As large-scale theft of data from corporate servers is becoming increasingly common, it becomes interesting to examine alternatives to the paradigm of centralizing sensitive data into large databases. Instead, one could use cryptography and distributed computation so that sensitive data can be supplied and processed in encrypted form, and only the final result is made known. In this paper, we examine how such a paradigm can be used to implement constraint satisfaction, a technique that can solve a broad class of AI problems such as resource allocation, planning, scheduling, and diagnosis. Most previous work on privacy in constraint satisfaction only attempted to protect specific types of information, in particular the feasibility of particular combinations of decisions. We formalize and extend these restricted notions of privacy by introducing four types of private information, including the feasibility of decisions and the final decisions made, but also the identities of the participants and the topology of the problem. We present distributed algorithms that allow computing solutions to constraint satisfaction problems while maintaining these four types of privacy. We formally prove the privacy properties of these algorithms, and show experiments that compare their respective performance on benchmark problems.

In many real-life optimization problems involving multiple agents, the rewards are not necessarily known exactly in advance, but rather depend on sources of exogenous uncertainty. For instance, delivery companies might have to coordinate to choose who should serve which foreseen customer, under uncertainty in the locations of the customers. The framework of Distributed Constraint Optimization under Stochastic Uncertainty was proposed to model such problems; in this paper, we generalize this formalism by introducing the concept of evaluation functions that model various optimization criteria. We take the example of three such evaluation functions, expectation, consensus, and robustness, and we adapt and generalize two previous algorithms accordingly. Our experimental results on a class of Vehicle Routing Problems show that incomplete algorithms are not only cheaper than complete ones (in terms of simulated time, Non-Concurrent Constraint Checks, and information exchange), but they are also often able to find the optimal solution. We also show that exchanging more information about the dependencies of their respective cost functions on the sources of uncertainty can help the agents discover higher-quality solutions.