Core stability is a natural and well-studied notion for group fairness in multi-winner voting, where the task is to select a committee from a pool of candidates. We study the setting where voters either approve or disapprove of each candidate; here, it remains a major open problem whether a core-stable committee always exists. In this work, we develop an approach based on mixed-integer linear programming for deciding whether and when core-stable committees are guaranteed to exist. In contrast to SAT-based approaches popular in computational social choice, our method can produce proofs for a specific number of candidates independent of the number of voters. In addition to these computational gains, our program lends itself to a novel duality-based reformulation of the core stability problem, from which we obtain new existence results in special cases. Further, we use our framework to reveal previously unknown relationships between core stability and other desirable properties, such as notions of priceability.

We study the approval-based multi-winner election problem where \(n\) voters jointly decide a committee of \(k\) winners from \(m\) candidates. We focus on the axiom average justified representation (AJR) proposed by Fernández, Elkind, Lackner, García, Arias-Fisteus, Basanta-Val, and Skowron (2017). AJR postulates that every group of voters with a common preference should be sufficiently represented in that their average satisfaction should be no less than their Hare quota. Formally, for every group of \(\lceil \ell \cdot \tfrac{n}{k} \rceil\) voters with \(\ell\) common approved candidates, the average number of approved winners for this group should be at least \(\ell\). It is well-known that a winning committee satisfying AJR is not guaranteed to exist for all multi-winner election instances. In this paper, we study the likelihood of the existence of AJR under the Erdos–Rényi model. We consider the Erdos–Rényi model parameterized by \(p \in [0,1]\) that samples multi-winner election instances from the distribution where each voter approves each candidate with probability \(p\) (and the events that voters approve candidates are independent), and we provide a clean and complete characterization of the existence of AJR committees in the case where \(m\) is a constant and \(n\) tends to infinity. We show that there are two phase transition points \(p_1\) and \(p_2\) (with \(p_1 \le p_2\)) for the parameter \(p\) such that: 1) when \(p \lt p_1\) or \(p \gt p_2\), an AJR committee exists with probability \(1 - o(1)\), 2) when \(p_1 \lt p \lt p_2\), an AJR committee exists with probability \(o(1)\), and 3) when \(p = p_1\) or \(p = p_2\), the probability that an AJR committee exists is bounded away from both \(0\) and \(1\).

We investigate majority voting where agents possess private information about an unobservable ground truth that determines their preferences. In such settings, agents may hold different preferences and (collectively) engage in counterintuitive strategic behaviors. Previous work either assumes strategic behavior occurs without coordination or with unlimited coordination, yielding overly inclusive or exclusive predictions about voting outcomes. We incorporate coordination ability—the largest coalition size at which agents could strategically coordinate—into the analysis. Under the ex-ante Bayesian k-strong equilibrium framework, where no group of at most k agents can benefit from deviation, we provide closed-form characterizations of when informed majority decisions, the decision favored by the majority if the ground truth is common knowledge, are achievable. Specifically, we determine (1) when all k-strong equilibria reach the informed majority decision and (2) when at least one such equilibrium exists. These conditions depend on three factors: coordination ability, fraction of majority agents, and information structure. The boundary for the second question exhibits surprising complexity--non-continuous, non-linear, and segmental. Our results reveal the complicated landscape and provide refined predictions for strategic behavior across different coordination levels.

We study the voting problem with two alternatives where voters' preferences depend on a not-directly-observable state variable. While equilibria in the one-round voting mechanisms lead to a good decision, they are usually hard to compute and follow. We consider the two-round voting mechanism where the first round serves as a polling stage and the winning alternative only depends on the outcome of the second round. We show that the two-round voting mechanism is a powerful tool for making collective decisions. Firstly, every (approximated) equilibrium in the two-round voting mechanisms (asymptotically) leads to the decision preferred by the majority as if the state of the world were revealed to the voters. Moreover, there exist natural equilibria in the two-round game following intuitive behaviors such as informative voting, sincere voting, and surprisingly popular strategies. This sharply contrasts with the one-round voting mechanisms in the previous literature, where no simple equilibrium is known. Finally, we show that every equilibrium in the standard one-round majority vote mechanism gives an equilibrium in the two-round mechanisms that is not more complicated. Therefore, the two-round voting mechanism provides a natural equilibrium in every instance, including those where one-round voting fails, and it can reach an informed majority decision whenever one-round voting can. Our experiments on LLM voters also imply that two-round voting leads to the correct outcome more often than one-round voting under some circumstances.

In this paper, we investigate tradeoffs among differential privacy (DP) and several important voting axioms: Pareto efficiency, SD-efficiency, PC-efficiency, Condorcet criterion, and Condorcet loser criterion. We provide upper and lower bounds on the two-way tradeoffs between DP and each axiom. We also provide upper and lower bounds on three-way tradeoffs among DP and every pairwise combination of all the axioms, showing that, while the axioms are compatible without DP, their upper bounds cannot be achieved simultaneously under DP. Our results illustrate the effect of DP on the satisfaction and compatibility of voting axioms.

We characterize the maximum likelihood that two voting rule outcomes are different and that the winner of one voting rule is the loser of another (implying that they are {\em drastically different}) on positional scoring rules, Condorcet winner/loser, Copeland, Ranked Pairs, and STV (Single Transferable Vote) under any fixed number of alternatives. The most famous problem in this scope is strong Borda’s paradox, in which the winner of the plurality rule is the Condorcet loser. Under mild assumptions, we show that the maximum likelihood that different rules are drastically different is $\Theta(1)$ except for a few special cases, demonstrating the difference between these rules. We also prove that two scoring rules with linear independent scoring vectors have different winners with probability $\Theta(1)$, no matter how similar they are. Our analysis adopts the {\em smoothed social choice framework} \cite{xia2020smoothed} and can be applied to a variety of statistical models, including the standard impartial culture (IC).

We study the group strategic behaviors in Bayesian games. Equilibria in previous work do not consider group strategic behaviors with bounded sizes and are too ''strong'' to exist in many scenarios. We propose the ex-ante Bayesian k-strong equilibrium and the Bayesian k-strong equilibrium, where no group of at most k agents can benefit from deviation. The two solution concepts differ in how agents calculate their utilities when contemplating whether a deviation is beneficial. Intuitively, agents are more conservative in the Bayesian k-strong equilibrium than in the ex-ante Bayesian k-strong equilibrium. With our solution concepts, we study collusion in the peer prediction mechanisms, as a representative of the Bayesian games with group strategic behaviors. We characterize the thresholds of the group size k so that truthful reporting in the peer prediction mechanism is an equilibrium for each solution concept, respectively. Our solution concepts can serve as criteria to evaluate the robustness of a peer prediction mechanism against collusion. Besides the peer prediction problem, we also discuss two other potential applications of our new solution concepts, voting and Blotto games, where introducing bounded group sizes provides more fine-grained insights into the behavior of strategic agents.

