How humans make repeated choices among options with imperfectly known reward outcomes is an important problem in psychology and neuroscience. This is often studied using multi-armed bandits, which is also frequently studied in machine learning. We present data from a human stationary bandit experiment, in which we vary the average abundance and variability of reward availability (mean and variance of reward rate distributions). Surprisingly, we find subjects significantly underestimate prior mean of reward rates -- based on their self-report, at the end of a game, on their reward expectation of non-chosen arms. Previously, human learning in the bandit task was found to be well captured by a Bayesian ideal learning model, the Dynamic Belief Model (DBM), albeit under an incorrect generative assumption of the temporal structure - humans assume reward rates can change over time even though they are actually fixed. We find that the "pessimism bias" in the bandit task is well captured by the prior mean of DBM when fitted to human choices; but it is poorly captured by the prior mean of the Fixed Belief Model (FBM), an alternative Bayesian model that (correctly) assumes reward rates to be constants. This pessimism bias is also incompletely captured by a simple reinforcement learning model (RL) commonly used in neuroscience and psychology, in terms of fitted initial Q-values. While it seems sub-optimal, and thus mysterious, that humans have an underestimated prior reward expectation, our simulations show that an underestimated prior mean helps to maximize long-term gain, if the observer assumes volatility when reward rates are stable and utilizes a softmax decision policy instead of the optimal one (obtainable by dynamic programming). This raises the intriguing possibility that the brain underestimates reward rates to compensate for the incorrect non-stationarity assumption in the generative model and a simplified decision policy.

Understanding how humans and animals learn about statistical regularities in stable and volatile environments, and utilize these regularities to make predictions and decisions, is an important problem in neuroscience and psychology. Using a Bayesian modeling framework, specifically the Dynamic Belief Model (DBM), it has previously been shown that humans tend to make the {\it default} assumption that environmental statistics undergo abrupt, unsignaled changes, even when environmental statistics are actually stable. Because exact Bayesian inference in this setting, an example of switching state space models, is computationally intense, a number of approximately Bayesian and heuristic algorithms have been proposed to account for learning/prediction in the brain. Here, we examine a neurally plausible algorithm, a special case of leaky integration dynamics we denote as EXP (for exponential filtering), that is significantly simpler than all previously suggested algorithms except for the delta-learning rule, and which far outperforms the delta rule in approximating Bayesian prediction performance. We derive the theoretical relationship between DBM and EXP, and show that EXP gains computational efficiency by foregoing the representation of inferential uncertainty (as does the delta rule), but that it nevertheless achieves near-Bayesian performance due to its ability to incorporate a "persistent prior" influence unique to DBM and absent from the other algorithms. Furthermore, we show that EXP is comparable to DBM but better than all other models in reproducing human behavior in a visual search task, suggesting that human learning and prediction also incorporates an element of persistent prior. More broadly, our work demonstrates that when observations are information-poor, detecting changes or modulating the learning rate is both {\it difficult} and (thus) {\it unnecessary} for making Bayes-optimal predictions.

Understanding how humans perceive the likability of high-dimensional objects'' such as faces is an important problem in both cognitive science and AI/ML. Existing models generally assume these preferences to be fixed. However, psychologists have found human assessment of facial attractiveness to be context-dependent. Specifically, the classical Beauty-in-Averageness (BiA) effect, whereby a blended face is judged to be more attractive than the originals, is significantly diminished or reversed when the original faces are recognizable, or when the blend is mixed-race/mixed-gender and the attractiveness judgment is preceded by a race/gender categorization, respectively. This "Ugliness-in-Averageness" (UiA) effect has previously been explained via a qualitative disfluency account, which posits that the negative affect associated with the difficult race or gender categorization is inadvertently interpreted by the brain as a dislike for the face itself. In contrast, we hypothesize that human preference for an object is increased when it incurs lower encoding cost, in particular when its perceived {\it statistical typicality} is high, in consonance with Barlow's seminalefficient coding hypothesis.'' This statistical coding cost account explains both BiA, where facial blends generally have higher likelihood than ``parent faces'', and UiA, when the preceding context or task restricts face representation to a task-relevant subset of features, thus redefining statistical typicality and encoding cost within that subspace. We use simulations to show that our model provides a parsimonious, statistically grounded, and quantitative account of both BiA and UiA. We validate our model using experimental data from a gender categorization task. We also propose a novel experiment, based on model predictions, that will be able to arbitrate between the disfluency account and our statistical coding cost account of attractiveness.

