilibria in non-symmetric congestion games. We strengthen them further by proving that, for congestion games that deviate from our mild assumptions, computing ρ-approximate equilibria is PLS-complete for any polynomial-time computable ρ.

An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems is to understand how groups of selfish players can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality. We consider settings where each team's profit is given by a concave function, and propose three profit-sharing schemes, each of which is based on the concept of marginal utility. The agents are assumed to be myopic, i.e., they keep changing teams as long as they can increase their payoff by doing so. We study the properties (such as closeness to Nash equilibrium or total profit) of the states that result after a polynomial number of such moves, and prove bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability of the corresponding games.

We introduce a new general framework for the analysis of non cooperative games with limited social knowledge. Such an incomplete knowledge is modeled by means of a social graph G in which nodes represent players and there is an edge from i to j if i knows j, with the assumption that the payoff of each player is affected only by the strategies of the adjacent ones. In particular, we consider congestion games with linear latency functions in which each player is aware only of a subset of all the other ones. We first give a complete characterization of the games possessing pure Nash equilibria, and then investigate the impact of the limited knowledge of the players on the performance of the game, in terms of price of anarchy and price of stability.

We investigate the convergence of the price of anarchy after a limited number of moves in the classical multicast communication game when the underlying communication networks is directed. Namely, a subset of nodes of the network are interested in receiving the transmission from a given source node and can share the cost of the used links according to fixed cost sharing methods. At each step, a single receiver is allowed to modify its communication strategy, that is to select a communication path from the source, and assuming a sel?sh or rational behavior, it will make a best response move, that is it will select a solution yielding the minimum possible payment or shared cost. We determine lower and upper bounds on the price of anarchy,that is the highest possible ratio among the overall cost of the links used by the receivers and the minimum possible cost realizing the required communications, after a limited number of moves under the fundamental Shapley cost sharing method. In particular, assuming that the initial set of connecting paths can be arbitrary, we show an O(r√r) upper bound on the price of anarchy after 2 rounds, during each of which all the receivers move exactly once, and a matching lower bound, that we also extend to Ω(rk√r)for any number k =≥ 2 rounds, where r is the number of receivers. Similarly, exactly matching upper and lower bounds equal to r are determined for any number of rounds when starting from the empty state in which no path has been selected. Analogous results are obtained also with respect to other three natural cost sharing methods considered in the literature, that is the egalitarian, path-proportional and egalitarian-path proportional ones. Most results are also extended to the undirected case in which the communication links are bidirectional.