A well-regarded fairness notion when dividing indivisible chores is envy-freeness up to one item (EF1), which requires that pairwise envy can be eliminated by the removal of a single item. While an EF1 and Pareto optimal (PO) allocation of goods can always be found via well-known algorithms, even the existence of such solutions for chores remains open, to date. We take an epistemic approach utilizing information asymmetry by introducing dubious chores–items that inflict no cost on receiving agents but are perceived costly by others. On a technical level, dubious chores provide a more fine-grained approximation of envy-freeness than EF1. We show that finding allocations with minimal number of dubious chores is computationally hard. Nonetheless, we prove the existence of envy-free and fractional PO allocations for n agents with only 2n−2 dubious chores and strengthen it to n−1 dubious chores in four special classes of valuations. Our experimental analysis demonstrates that often only a few dubious chores are needed to achieve envy-freeness.

Designing private voting rules is an important and pressing problem for trustworthy democracy. In this paper, under the framework of differential privacy, we propose a novel famliy of randomized voting rules based on the well-known Condorcet method, and focus on three classes of voting rules in this family: Laplacian Condorcet method (CMLAP), exponential Condorcet method (CMEXP), and randomized response Condorcet method (CMRR), where λ represents the level of noise. We prove that all of our rules satisfy absolute monotonicity, lexi-participation, probabilistic Pareto efficiency, approximate probabilistic Condorcet criterion, and approximate SD-strategyproofness. In addition, CMRR satisfies (non-approximate) probabilistic Condorcet criterion, while CMLAP and CMEXP satisfy strong lexi-participation. Finally, we regard differential privacy as a voting axiom, and discuss its relations to other axioms.

Truth discovery is a general name for a broad range of statistical methods aimed to extract the correct answers to questions, based on multiple answers coming from noisy sources. For example, workers in a crowdsourcing platform. In this paper, we consider an extremely simple heuristic for estimating workers' competence using average proximity to other workers. We prove that this estimates well the actual competence level and enables separating high and low quality workers in a wide spectrum of domains and statistical models. Under Gaussian noise, this simple estimate is the unique solution to the MLE with a constant regularization factor. Finally, weighing workers according to their average proximity in a crowdsourcing setting, results in substantial improvement over unweighted aggregation and other truth discovery algorithms in practice.

The Condorcet criterion (CC) is a classical and well-accepted criterion for voting. Unfortunately, it is incompatible with many other desiderata including participation (PAR), half-way monotonicity (HM), Maskin monotonicity (MM), and strategy-proofness (SP). Such incompatibilities are often known as impossibility theorems, and are proved by worst-case analysis. Previous work has investigated the likelihood for these impossibilities to occur under certain models, which are often criticized of being unrealistic. We strengthen previous work by proving the first set of semi-random impossibilities for voting rules to satisfy CC and the more general, group versions of the four desiderata: for any sufficiently large number of voters n, any size of the group 1

For the assignment problem where multiple indivisible items are allocated to a group of agents given their ordinal preferences, we design randomized mechanisms that satisfy first-choice maximality (FCM), i.e., maximizing the number of agents assigned their first choices, together with Pareto efficiency (PE). Our mechanisms also provide guarantees of ex-ante and ex-post fairness. The generalized eager Boston mechanism is ex-ante envy-free, and ex-post envy-free up to one item (EF1). The generalized probabilistic Boston mechanism is also ex-post EF1, and satisfies ex-ante efficiency instead of fairness. We also show that no strategyproof mechanism satisfies ex-post PE, EF1, and FCM simultaneously. In doing so, we expand the frontiers of simultaneously providing efficiency and both ex-ante and ex-post fairness guarantees for the assignment problem.

We study strategic behavior in iterative plurality voting for multiple issues under uncertainty. We introduce a model synthesizing simultaneous multi-issue voting with local dominance theory, in which agents repeatedly update their votes based on sets of vote profiles they deem possible, and determine its convergence properties. After demonstrating that local dominance improvement dynamics may fail to converge, we present two sufficient model refinements that guarantee convergence from any initial vote profile for binary issues: constraining agents to have O-legal preferences, where issues are ordered by importance, and endowing agents with less uncertainty about issues they are modifying than others. Our empirical studies demonstrate that while cycles are common for agents without uncertainty, introducing uncertainty makes convergence almost guaranteed in practice.

Voting is used widely to aggregate preferences to make a collective decision. In this paper, we focus on evaluating and designing voting rules that support both the privacy of the voting agents and a notion of fairness over such agents. First, we introduce a novel notion of group fairness and adopt the existing notion of local differential privacy. We then evaluate the level of group fairness in several existing voting rules, as well as the trade-offs between fairness and privacy, showing that it is not possible to always obtain maximal economic efficiency with high fairness. Then, we present both a machine learning and a constrained optimization approach to design new voting rules that are fair while maintaining a high level of economic efficiency. Finally, we empirically examine the effect of adding noise to create local differentially private voting rules and discuss the three-way trade-off between economic efficiency, fairness, and privacy.

We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the "correct" decision, outperforming the common non-strategic behavior of informative voting and sincere voting. Our results give merit to strategic voting for making good decisions.

For centuries, it has been widely believed that the influence of a small coalition of voters is negligible in a large election. Consequently, there is a large body of literature on characterizing the likelihood for an election to be influenced when the votes follow certain distributions, especially the likelihood of being manipulable by a single voter under the i.i.d. uniform distribution, known as the Impartial Culture (IC).

Studying the computational complexity and designing fast algorithms for determining winners under voting rules are classical and fundamental questions in computational social choice. In this paper, we accelerate voting by leveraging quantum computation: we propose a quantum-accelerated voting algorithm that can be applied to any anonymous voting rule. We show that our algorithm can be quadratically faster than any classical algorithm (based on sampling with replacement) under a wide range of common voting rules, including positional scoring rules, Copeland, and single transferable voting (STV). Precisely, our quantum-accelerated voting algorithm outputs the correct winner with high probability in $\Theta\left(\frac{n}{\text{MOV}}\right)$ time, where $n$ is the number of votes and $\text{MOV}$ is margin of victory, the smallest number of voters to change the winner. In contrast, any classical voting algorithm based on sampling with replacement requires $\Omega\left(\frac{n^2}{\text{MOV}^2}\right)$ time under a large class of voting rules. Our theoretical results are supported by experiments under plurality, Borda, Copeland, and STV.

In the assignment problem, the goal is to assign indivisible items to agents who have ordinal preferences, efficiently and fairly, in a strategyproof manner. In practice, first-choice maximality, i.e., assigning a maximal number of agents their top items, is often identified as an important efficiency criterion and measure of agents' satisfaction. In this paper, we propose a natural and intuitive efficiency property, favoring-eagerness-for-remaining-items (FERI), which requires that each item is allocated to an agent who ranks it highest among remaining items, thereby implying first-choice maximality. Using FERI as a heuristic, we design mechanisms that satisfy ex-post or ex-ante variants of FERI together with combinations of other desirable properties of efficiency (Pareto-efficiency), fairness (strong equal treatment of equals and sd-weak-envy-freeness), and strategyproofness (sd-weak-strategyproofness). We also explore the limits of FERI mechanisms in providing stronger efficiency, fairness, or strategyproofness guarantees through impossibility results.

