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Artem Dinaburg

dblp:76/2979 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-authorSoftware engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Program analysis · 50% Software testing · 50%
Network and information security
2 papers
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 58% Malware analysis · 42%

Topics — the 8 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Software testing › test coverage
code coverage
0.412019
Manticore: A User-Friendly Symbolic Execution Framework for Binaries and Smart Contracts · ASE 2019
Program analysis
dynamic analysis
0.412019
Manticore: A User-Friendly Symbolic Execution Framework for Binaries and Smart Contracts · ASE 2019
Program analysis
symbolic execution
0.412019
Manticore: A User-Friendly Symbolic Execution Framework for Binaries and Smart Contracts · ASE 2019
Software testing
test generation
0.412019
Manticore: A User-Friendly Symbolic Execution Framework for Binaries and Smart Contracts · ASE 2019
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security
smart contract security
0.112019
Manticore: A User-Friendly Symbolic Execution Framework for Binaries and Smart Contracts · ASE 2019
Malware analysis › dynamic malware analysis
transparent malware analysis
0.112008
Ether: malware analysis via hardware virtualization extensions · CCS 2008
Cloud and datacenter computing › virtualization
hardware-assisted virtualization
0.012008
Ether: malware analysis via hardware virtualization extensions · CCS 2008
Cloud and datacenter computing
virtualization
0.012008
Ether: malware analysis via hardware virtualization extensions · CCS 2008

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

constraint solving · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2019 Manticore: A User-Friendly Symbolic Execution Framework for Binaries and Smart Contracts
abstract
An effective way to maximize code coverage in software tests is through dynamic symbolic execution-a technique that uses constraint solving to systematically explore a program's state space. We introduce an open-source dynamic symbolic execution framework called Manticore for analyzing binaries and Ethereum smart contracts. Manticore's flexible architecture allows it to support both traditional and exotic execution environments, and its API allows users to customize their analysis. Here, we discuss Manticore's architecture and demonstrate the capabilities we have used to find bugs and verify the correctness of code for our commercial clients.
Mark Mossberg, Felipe Manzano, Eric Hennenfent, Alex Groce, Gustavo Grieco, Josselin Feist, Trent Brunson, Artem Dinaburg
ASE8
2008 Ether: malware analysis via hardware virtualization extensions
abstract
Malware has become the centerpiece of most security threats on the Internet. Malware analysis is an essential technology that extracts the runtime behavior of malware, and supplies signatures to detection systems and provides evidence for recovery and cleanup. The focal point in the malware analysis battle is how to detect versus how to hide a malware analyzer from malware during runtime. State-of-the-art analyzers reside in or emulate part of the guest operating system and its underlying hardware, making them easy to detect and evade. In this paper, we propose a transparent and external approach to malware analysis, which is motivated by the intuition that for a malware analyzer to be transparent, it must not induce any side-effects that are unconditionally detectable by malware. Our analyzer, Ether, is based on a novel application of hardware virtualization extensions such as Intel VT, and resides completely outside of the target OS environment. Thus, there are no in-guest software components vulnerable to detection, and there are no shortcomings that arise from incomplete or inaccurate system
Artem Dinaburg, Paul Royal, Monirul Islam Sharif, Wenke Lee
CCS1