Humans and animals readily utilize active sensing, or the use of self-motion, to focus sensory and cognitive resources on the behaviorally most relevant stimuli and events in the environment. Understanding the computational basis of natural active sensing is important both for advancing brain sciences and for developing more powerful artificial systems. Recently, a goal-directed, context-sensitive, Bayesian control strategy for active sensing, termed C-DAC (Context-Dependent Active Controller), was proposed (Ahmad & Yu, 2013). In contrast to previously proposed algorithms for human active vision, which tend to optimize abstract statistical objectives and therefore cannot adapt to changing behavioral context or task goals, C-DAC directly minimizes behavioral costs and thus, automatically adapts itself to different task conditions. However, C-DAC is limited as a model of human active sensing, given its computational/representational requirements, especially for more complex, real-world situations. Here, we propose a myopic approximation to C-DAC, which also takes behavioral costs into account, but achieves a significant reduction in complexity by looking only one step ahead. We also present data from a human active visual search experiment, and compare the performance of the various models against human behavior. We find that C-DAC and its myopic variant both achieve better fit to human data than Infomax (Butko & Movellan, 2010), which maximizes expected cumulative future information gain. In summary, this work provides novel experimental results that differentiate theoretical models for human active sensing, as well as a novel active sensing algorithm that retains the context-sensitivity of the optimal controller while achieving significant computational savings.

How humans achieve long-term goals in an uncertain environment, via repeated trials and noisy observations, is an important problem in cognitive science. We investigate this behavior in the context of a multi-armed bandit task. We compare human behavior to a variety of models that vary in their representational and computational complexity. Our result shows that subjects' choices, on a trial-to-trial basis, are best captured by a forgetful" Bayesian iterative learning model in combination with a partially myopic decision policy known as Knowledge Gradient. This model accounts for subjects' trial-by-trial choice better than a number of other previously proposed models, including optimal Bayesian learning and risk minimization, epsilon-greedy and win-stay-lose-shift. It has the added benefit of being closest in performance to the optimal Bayesian model than all the other heuristic models that have the same computational complexity (all are significantly less complex than the optimal model). These results constitute an advancement in the theoretical understanding of how humans negotiate the tension between exploration and exploitation in a noisy, imperfectly known environment."

Two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) and Go/NoGo (GNG) tasks are behavioral choice paradigms commonly used to study sensory and cognitive processing in choice behavior. While GNG is thought to isolate the sensory/decisional component by removing the need for response selection, a consistent bias towards the Go response (higher hits and false alarm rates) in the GNG task suggests possible fundamental differences in the sensory or cognitive processes engaged in the two tasks. Existing mechanistic models of these choice tasks, mostly variants of the drift-diffusion model (DDM; [1,2]) and the related leaky competing accumulator models [3,4] capture various aspects of behavior but do not address the provenance of the Go bias. We postulate that this ``impatience'' to go is a strategic adjustment in response to the implicit asymmetry in the cost structure of GNG: the NoGo response requires waiting until the response deadline, while a Go response immediately terminates the current trial. We show that a Bayes-risk minimizing decision policy that minimizes both error rate and average decision delay naturally exhibits the experimentally observed bias. The optimal decision policy is formally equivalent to a DDM with a time-varying threshold that initially rises after stimulus onset, and collapses again near the response deadline. The initial rise is due to the fading temporal advantage of choosing the Go response over the fixed-delay NoGo response. We show that fitting a simpler, fixed-threshold DDM to the optimal model reproduces the counterintuitive result of a higher threshold in GNG than 2AFC decision-making, previously observed in direct DDM fit to behavioral data [2], although such approximations cannot reproduce the Go bias. Thus, observed discrepancies between GNG and 2AFC decision-making may arise from rational strategic adjustments to the cost structure, and need not imply additional differences in the underlying sensory and cognitive processes.

