This paper examines the legal issues related to the access and use of call detail records (CDRs) of telephone subscribers that are maintained by service providers. The scenarios considered involve a federal law enforcement agency obtaining CDRs to identify suspects in a terrorism investigation; a federal, state or local law enforcement agency analyzing CDRs to gain insight into drug trafficking activities by an organized crime family; and a state or local law enforcement agency using CDRs to identify parole violators or motorists who exceed the posted speed limit. In addition, the legality of a service provider analyzing CDRs to support its direct marketing efforts is discussed.

Journaling is a relatively new feature of modern file systems that is not yet exploited by most digital forensic tools. A file system journal caches data to be written to the file system to ensure that it is not lost in the event of a power loss or system malfunction. Analysis of journal data can identify which files were overwritten recently. Indeed, under the right circumstances, analyzing a file system journal can reveal deleted files and previous versions of files without having to review the hex dump of a drive. This paper discusses data recovery from ReiserFS and ext3, two popular journaled file systems. It also describes a Java-based tool for analyzing ext3 file system journals and recovering data pertaining to overwritten and deleted files.

This paper describes a novel tool forremotely “fingerprinting” computers used in criminal activity. The tool employs network scanning and machine identification techniques to acquire a fingerprint of a computer over the Internet. The fingerprint includes identifying information about the operating system, banners, enumerations and services. Once the computer is seized, it is connected to a closed network and scanned again to produce a second fingerprint to check against the original. Two scenarios - one related to investigating pedophiles and the other involving an illegal website - are examined. Legal issues pertaining to the use of computer fingerprinting in criminal investigations are also discussed.

Software developers rely on sophisticated programming language protection models and APIs to manifest security policies for Internet applications. These tools do not provide suitable expressiveness for fine-grained, configurable policies. Nor do they ensure the consistency of a given policy impleme ntation across objects in a heterogeneous environment. Programmable access control provides syntactic and semantic constructs in programming languages for systematically embedding security functionality within applications. Secure interoperability is of utmost importance in a distributed heterogeneous environment. This paper introduces a methodology for programmable security by language extension, as well as a prototype model and implementation of JPAC, a programmable access control extension to Java. A coordination language is also presented to support secure interoperability within the framework.

The paper presents a formalism for the analysis of e-commerce protocols. The approach integrates logics and process calculi, providing an expressive message passing semantics and sophisticated constructs for modeling principals. A common set of inference rules for communication, reduction and information analysis supports proofs about message passing, the knowledge and behavior of principals, and protocol properties. The power of the formalism is illustrated with an analysis of the NetBill Protocol.

Existing software infrastructures and middleware provide uniform security services across heterogeneous information networks. However few, if any, tools exist that support access control policy management for and between large enterprise information networks. Insiders often exploit gaps in policies to mount devastating attacks. This paper presents a Policy Machine and Policy Mediation Architecture for coordinating diverse policies in large information networks. The language-based approach adopted by each of these technologies permits local and global access control policy validation with static analysis and other formal techniques. Together the Policy Machine and Policy Mediation Architecture comprise an effective system for closing policy gaps in multi-enterprise environments.

This paper describes an extension of the Java language that provides programmable security. The approach augments the Java syntax with constructs for specifying various access control policies for Java packages, including DAC, MAC, RBAC and TBAC. A primitive ticket based mechanism serves as the foundation for programmable security. The implementation incorporates a preprocessor for language translation and a security service library that implements the ticket management infrastructure. The preprocessor translates the extended Java source code to native Java for eventual bytecode interpretation simultaneously binding security services to the native code. The design is simple and flexible and provides developers with an effective tool for programming security within Java packages.

The design and implementation of authorization services for distributed object systems are hindered by the semantic diversity of object models, the brittleness of access control mechanisms, and the lack of design and analysis tools. This paper presents a primitive ticket-based access control archit ecture that can model a variety of authorization policies. The access control architecture is integrated within a primitive distributed object model that can capture most distributed object languages and systems. The integration provides a common foundation for access control in heterogeneous distributed object systems, instrumental to achieving high assurance secure interoperability.

Coordinating security policies in information enclaves is challenging due to their heterogeneity and autonomy. Administrators must reconcile the semantic diversity of data and security models before negotiating secure interoperation. This paper proposes an architecture that uses mediators and a primitive ticket-based authorization model to manage disparate policies in information enclaves. The formal foundation of the architecture facilitates static and dynamic analysis of global consistency and policy enforcement.

Knowledge discovery in databases can be enhanced by introducing "catalytic relations" conveying external knowledge. The new information catalyzes database inference, manifesting latent channels. Catalytic inference is imprecise in nature, but the granularity of inference may be fine enough to create security compromises. Catalytic inference is computationally intensive. However, it can be automated by advanced search engines that gather and assemble knowledge from information repositories. The relentless information gathering potential of such search engines makes them formidable security threats. This paper presents a formalism for modeling and analyzing catalytic inference in "mixed" databases containing various precise, imprecise and fuzzy relations. The inference formalism is flexible and robust, and well-suited to implementation.