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David Bismark

dblp:76/8522 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2009
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › electronic voting
ballot secrecy
0.112009
Prêt à voter: a voter-verifiable voting system · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2009
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › electronic voting
end-to-end verifiable e-voting
0.112009
Prêt à voter: a voter-verifiable voting system · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2009
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › electronic voting
verifiable voting
0.112009
Prêt à voter: a voter-verifiable voting system · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2009
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › electronic voting › verifiable voting
voter verification
0.012009
Prêt à voter: a voter-verifiable voting system · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2009

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

cryptographic protocol design · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2009 Prêt à voter: a voter-verifiable voting system
abstract
¿¿¿¿¿¿Pre¿t a¿ Voter provides a practical approach to end-to-end verifiable elections with a simple, familiar voter-experience. It assures a high degree of transparency while preserving secrecy of the ballot. Assurance arises from the auditability of the election itself, rather than the need to place trust in the system components. The original idea has undergone several revisions and enhancements since its inception in 2004, driven by the identification of threats, the availability of improved cryptographic primitives, and the desire to make the scheme as flexible as possible. This paper presents the key elements of the approach and describes the evolution of the design and their suitability in various contexts. We also describe the voter experience, and the security properties that the schemes provide.
Peter Y. A. Ryan, David Bismark, James Heather, Steve A. Schneider, Zhe Xia
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.2