Intelligent agents are often faced with the need to choose actions with uncertain consequences, and to modify those actions according to ongoing sensory processing and changing task demands. The requisite ability to dynamically modify or cancel planned actions is known as inhibitory control in psychology. We formalize inhibitory control as a rational decision-making problem, and apply to it to the classical stop-signal task. Using Bayesian inference and stochastic control tools, we show that the optimal policy systematically depends on various parameters of the problem, such as the relative costs of different action choices, the noise level of sensory inputs, and the dynamics of changing environmental demands. Our normative model accounts for a range of behavioral data in humans and animals in the stop-signal task, suggesting that the brain implements statistically optimal, dynamically adaptive, and reward-sensitive decision-making in the context of inhibitory control problems.

The Eriksen task is a classical paradigm that explores the effects of competing sensory inputs on response tendencies and the nature of selective attention in controlling these processes. In this task, conflicting flanker stimuli interfere with the processing of a central target, especially on short reaction time trials. This task has been modeled by neural networks and more recently by a normative Bayesian account. Here, we analyze the dynamics of the Bayesian models, which are nonlinear, coupled discrete time dynamical systems, by considering simplified, approximate systems that are linear and decoupled. Analytical solutions of these allow us to describe how posterior probabilities and psychometric functions depend on model parameters. We compare our results with numerical simulations of the original models and derive fits to experimental data, showing that agreements are rather good. We also investigate continuum limits of these simplified dynamical systems and demonstrate that Bayesian updating is closely related to a drift-diffusion process, whose implementation in neural network models has been extensively studied. This provides insight into how neural substrates can implement Bayesian computations.

In a variety of behavioral tasks, subjects exhibit an automatic and apparently sub-optimal sequential effect: they respond more rapidly and accurately to a stimulus if it reinforces a local pattern in stimulus history, such as a string of repetitions or alternations, compared to when it violates such a pattern. This is often the case even if the local trends arise by chance in the context of a randomized design, such that stimulus history has no predictive power. In this work, we use a normative Bayesian framework to examine the hypothesis that such idiosyncrasies may reflect the inadvertent engagement of fundamental mechanisms critical for adapting to changing statistics in the natural environment. We show that prior belief in non-stationarity can induce experimentally observed sequential effects in an otherwise Bayes-optimal algorithm. The Bayesian algorithm is shown to be well approximated by linear-exponential filtering of past observations, a feature also apparent in the behavioral data. We derive an explicit relationship between the parameters and computations of the exact Bayesian algorithm and those of the approximate linear-exponential filter. Since the latter is equivalent to a leaky-integration process, a commonly used model of neuronal dynamics underlying perceptual decision-making and trial-to-trial dependencies, our model provides a principled account of why such dynamics are useful. We also show that near-optimal tuning of the leaky-integration process is possible, using stochastic gradient descent based only on the noisy binary inputs. This is a proof of concept that not only can neurons implement near-optimal prediction based on standard neuronal dynamics, but that they can also learn to tune the processing parameters without explicitly representing probabilities.

Most models of decision-making in neuroscience assume an infinite horizon, which yields an optimal solution that integrates evidence up to a fixed decision threshold; however, under most experimental as well as naturalistic behavioral settings, the decision has to be made before some finite deadline, which is often experienced as a stochastic quantity, either due to variable external constraints or internal timing uncertainty. In this work, we formulate this problem as sequential hypothesis testing under a stochastic horizon. We use dynamic programming tools to show that, for a large class of deadline distributions, the Bayes-optimal solution requires integrating evidence up to a threshold that declines monotonically over time. We use numerical simulations to illustrate the optimal policy in the special cases of a fixed deadline and one that is drawn from a gamma distribution.