When aggregating logically interconnected judgements from n agents, the result might be logically inconsistent. This phenomenon is known as the doctrinal paradox, which plays a central role in the field of judgement aggregation. Previous work has mostly focused on the worst-case analysis of the doctrinal paradox, leading to many impossibility results. Little is known about its likelihood of occurrence in practical settings, except for the study under certain distributions by List in 2005. In this paper, we characterize the likelihood of the doctrinal paradox under a general and realistic model called semi-random social choice framework (proposed by Xia in 2020). In the framework, agents' ground truth judgements can be arbitrarily correlated, while the noises are independent. Our main theorem states that under mild conditions, the semi-random likelihood of the doctrinal paradox is either 0, exp(-Θ(n)), Θ(n\^~(-0.5)) or Θ(1). This not only answers open questions by List in 2005, but also draws clear lines between situations with frequent paradoxes and with vanishing paradoxes.

Gerrymandering is the manipulation of redistricting to influence the results of a set of elections for local representatives. Gerrymandering has the potential to drastically swing power in legislative bodies even with no change in a population’s political views. Identifying gerrymandering and measuring fairness using metrics of proposed district plans is a topic of current research, but there is less work on how such plans will be perceived by voters. Gathering data on such perceptions presents several challenges such as the ambiguous definitions of ‘fair’ and the complexity of real world geography and district plans. We present a dataset collected from an online crowdsourcing platform on a survey asking respondents to mark which of two maps of equal population distribution but different districts appear more ‘fair’ and the reasoning for their decision. We performed preliminary analysis on this data and identified which of several commonly suggested metrics are most predictive of the responses. We found that the maximum perimeter of any district was the most predictive metric, especially with participants who reported that they made their decision based on the shape of the districts.

Random Utility Models (RUMs), which subsume Plackett-Luce model (PL) as a special case, are among the most popular models for preference learning. In this paper, we consider RUMs with features and their mixtures, where each alternative has a vector of features, possibly different across agents. Such models significantly generalize the standard PL and RUMs, but are not as well investigated in the literature. We extend mixtures of RUMs with features to models that generate incomplete preferences and characterize their identifiability. For PL, we prove that when PL with features is identifiable, its MLE is consistent with a strictly concave objective function under mild assumptions, by characterizing a bound on root-mean-square-error (RMSE), which naturally leads to a sample complexity bound. We also characterize identifiability of more general RUMs with features and propose a generalized RBCML to learn them. Our experiments on synthetic data demonstrate the effectiveness of MLE on PL with features with tradeoffs between statistical efficiency and computational efficiency. Our experiments on real-world data show the prediction power of PL with features and its mixtures.

Voting is used widely to identify a collective decision for a group of agents, based on their preferences. In this paper, we focus on evaluating and designing voting rules that support both the privacy of the voting agents and a notion of fairness over such agents. To do this, we introduce a novel notion of group fairness and adopt the existing notion of local differential privacy. We then evaluate the level of group fairness in several existing voting rules, as well as the trade-offs between fairness and privacy, showing that it is not possible to always obtain maximal economic efficiency with high fairness or high privacy levels. Then, we present both a machine learning and a constrained optimization approach to design new voting rules that are fair while maintaining a high level of economic efficiency. Finally, we empirically examine the effect of adding noise to create local differentially private voting rules and discuss the three-way trade-off between economic efficiency, fairness, and privacy. This paper appears in the special track on AI & Society.

We study a model of proxy voting where the candidates, voters, and proxies are all located on the real line, and instead of voting directly, each voter delegates its vote to the closest proxy. The goal is to find a set of proxies that is theta-representative, which entails that for any voter located anywhere on the line, its favorite candidate is within a distance theta of the favorite candidate of its closest proxy. This property guarantees a strong form of representation as the set of voters is not required to be fixed in advance, or even be finite. We show that for candidates located on a line, an optimal proxy arrangement can be computed in polynomial time. Moreover, we provide upper and lower bounds on the number of proxies required to form a theta-representative set, thus showing that a relatively small number of proxies is enough to capture the preferences of any set of voters. An additional beneficial property of a theta-representative proxy arrangement is that for strict-Condorcet voting rules, the outcome of proxy voting is similarly close to the outcome of direct voting.

We introduce the Online Preference Reporting and Aggregation (OPRA) system, an open-source online system that aims at providing support for group decision-making. We illustrate OPRA's distinctive features: UI for reporting rankings with ties, comprehensive analytics of preferences, and group decision-making in combinatorial domains. We also discuss our work in an automatic mentor matching system. We hope that the open-source nature of OPRA will foster development of computerized group decision support systems.

Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) provides a strong and intuitive guarantee of fairness in the allocation of indivisible goods. But whether such allocations always exist or whether they can be efficiently computed remains an important open question. We study the existence and computation of EFX in conjunction with various other economic properties under lexicographic preferences--a well-studied preference restriction model in artificial intelligence and economics. In sharp contrast to the known results for additive valuations, we not only prove the existence of EFX and Pareto optimal allocations, but in fact provide an algorithmic characterization of these two properties. We also characterize the mechanisms that are, in addition, strategyproof, non-bossy, and neutral. When the efficiency notion is strengthened to rank-maximality, we obtain non-existence and computational hardness results, and show that tractability can be restored when EFX is relaxed to another well-studied fairness notion called maximin share guarantee (MMS).

The computational complexity of winner determination under common voting rules is a classical and fundamental topic in the field of computational social choice. Previous work has established the NP-hardness of winner determination under some commonly-studied voting rules, such as the Kemeny rule and the Slater rule. In a recent position paper, Baumeister, Hogrebe, and Rothe (2020) questioned the relevance of the worst-case nature of NP-hardness in social choice and proposed to conduct smoothed complexity analysis (Spielman and Teng 2009) under Blaser and Manthey’s (2015) framework. In this paper, we develop the first smoothed complexity results for winner determination in voting. We prove the smoothed hardness of Kemeny and Slater using the classical smoothed runtime analysis, and prove a parameterized typical-case smoothed easiness result for Kemeny. We also make an attempt of applying Blaser and Manthey’s (2015) smoothed complexity framework in social choice contexts by proving that the framework categorizes an always-exponential-time brute force search algorithm as being smoothed poly-time, under a natural noise model based on the well-studied Mallows model in social choice and statistics. Overall, our results show that smoothed complexity analysis in computational social choice is a challenging and fruitful topic.

Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA) as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and worst-case equilibrium profiles resulting from repeated strategic manipulations. While iterative plurality has been shown to only return alternatives with at most one less initial votes than the truthful winner, it is less understood how agents' welfare changes in equilibrium. To this end, we differentiate agents' utility from their manipulation mechanism and determine iterative plurality's ADPoA in the worst- and average-cases. We first prove that the worst-case ADPoA is linear in the number of agents. To overcome this negative result, we study the average-case ADPoA and prove that equilibrium winners have a constant order welfare advantage over the truthful winner in expectation. Our positive results illustrate the prospect for social welfare to increase due to strategic manipulation.

We initiate the work towards a comprehensive picture of the worst average-case satisfaction of voting axioms in semi-random models, to provide a finer and more realistic foundation for comparing voting rules. We adopt the semi-random model and formulation in [Xia 2020], where an adversary chooses arbitrarily correlated ``ground truth'' preferences for the agents, on top of which random noises are added. We focus on characterizing the semi-random satisfaction of two well-studied voting axioms: Condorcet criterion and participation. We prove that for any fixed number of alternatives, when the number of voters $n$ is sufficiently large, the semi-random satisfaction of the Condorcet criterion under a wide range of voting rules is $1$, $1-\exp(-\Theta(n))$, $\Theta(n^{-0.5})$, $ \exp(-\Theta(n))$, or being $\Theta(1)$ and $1-\Theta(1)$ at the same time; and the semi-random satisfaction of participation is $1-\Theta(n^{-0.5})$. Our results address open questions by Berg and Lepelley in 1994, and also confirm the following high-level message: the Condorcet criterion is a bigger concern than participation under realistic models.

