We study a hedonic game for which feasible coalitions are prescribed by a graph representing the agents’ social relations. A group of agents can form a feasible coalition if and only if their corresponding vertices can be spanned with a star. This requirement guarantees that agents are connected, close to each other, and one central agent can coordinate the actions of the group. In our game, everyone strives to join the largest feasible coalition. We study the existence and computational complexity of both Nash stable and core stable partitions. Then, we provide tight or asymptotically tight bounds on their efficiency, measured in terms of the price of anarchy and the price of stability, under two natural social functions, namely, the number of agents who are not in a singleton coalition, and the number of coalitions. We also derive refined bounds for games in which the social graph is claw-free. Finally, we investigate the complexity of computing socially optimal partitions, as well as extreme Nash stable ones.

Given two strings A and B such that B is a permutation of A, the max duo-preservation string mapping (MPSM) problem asks to find a mapping π between them so as to preserve a maximum number of duos. A duo is any pair of consecutive characters in a string and it is preserved by π if its two consecutive characters in A are mapped to same two consecutive characters in B. This problem has received a growing attention in recent years, partly as an alternative way to produce approximation algorithms for its minimization counterpart, min common string partition, a widely studied problem due its applications in comparative genomics. Considering this favored field of application with short alphabet, it is surprising that MPSM^𝓁, the variant of MPSM with bounded alphabet, has received so little attention, with a single yet impressive work that provides a 2.67-approximation achieved in O(n) [Brubach, 2018], where n = |A| = |B|. Our work focuses on MPSM^𝓁, and our main contribution is the demonstration that this problem admits a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS) when 𝓁 = O(1). We also provide an alternate, somewhat simpler, proof of NP-hardness for this problem compared with the NP-hardness proof presented in [Haitao Jiang et al., 2012].

Optimization problems consist of either maximizing or minimizing an objective function. Instead of looking for a maximum solution (resp. minimum solution), one can find a minimum maximal solution (resp. maximum minimal solution). Such "flipping" of the objective function was done for many classical optimization problems. For example, ${\rm M{\small INIMUM}}$ ${\rm V{\small ERTEX}}$ ${\rm C{\small OVER}}$ becomes ${\rm M{\small AXIMUM}}$ ${\rm M{\small INIMAL}}$ ${\rm V{\small ERTEX}}$ ${\rm C{\small OVER}}$, ${\rm M{\small AXIMUM}}$ ${\rm I{\small NDEPENDENT}}$ ${\rm S{\small ET}}$ becomes ${\rm M{\small INIMUM}}$ ${\rm M{\small AXIMAL}}$ ${\rm I{\small NDEPENDENT}}$ ${\rm S{\small ET}}$ and so on. In this paper, we propose to study the weighted version of Maximum Minimal Edge Cover called ${\rm U{\small PPER}}$ ${\rm E{\small DGE}}$ ${\rm C{\small OVER}}$, a problem having application in genomic sequence alignment. It is well-known that ${\rm M{\small INIMUM}}$ ${\rm E{\small DGE}}$ ${\rm C{\small OVER}}$ is polynomial-time solvable and the "flipped" version is NP-hard, but constant approximable. We show that the weighted ${\rm U{\small PPER}}$ ${\rm E{\small DGE}}$ ${\rm C{\small OVER}}$ is much more difficult than ${\rm U{\small PPER}}$ ${\rm E{\small DGE}}$ ${\rm C{\small OVER}}$ because it is not $O(\frac{1}{n^{1/2-\varepsilon}})$ approximable, nor $O(\frac{1}{\Delta^{1-\varepsilon}})$ in edge-weighted graphs of size $n$ and maximum degree $\Delta$ respectively. Indeed, we give some hardness of approximation results for some special restricted graph classes such as bipartite graphs, split graphs and $k$-trees. We counter-balance these negative results by giving some positive approximation results in specific graph classes.

This article deals with the fair allocation of indivisible goods and its generalization to matroids. The notions of fairness under consideration are equitability, proportionality and envy-freeness. It is long known that some instances fail to admit a fair allocation. However, an almost fair solution may exist if an appropriate relaxation of the fairness condition is adopted. This article deals with a matroid problem which comprises the allocation of indivisible goods as a special case. It is to find a base of a matroid and to allocate it to a pool of agents. We first adapt the aforementioned fairness concepts to matroids. Next we propose a relaxed notion of fairness said to be near to fairness. Near fairness respects the fairness up to one element. We show that a nearly fair solution always exists and it can be constructed in polynomial time in the general context of matroids.

We address the problem of designing communication protocols for voting rules when the set of candidates can evolve via the addition of new candidates. We show that the necessary amount of communication that must be transmitted between the voters and the central authority depends on the amount of space devoted to the storage of the votes over the initial set of candidates. This calls for a bicriteria evaluation of protocols. We consider a few usual voting rules, and three types of storage functions: full storage, where the full votes on the initial set of voters are stored; null storage, where nothing is stored; and anonymous storage, which lies in-between. For some of these pairs (voting rule, type of storage) we design protocols and show that they are asymptotically optimal by determining the communication complexity of the rule under the storage function considered.

In some voting situations, some new candidates may show up in the course of the process. In this case, we may want to determine which of the initial candidates are possible winners, given that a fixed number k of new candidates will be added. Focusing on scoring rules, we give complexity results for the above possible winner problem.