Survival in a non-stationary, potentially adversarial environment requires animals to detect sensory changes rapidly yet accurately, two oft competing desiderata. Neurons subserving such detections are faced with the corresponding challenge to discern "real" changes in inputs as quickly as possible, while ignoring noisy fluctuations. Mathematically, this is an example of a change-detection problem that is actively researched in the controlled stochastic processes community. In this paper, we utilize sophisticated tools developed in that community to formalize an instantiation of the problem faced by the nervous system, and characterize the Bayes-optimal decision policy under certain assumptions. We will derive from this optimal strategy an information accumulation and decision process that remarkably resembles the dynamics of a leaky integrate-and-fire neuron. This correspondence suggests that neurons are optimized for tracking input changes, and sheds new light on the computational import of intracellular properties such as resting membrane potential, voltage-dependent conductance, and post-spike reset voltage. We also explore the influence that factors such as timing, uncertainty, neuromodulation, and reward should and do have on neuronal dynamics and sensitivity, as the optimal decision strategy depends critically on these factors.

Angela J. Yu Center for Brain, Mind & Behavior Green Hall, Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08540, USA [email protected] Experimental data indicate that norepinephrine is critically involved in aspects of vigilance and attention. Previously, we considered the func- tion of this neuromodulatory system on a time scale of minutes and longer, and suggested that it signals global uncertainty arising from gross changes in environmental contingencies. However, norepinephrine is also known to be activated phasically by familiar stimuli in well- learned tasks. Here, we extend our uncertainty-based treatment of nore- pinephrine to this phasic mode, proposing that it is involved in the de- tection and reaction to state uncertainty within a task. This role of nore- pinephrine can be understood through the metaphor of neural interrupts.

We study the synthesis of neural coding, selective attention and percep- tual decision making. A hierarchical neural architecture is proposed, which implements Bayesian integration of noisy sensory input and top- down attentional priors, leading to sound perceptual discrimination. The model offers an explicit explanation for the experimentally observed modulation that prior information in one stimulus feature (location) can have on an independent feature (orientation). The network's intermediate levels of representation instantiate known physiological properties of vi- sual cortical neurons. The model also illustrates a possible reconciliation of cortical and neuromodulatory representations of uncertainty.

Inference and adaptation in noisy and changing, rich sensory environ- ments are rife with a variety of specific sorts of variability. Experimental and theoretical studies suggest that these different forms of variability play different behavioral, neural and computational roles, and may be reported by different (notably neuromodulatory) systems. Here, we re- fine our previous theory of acetylcholine’s role in cortical inference in the (oxymoronic) terms of expected uncertainty, and advocate a theory for norepinephrine in terms of unexpected uncertainty. We suggest that norepinephrine reports the radical divergence of bottom-up inputs from prevailing top-down interpretations, to influence inference and plasticity. We illustrate this proposal using an adaptive factor analysis model.

Visual processing in the cortex can be characterized by a predominantly hierarchical architecture, in which specialized brain regions along the processing pathways extract visual features of increasing complexity, accompanied by greater invariance in stimulus properties such as size and position. Various studies have postulated that a nonlinear pooling function such as the maximum (MAX) operation could be fundamental in achieving such selectivity and invariance. In this article, we are concerned with neurally plausible mechanisms that may be involved in realizing the MAX operation. Different canonical models are proposed, each based on neural mechanisms that have been previously discussed in the context of cortical processing. Through simulations and mathematical analysis, we compare the performance and robustness of these mechanisms. We derive experimentally verifiable predictions for each model and discuss the relevant physiological considerations.

Acetylcholine (ACh) has been implicated in a wide variety of tasks involving attentional processes and plasticity. Following extensive animal studies, it has previously been suggested that ACh reports on uncertainty and controls hippocampal, cortical and cortico-amygdalar plasticity. We extend this view and consider its effects on cortical representational inference, arguing that ACh controls the balance between bottom-up inference, in(cid:3)uenced by input stimuli, and top-down inference, in(cid:3)uenced by contextual information. We illustrate our proposal using a hierarchical hid- den Markov model.