No abstract available.

Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is a well-studied fairness notion for indivisible goods that addresses pairwise envy by the removal of at most one good. In the worst case, each pair of agents might require the (hypothetical) removal of a different good, resulting in a weak aggregate guarantee. We study allocations that are nearly envy-free in aggregate, and define a novel fairness notion based on information withholding. Under this notion, an agent can withhold (or hide) some of the goods in its bundle and reveal the remaining goods to the other agents. We observe that in practice, envy-freeness can be achieved by withholding only a small number of goods overall. We show that finding allocations that withhold an optimal number of goods is computationally hard even for highly restricted classes of valuations. In contrast to the worst-case results, our experiments on synthetic and real-world preference data show that existing algorithms for finding EF1 allocations withhold a close-to-optimal amount of information.

We propose multi-type probabilistic serial (MPS) and multi-type random priority (MRP) as extensions of the well-known PS and RP mechanisms to the multi-type resource allocation problems (MTRAs) with partial preferences. In our setting, there are multiple types of divisible items, and a group of agents who have partial order preferences over bundles consisting of one item of each type. We show that for the unrestricted domain of partial order preferences, no mechanism satisfies both sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness. Notwithstanding this impossibility result, our main message is positive: When agents' preferences are represented by acyclic CP-nets, MPS satisfies sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, ordinal fairness, and upper invariance, while MRP satisfies ex-post-efficiency, sd-strategyproofness, and upper invariance, recovering the properties of PS and RP. Besides, we propose a hybrid mechanism, multi-type general dictatorship (MGD), combining the ideas of MPS and MRP, which satisfies sd-efficiency, equal treatment of equals and decomposability under the unrestricted domain of partial order preferences.

Dual learning has been successfully applied in many machine learning applications including machine translation, image-to-image transformation, etc. The high-level idea of dual learning is very intuitive: if we map an $x$ from one domain to another and then map it back, we should recover the original $x$. Although its effectiveness has been empirically verified, theoretical understanding of dual learning is still very limited. In this paper, we aim at understanding why and when dual learning works. Based on our theoretical analysis, we further extend dual learning by introducing more related mappings and propose multi-step dual learning, in which we leverage feedback signals from additional domains to improve the qualities of the mappings. We prove that multi-step dual learning can boost the performance of standard dual learning under mild conditions. Experiments on WMT 14 English↔German and MultiUN English↔French translations verify our theoretical findings on dual learning, and the results on the translations among English, French, and Spanish of MultiUN demonstrate the effectiveness of multi-step dual learning

We develop a framework that leverages the smoothed complexity analysis by Spielman and Teng to circumvent paradoxes and impossibility theorems in social choice, motivated by modern applications of social choice powered by AI and ML. For Condrocet’s paradox, we prove that the smoothed likelihood of the paradox either vanishes at an exponential rate as the number of agents increases, or does not vanish at all. For the ANR impossibility on the non-existence of voting rules that simultaneously satisfy anonymity, neutrality, and resolvability, we characterize the rate for the impossibility to vanish, to be either polynomially fast or exponentially fast. We also propose a novel easy-to-compute tie-breaking mechanism that optimally preserves anonymity and neutrality for even number of alternatives in natural settings. Our results illustrate the smoothed possibility of social choice—even though the paradox and the impossibility theorem hold in the worst case, they may not be a big concern in practice.

Differential privacy has been widely applied to provide privacy guarantees by adding random noise to the function output. However, it inevitably fails in many high-stakes voting scenarios, where voting rules are required to be deterministic. In this work, we present the first framework for answering the question:“How private are commonly-used voting rules?" Our answers are two-fold. First, we show that deterministic voting rules provide sufficient privacy in the sense of distributional differential privacy (DDP). We show that assuming the adversarial observer has uncertainty about individual votes, even publishing the histogram of votes achieves good DDP. Second, we introduce the notion of exact privacy to compare the privacy preserved in various commonly-studied voting rules, and obtain dichotomy theorems of exact DDP within a large subset of voting rules called generalized scoring rules.

We address the following question in this paper: “What are the most robust statistical methods for social choice?” By leveraging the theory of uniformly least favorable distributions in the Neyman-Pearson framework to finite models and randomized tests, we characterize uniformly most powerful (UMP) tests, which is a well-accepted statistical optimality w.r.t. robustness, for testing whether a given alternative is the winner under Mallows’ model and under Condorcet’s model, respectively.

This paper studies a stylized, yet natural, learning-to-rank problem and points out the critical incorrectness of a widely used nearest neighbor algorithm. We consider a model with n agents (users) {xi}i∈[n] and m alternatives (items) {yl}l∈[m], each of which is associated with a latent feature vector. Agents rank items nondeterministically according to the Plackett-Luce model, where the higher the utility of an item to the agent, the more likely this item will be ranked high by the agent. Our goal is to identify near neighbors of an arbitrary agent in the latent space for prediction.We first show that the Kendall-tau distance based kNN produces incorrect results in our model. Next, we propose a new anchor-based algorithm to find neighbors of an agent. A salient feature of our algorithm is that it leverages the rankings of many other agents (the so-called “anchors”) to determine the closeness/similarities of two agents. We provide a rigorous analysis for one-dimensional latent space, and complement the theoretical results with experiments on synthetic and real datasets. The experiments confirm that the new algorithm is robust and practical.

We propose an EM-based framework for learning Plackett-Luce model and its mixtures from partial orders. The core of our framework is the efficient sampling of linear extensions of partial orders under Plackett-Luce model. We propose two Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) samplers: Gibbs sampler and the generalized repeated insertion method tuned by MCMC (GRIM-MCMC), and prove the efficiency of GRIM-MCMC for a large class of preferences.Experiments on synthetic data show that the algorithm with Gibbs sampler outperforms that with GRIM-MCMC. Experiments on real-world data show that the likelihood of test dataset increases when (i) partial orders provide more information; or (ii) the number of components in mixtures of PlackettLuce model increases.

We extend the Top-Trading-Cycles (TTC) mechanism to select strict core allocations for housing markets with multiple types of items, where each agent may be endowed and allocated with multiple items of each type. In doing so, we advance the state of the art in mechanism design for housing markets along two dimensions: First, our setting is more general than multi-type housing markets (Moulin 1995; Sikdar, Adali, and Xia 2017) and the setting of Fujita et al. (2015). Further, we introduce housing markets with acceptable bundles (HMABs) as a more general setting where each agent may have arbitrary sets of acceptable bundles. Second, our extension of TTC is strict core selecting under the weaker restriction on preferences of CMI-trees, which we introduce as a new domain restriction on preferences that generalizes commonly-studied languages in previous works.

STV and ranked pairs (RP) are two well-studied voting rules for group decision-making. They proceed in multiple rounds, and are affected by how ties are broken in each round. However, the literature is surprisingly vague about how ties should be broken. We propose the first algorithms for computing the set of alternatives that are winners under some tiebreaking mechanism under STV and RP, which is also known as parallel-universes tiebreaking (PUT). Unfortunately, PUT-winners are NP-complete to compute under STV and RP, and standard search algorithms from AI do not apply. We propose multiple DFS-based algorithms along with pruning strategies, heuristics, sampling and machine learning to prioritize search direction to significantly improve the performance. We also propose novel ILP formulations for PUT-winners under STV and RP, respectively. Experiments on synthetic and realworld data show that our algorithms are overall faster than ILP.

As large eye-tracking datasets are created, data privacy is a pressing concern for the eye-tracking community. De-identifying data does not guarantee privacy because multiple datasets can be linked for inferences. A common belief is that aggregating individuals' data into composite representations such as heatmaps protects the individual. However, we analytically examine the privacy of (noise-free) heatmaps and show that they do not guarantee privacy. We further propose two noise mechanisms that guarantee privacy and analyze their privacy-utility tradeoff. Analysis reveals that our Gaussian noise mechanism is an elegant solution to preserve privacy for heatmaps. Our results have implications for interdisciplinary research to create differentially private mechanisms for eye tracking.

Consider the following problem faced by an online voting platform: A user is provided with a list of alternatives, and is asked to rank them in order of preference using only drag-and-drop operations. The platform's goal is to recommend an initial ranking that minimizes the time spent by the user in arriving at her desired ranking. We develop the first optimization framework to address this problem, and make theoretical as well as practical contributions. On the practical side, our experiments on the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform provide two interesting insights about user behavior: First, that users' ranking strategies closely resemble selection or insertion sort, and second, that the time taken for a drag-and-drop operation depends linearly on the number of positions moved. These insights directly motivate our theoretical model of the optimization problem. We show that computing an optimal recommendation is NP-hard, and provide exact and approximation algorithms for a variety of special cases of the problem. Experimental evaluation on MTurk shows that, compared to a random recommendation strategy, the proposed approach reduces the (average) time-to-rank by up to 50%.

In fair division, equitability dictates that each participant receives the same level of utility. In this work, we study equitable allocations of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. While prior work has studied (approximate) equitability in isolation, we consider equitability in conjunction with other well-studied notions of fairness and economic efficiency. We show that the Leximin algorithm produces an allocation that satisfies equitability up to any good and Pareto optimality. We also give a novel algorithm that guarantees Pareto optimality and equitability up to one good in pseudopolynomial time. Our experiments on real-world preference data reveal that approximate envy-freeness, approximate equitability, and Pareto optimality can often be achieved simultaneously.

Mixtures of ranking models have been widely used for heterogeneous preferences. However, learning a mixture model is highly nontrivial, especially when the dataset consists of partial orders. In such cases, the parameter of the model may not be even identifiable. In this paper, we focus on three popular structures of partial orders: ranked top-$l_1$, $l_2$-way, and choice data over a subset of alternatives. We prove that when the dataset consists of combinations of ranked top-$l_1$ and $l_2$-way (or choice data over up to $l_2$ alternatives), mixture of $k$ Plackett-Luce models is not identifiable when $l_1+l_2\le 2k-1$ ($l_2$ is set to $1$ when there are no $l_2$-way orders). We also prove that under some combinations, including ranked top-$3$, ranked top-$2$ plus $2$-way, and choice data over up to $4$ alternatives, mixtures of two Plackett-Luce models are identifiable. Guided by our theoretical results, we propose efficient generalized method of moments (GMM) algorithms to learn mixtures of two Plackett-Luce models, which are proven consistent. Our experiments demonstrate the efficacy of our algorithms. Moreover, we show that when full rankings are available, learning from different marginal events (partial orders) provides tradeoffs between statistical efficiency and computational efficiency.

Depression is becoming a serious global health problem worldwide, with an increasing number of patients suffering from anxiety and other disorders. Our work aims to provide the appropriate social support (SS) to the prevention of depression for highly anxious undergraduates. We used 1425 undergraduates from 18 universities in China via a cluster random sampling method for the survey on the self-rating anxiety scale, the self-rating depression scale, and the SS scale for anxiety and depression. Based on the collected questionnaire data, we first reveal that the distribution of both anxiety data and depression data follows a Gaussian distribution. Then, a Gaussian mixture model is adopted for clustering these data in terms of anxiety index and depression index. According to the observations extracted from the clusters, the correlation among anxiety, depression, and SS is investigated by a correlation analysis method. Finally, the corresponding moderating effect of SS between anxiety and depression is figured out via the hierarchical multiple regression analysis. The detailed analysis indicates that the high-level SS, such as the help and support from individual's friends or family members, could reduce the risk for depression from highly anxious undergraduates.

We tackle the problem of identifiability and efficient learning of mixtures of Random Utility Models (RUMs). We show that when the PDFs of utility distributions are symmetric, the mixture of k RUMs (denoted by k-RUM) is not identifiable when the number of alternatives m is no more than 2k-1. On the other hand, when m ≥ max{4k-2,6}, any k-RUM is generically identifiable. We then propose three algorithms for learning mixtures of RUMs: an EM-based algorithm, which we call E-GMM, a direct generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) algorithm, and a sandwich (GMM-E-GMM) algorithm that combines the other two. Experiments on synthetic data show that the sandwich algorithm achieves the highest statistical efficiency and GMM is the most computationally efficient. Experiments on real-world data at Preflib show that Gaussian k-RUMs provide better fitness than a single Gaussian RUM, the Plackett-Luce model, and mixtures of Plackett-Luce models w.r.t. commonly-used model fitness criteria. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on learning mixtures of general RUMs.

We propose a novel and flexible rank-breaking-then-composite-marginal-likelihood (RBCML) framework for learning random utility models (RUMs), which include the Plackett-Luce model. We characterize conditions for the objective function of RBCML to be strictly log-concave by proving that strict log-concavity is preserved under convolution and marginalization. We characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for RBCML to satisfy consistency and asymptotic normality. Experiments on synthetic data show that RBCML for Gaussian RUMs achieves better statistical efficiency and computation efficiency than the state-of-the-art algorithm and our RBCML for the Plackett-Luce model provides flexible tradeoffs between running time and statistical efficiency.

Direct democracy, where each voter casts one vote, fails when the average voter competence falls below 50%. This happens in noisy settings when voters have limited information. Representative democracy, where voters choose representatives to vote, can be an elixir in both these situations. We introduce a mathematical model for studying representative democracy, in particular understanding the parameters of a representative democracy that gives maximum decision making capability. Our main result states that under general and natural conditions, for fixed voting cost, the optimal number of representatives is linear; for polynomial cost, the optimal number of representatives is logarithmic.

To design social choice mechanisms with desirable utility properties, normative properties, and low sample complexity, we propose a new randomized mechanism called 2-Agree. This mechanism asks random voters for their top alternatives until at least two voters agree, at which point it selects that alternative as the winner. We prove that, despite its simplicity and low sample complexity, 2-Agree achieves almost optimal distortion on a metric space when the number of alternatives is not large, and satisfies anonymity, neutrality, ex-post Pareto efficiency, very strong SD-participation, and is approximately truthful. We further show that 2-Agree works well for larger number of alternatives with decisive agents.

We study multi-type housing markets, where there are p ≥ 2 types of items, each agent is initially endowed one item of each type, and the goal is to design mechanisms without monetary transfer to (re)allocate items to the agents based on their preferences over bundles of items, such that each agent gets one item of each type. In sharp contrast to classical housing markets, previous studies in multi-type housing markets have been hindered by the lack of natural solution concepts, because the strict core might be empty. We break the barrier in the literature by leveraging AI techniques and making natural assumptions on agents’ preferences. We show that when agents’ preferences are lexicographic, even with different importance orders, the classical top-trading-cycles mechanism can be extended while preserving most of its nice properties. We also investigate computational complexity of checking whether an allocation is in the strict core and checking whether the strict core is empty. Our results convey an encouragingly positive message: it is possible to design good mechanisms for multi-type housing markets under natural assumptions on preferences.

There is increasing interest in promoting participatory democracy, in particular by allowing voting by mail or internet and through random-sample elections. A pernicious concern, though, is that of vote buying, which occurs when a bad actor seeks to buy ballots, paying someone to vote against their own intent. This becomes possible whenever a voter is able to sell evidence of which way she voted. We show how to thwart vote buying through decoy ballots, which are not counted but are indistinguishable from real ballots to a buyer. We show that an Election Authority can significantly reduce the power of vote buying through a small number of optimally distributed decoys, and model societal processes by which decoys could be distributed.

We summarize some of our recent work on using AI to improve group decision-making by taking a unified approach from statistics, economics, and computation. We then discuss a few ongoing and future directions.

Sequential allocation is a simple and attractive mechanism for the allocation of indivisible goods used in a number of real world settings. In sequential allocation, agents pick items according to a policy, the order in which agents take turns. Sequential allocation will return an allocation which is Pareto efficient – no agent can do better without others doing worse. However, sequential allocation may not return the outcome that optimizes the social welfare. We consider therefore the relationship between the welfare and the efficiency of the allocations returned by sequential allocation mechanisms. We then study some simple computational questions about what welfare is possible or necessary depending on the choice of policy. Over half the problems we study turn out to be tractable, and we give polynomial time algorithms to compute them. We also consider a novel control problem in which the Chair chooses a policy to improve social welfare. Again, many of the control problems we study turn out to be tractable, and our results give polynomial time algorithms. In this case, tractability is a good thing so that the Chair can improve the social welfare of the allocation.

In this paper we address the identifiability and efficient learning problems of finite mixtures of Plackett-Luce models for rank data. We prove that for any k≥2, the mixture of k Plackett-Luce models for no more than 2k-1 alternatives is non-identifiable and this bound is tight for k=2. For generic identifiability, we prove that the mixture of k Plackett-Luce models over m alternatives is \em generically identifiable if k≤⌊\frac m-2 2⌋!. We also propose an efficient generalized method of moments (GMM) algorithm to learn the mixture of two Plackett-Luce models and show that the algorithm is consistent. Our experiments show that our GMM algorithm is significantly faster than the EMM algorithm by Gormley & Murphy (2008), while achieving competitive statistical efficiency.

Crowdsourcing can be modeled as a principal-agent problem in which the principal (crowdsourcer) desires to solicit a maximal contribution from a group of agents (participants) while agents are only motivated to act according to their own respective advantages. To reconcile this tension, we propose an all-pay auction approach to incentivize agents to act in the principal’s interest, i.e., maximizing profit, while allowing agents to reap strictly positive utility. Our rationale for advocating all-pay auctions is based on two merits that we identify, namely all-pay auctions (i) compress the common, two-stage “bid-contribute” crowdsourcing process into a single “bid-cum-contribute” stage, and (ii) eliminate the risk of task nonfulfillment. In our proposed approach, we enhance all-pay auctions with two additional features: an adaptive prize and a general crowdsourcing environment. The prize or reward adapts itself as per a function of the unknown winning agent’s contribution, and the environment or setting generally accommodates incomplete and asymmetric information, risk-averse (and risk-neutral) agents, and a stochastic (and deterministic) population. We analytically derive this all-pay auction-based mechanism and extensively evaluate it in comparison to classic and optimized mechanisms. The results demonstrate that our proposed approach remarkably outperforms its counterparts in terms of the principal’s profit, agent’s utility, and social welfare.

We pursue a design by social choice, evaluation by statistics and computer science paradigm to build a principled framework for discovering new social choice mechanisms with desirable statistical, computational, and social choice axiomatic properties. Our new framework is called generalized decision scoring rules (GDSRs), which naturally extend generalized scoring rules [Xia and Conitzer 2008] to arbitrary preference space and decision space, including sets of alternatives with fixed or unfixed size, rankings, and sets of rankings. We show that GDSRs cover a wide range of existing mechanisms including MLEs, Chamberlin and Courant rule, and resolute, irresolute, and preference function versions of many commonly studied voting rules. We provide a characterization of statistical consistency for any GDSR w.r.t. any statistical model and asymptotically tight bounds on the convergence rate. We investigate the complexity of winner determination and a wide range of strategic behavior called vote operations for all GDSRs, and prove a general phase transition theorem on the minimum number of vote operations for the strategic entity to succeed. We also characterize GDSRs by two social choice normative properties: anonymity and finite local consistency.

We consider problems of approximate inference in which the query of interest is given by a complex formula (such as a formula in disjunctive formal form (DNF)) over a joint distribution given by a graphical model. We give a general reduction showing that (approximate) marginal inference for a class of distributions yields approximate inference for DNF queries, and extend our techniques to accommodate even more complex queries, and dense graphical models with variational inference, under certain conditions. Our results unify and generalize classical inference techniques (which are generally restricted to simple marginal queries) and approximate counting methods such as those introduced by Karp, Luby and Madras (which are generally restricted to product distributions).

Rank breaking is a methodology introduced by Azari Soufiani et al. (2013a) for applying a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) algorithm to the estimation of parametric ranking models. Breaking takes full rankings and breaks, or splits them up, into counts for pairs of alternatives that occur in particular positions (e.g., first place and second place, second place and third place). GMMs are of interest because they can achieve significant speed-up relative to maximum likelihood approaches and comparable statistical efficiency. We characterize the breakings for which the estimator is consistent for random utility models (RUMs) including Plackett-Luce and Normal-RUM, develop a general sufficient condition for a full breaking to be the only consistent breaking, and provide a trichotomy theorem in regard to single-edge breakings. Experimental results are presented to show the computational efficiency along with statistical performance of the proposed method.

We design an incentive mechanism based on all-pay auctions for participatory sensing. The organizer (principal) aims to attract a high amount of contribution from participating users (agents) while at the same time lowering his payout, which we formulate as a profit-maximization problem. We use a contribution-dependent prize function in an environment that is specifically tailored to participatory sensing, namely incomplete information (with information asymmetry), risk-averse agents, and stochastic population. We derive the optimal prize function that induces the maximum profit for the principal, while satisfying strict individual rationality (i.e., strictly have incentive to participate at equilibrium) for both risk-neutral and weakly risk-averse agents. The thus induced profit is demonstrated to be higher than the maximum profit induced by constant (yet optimized) prize. We also show that our results are readily extensible to cases of risk-neutral agents and deterministic populations.

We study a simple sequential allocation mechanism for allocating indivisible goods between agents in which agents take turns to pick items.We focus on agents behaving strategically. We view the allocation procedure as a finite repeated game with perfect information. We show that with just two agents, we can compute the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in linear time. With more agents, computing the subgame perfect Nash equilibria is more difficult. There can be an exponential number of equilibria and computing even one of them is PSPACE-hard. We identify a special case, when agents value many of the items identically, where we can efficiently compute the subgame perfect Nash equilibria. We also consider the effect of externalities and modifications to the mechanism that make it strategy proof.

In this paper we propose a class of efficient Generalized Method-of-Moments(GMM) algorithms for computing parameters of the Plackett-Luce model, where the data consists of full rankings over alternatives. Our technique is based on breaking the full rankings into pairwise comparisons, and then computing parameters that satisfy a set of generalized moment conditions. We identify conditions for the output of GMM to be unique, and identify a general class of consistent and inconsistent breakings. We then show by theory and experiments that our algorithms run significantly faster than the classical Minorize-Maximization (MM) algorithm, while achieving competitive statistical efficiency.

Schulze's rule and ranked pairs are two Condorcet methods that both satisfy many natural axiomatic properties. Schulze's rule is used in the elections of many organizations, including the Wikimedia Foundation, the Pirate Party of Sweden and Germany, the Debian project, and the Gento Project. Both rules are immune to control by cloning alternatives, but little is otherwise known about their strategic robustness, including resistance to manipulation by one or more voters, control by adding or deleting alternatives, adding or deleting votes, and bribery. Considering computational barriers, we show that these types of strategic behavior are NP-hard for ranked pairs (both constructive, in making an alternative a winner, and destructive, in precluding an alternative from being a winner). Schulze's rule, in comparison, remains vulnerable at least to constructive manipulation by a single voter and destructive manipulation by a coalition. As the first such polynomial-time rule known to resist all such manipulations, and considering also the broad axiomatic support, ranked pairs seems worthwhile to consider for practical applications.

In many mechanisms (especially online mechanisms), a strategic agent can influence the outcome by creating multiple false identities. We consider voting settings where the mechanism designer cannot completely prevent false-name manipulation, but may use false-name-limiting methods such as CAPTCHAs to influence the amount and characteristics of such manipulation. Such a designer would prefer, first, a high probability of obtaining the “correct” outcome, and second, a statistical method for evaluating the correctness of the outcome. In this paper, we focus on settings with two alternatives. We model voters as independently drawing a number of identities from a distribution that may be influenced by the choice of the false-name-limiting method. We give a criterion for the evaluation and comparison of these distributions. Then, given the results of an election in which false-name manipulation may have occurred, we propose and justify a statistical test for evaluating the outcome.

Random utility theory models an agents preferences on alternatives by drawing a real-valued score on each alternative (typically independently) from a parameterized distribution, and then ranking the alternatives according to scores. A special case that has received signicant attention is the Plackett-Luce model, for which fast inference methods for maximum likelihood estimators are available. This paper develops conditions on general random utility models that enable fast inference within a Bayesian framework through MC-EM, providing concave loglikelihood functions and bounded sets of global maxima solutions. Results on both real-world and simulated data provide support for the scalability of the approach and capability for model selection among general random utility models including Plackett-Luce.

The margin of victory of an election, defined as the smallest number k such that k voters can change the winner by voting differently, is an important measurement for robustness of the election outcome. It also plays an important role in implementing efficient post-election audits, which has been widely used in the United States to detect errors or fraud caused by malfunctions of electronic voting machines.

We consider manipulation problems when the manipulator only has partial information about the votes of the non-manipulators. Such partial information is described by an {\em information set}, which is the set of profiles of the non-manipulators that are indistinguishable to the manipulator. Given such an information set, a {\em dominating manipulation} is a non-truthful vote that the manipulator can cast which makes the winner at least as preferable (and sometimes more preferable) as the winner when the manipulator votes truthfully. When the manipulator has full information, computing whether or not there exists a dominating manipulation is in P for many common voting rules (by known results). We show that when the manipulator has no information, there is no dominating manipulation for many common voting rules. When the manipulator's information is represented by partial orders and only a small portion of the preferences are unknown, computing a dominating manipulation is NP-hard for many common voting rules. Our results thus throw light on whether we can prevent strategic behavior by limiting information about the votes of other voters.

Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules selecta winner by successively eliminatingcandidates with low Borda scores. We showthat these rules have a number of desirablecomputational properties. In particular,with unweighted votes, it isNP-hard to manipulate either rule with one manipulator, whilstwith weighted votes, it isNP-hard to manipulate either rule with a small number ofcandidates and a coalition of manipulators.As only a couple of other voting rulesare known to be NP-hard to manipulatewith a single manipulator, Nanson'sand Baldwin's rules appearto be particularly resistant to manipulation from a theoretical perspective.We also propose a number of approximation methodsfor manipulating these two rules.Experiments demonstrate that both rules areoften difficult to manipulate in practice.These results suggest that elimination stylevoting rules deserve further study.

In many settings, a group of voters must come to a joint decision on multiple issues. In practice, this is often done by voting on the issues in sequence. We model sequential voting in multi-issue domains as a complete-information extensive-form game, in which the voters are perfectly rational and their preferences are common knowledge. In each step, the voters simultaneously vote on one issue, and the order of the issues is given exogenously before the process. We call this model strategic sequential voting.

Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has been suggested to let agents submit partial orders instead. Then, given a voting rule, a profile of partial orders, and an alternative (candidate) c, two important questions arise: first, is it still possible for c to win, and second, is c guaranteed to win? These are the possible winner and necessary winner problems, respectively. Each of these two problems is further divided into two sub-problems: determining whether c is a unique winner (that is, c is the only winner), or determining whether c is a co-winner (that is, c is in the set of winners). We consider the setting where the number of alternatives is unbounded and the votes are unweighted. We completely characterize the complexity of possible/necessary winner problems for the following common voting rules: a class of positional scoring rules (including Borda), Copeland, maximin, Bucklin, ranked pairs, voting trees, and plurality with runoff.

In computational social choice, one important problem is to take the votes of a subelectorate (subset of the voters), and summarize them using a small number of bits. This needs to be done in such a way that, if all that we know is the summary, as well as the votes of voters outside the subelectorate, we can conclude which of the m alternatives wins. This corresponds to the notion of compilation complexity, the minimum number of bits required to summarize the votes for a particular rule, which was introduced by Chevaleyre et al. [IJCAI-09]. We study three different types of compilation complexity. The first, studied by Chevaleyre et al., depends on the size of the subelectorate but not on the size of the complement (the voters outside the subelectorate). The second depends on the size of the complement but not on the size of the subelectorate. The third depends on both. We first investigate the relations among the three types of compilation complexity. Then, we give upper and lower bounds on all three types of compilation complexity for the most prominent voting rules. We show that for l-approval (when l ≤ m/2), Borda, and Bucklin, the bounds for all three types are asymptotically tight, up to a multiplicative constant; for l-approval (when l > m/2), plurality with runoff, all Condorcet consistent rules that are based on unweighted majority graphs (including Copeland and voting trees), and all Condorcet consistent rules that are based on the order of pairwise elections (including ranked pairs and maximin), the bounds for all three types are asymptotically tight up to a multiplicative constant when the sizes of the subelectorate and its complement are both larger than m1+ε for some ε > 0.

We consider settings in which voters vote in sequence, each voter knows the votes of the earlier voters and the preferences of the later voters, and voters are strategic. This can be modeled as an extensive-form game of perfect information, which we call a Stackelberg voting game. We first propose a dynamic-programming algorithm for finding the backward-induction outcome for any Stackelberg voting game when the rule is anonymous; this algorithm is efficient if the number of alternatives is no more than a constant. We show how to use compilation functions to further reduce the time and space requirements. Our main theoretical results are paradoxes for the backward-induction outcomes of Stackelberg voting games. We show that for any n ≥ 5 and any voting rule that satisfies nonimposition and with a low domination index, there exists a profile consisting of n voters, such that the backward-induction outcome is ranked somewhere in the bottom two positions in almost every voter’s preferences. Moreover, this outcome loses all but one of its pairwise elections. Furthermore, we show that many common voting rules have a very low (= 1) domination index, including all majority-consistent voting rules. For the plurality and nomination rules, we show even stronger paradoxes. Finally, using our dynamic-programming algorithm, we run simulations to compare the backward-induction outcome of the Stackelberg voting game to the winner when voters vote truthfully, for the plurality and veto rules. Surprisingly, our experimental results suggest that on average, more voters prefer the backward-induction outcome.

The coalitional manipulation problem is one of the central problems in computational social choice. In this paper, we focus on solving the problem under the important family of positional scoring rules, in an approximate sense that was advocated by Zuckerman et al. [SODA 2008, AIJ 2009]. Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm with (roughly speaking) the following theoretical guarantee: given a manipulable instance with m alternatives, the algorithm finds a successful manipulation with at most m - 2 additional manipulators. Our technique is based on a reduction to the scheduling problem known as Q|pmtn|Cmax, along with a novel rounding procedure. We demonstrate that our analysis is tight by establishing a new type of integrality gap. We also resolve a known open question in computational social choice by showing that the coalitional manipulation problem remains (strongly) NP-complete for positional scoring rules even when votes are unweighted. Finally, we discuss the implications of our results with respect to the question: "Is there a prominent voting rule that is usually hard to manipulate?"

In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budget constraints. When only the valuations are private and the budgets are public, Dobzinski et al [8] show that the adaptive clinching auction is the unique incentive-compatible auction achieving Pareto-optimality. They further show that this auction is not truthful with private budgets, so that there is no deterministic Pareto-optimal auction with private budgets. Our main contribution is to show the following Budget Monotonicity property of this auction: When there is only one infinitely divisible good, a bidder cannot improve her utility by reporting a budget smaller than the truth. This implies that the adaptive clinching auction is incentive compatible when over-reporting the budget is not possible (for instance, when funds must be shown upfront). We can also make reporting larger budgets suboptimal with a small randomized modification to the auction. In either case, this makes the modified auction Pareto-optimal with private budgets. We also show that the Budget Monotonicity property does not hold for auctioning indivisible units of the good, showing a sharp contrast between the divisible and indivisible cases. The Budget Monotonicity property also implies other improved results in this context. For revenue maximization, the same auction improves the best-known competitive ratio due to Abrams [1] by a factor of 4, and asymptotically approaches the performance of the optimal single-price auction. Finally, we consider the problem of revenue maximization (or social welfare) in a Bayesian setting. We allow the bidders have public size constraints (on the amount of good they are willing to buy) in addition to private budget constraints. We show a simple poly-time computable 5.83-approximation to the optimal Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, that is implementable in dominant strategies. Our technique again crucially needs the ability to prevent bidders from over-reporting budgets via randomization. We show the approximation result via designing a rounding scheme for an LP relaxation of the problem, which may be of independent interest.

Computational inference of haplotypes from genotypes has attracted a great deal of attention in the computational biology community recently, partially driven by the international HapMap project. In this paper, we study the question of how to efficiently infer haplotypes from genotypes of individuals related by a pedigree, assuming that the hereditary process was free of mutations (i.e., the Mendelian law of inheritance) and recombinants. The problem has recently been formulated as a system of linear equations over the finite field of $F(2)$ and solved in $O(m^3n^3)$ time by using standard Gaussian elimination, where m is the number of loci (or markers) in a genotype and n the number of individuals in the pedigree. We give a much faster algorithm with running time $O(mn^2+n^3\log^2n\log\log n)$. The key ingredients of our construction are (i) a new system of linear equations based on some spanning tree of the pedigree graph and (ii) an efficient method for eliminating redundant equations in a system of $O(mn)$ linear equations over $O(n)$ variables. Although such a fast elimination method is not known for general systems of linear equations, we take advantage of the underlying pedigree graph structure and recent progress on low-stretch spanning trees.

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that (in unrestricted settings) any reasonable voting rule is manipulable. Recently, a quantitative version of this theorem was proved by Ehud Friedgut, Gil Kalai, and Noam Nisan: when the number of alternatives is three, for any neutral voting rule that is far from any dictatorship, there exists a voter such that a random manipulation---that is, the true preferences and the strategic vote are all drawn i.i.d., uniformly at random---will succeed with a probability of Ω(1/n), where n is the number of voters. However, it seems that the techniques used to prove this theorem can not be fully extended to more than three alternatives. In this paper, we give a more limited result that does apply to four or more alternatives. We give a sufficient condition for a voting rule to be randomly manipulable with a probability of Ω(1/n) for at least one voter, when the number of alternatives is held fixed. Specifically, our theorem states that if a voting rule r satisfies 1. homogeneity, 2. anonymity, 3. non-imposition, 4. a canceling-out condition, and 5. there exists a stable profile that is still stable after one given alternative is uniformly moved to different positions; then there exists a voter such that a random manipulation for that voter will succeed with a probability of Ω(1/n). We show that many common voting rules satisfy these conditions, for example any positional scoring rule, Copeland, STV, maximin, and ranked pairs.

We introduce a class of voting rules called generalized scoring rules. Under such a rule, each vote generates a vector of k scores, and the outcome of the voting rule is based only on the sum of these vectors---more specifically, only on the order (in terms of score) of the sum's components. This class is extremely general: we do not know of any commonly studied rule that is not a generalized scoring rule.

Multiple election paradoxes arise when voting separately on each issue from a set of related issues results in an obviously undesirable outcome. Several authors have argued that a sufficient condition for avoiding multiple election paradoxes is the assumption that voters have separable preferences. We show that this extremely demanding restriction can be relaxed into the much more reasonable one: there exists a linear order x1 > … > xp on the set of issues such that for each voter, every issue xi is preferentially independent of xi+1, …, xp given x1, …, xi-1. This leads us to define a family of sequential voting rules, defined as the sequential composition of local voting rules. These rules relate to the setting of conditional preference networks (CP-nets) recently developed in the Artificial Intelligence literature. We study in detail how these sequential rules inherit, or do not inherit, the properties of their local components. We focus on the case of multiple referenda, corresponding to multiple elections with binary issues.

In this paper, we propose a set of human perceptual cues used jointly to automatically detect image orientation. The cues used are: orientation of faces, position of the sky, brighter regions, and textured objects, and symmetry. We combine these cues in a Bayesian framework, and the photo acquiring model has been considered carefully as the prior knowledge of the image orientation. Results on more than a thousand different images provide a compelling argument that our approach is a viable one.