We present our experience with QUIC, an encrypted, multiplexed, and low-latency transport protocol designed from the ground up to improve transport performance for HTTPS traffic and to enable rapid deployment and continued evolution of transport mechanisms. QUIC has been globally deployed at Google on thousands of servers and is used to serve traffic to a range of clients including a widely-used web browser (Chrome) and a popular mobile video streaming app (YouTube). We estimate that 7% of Internet traffic is now QUIC. We describe our motivations for developing a new transport, the principles that guided our design, the Internet-scale process that we used to perform iterative experiments on QUIC, performance improvements seen by our various services, and our experience deploying QUIC globally. We also share lessons about transport design and the Internet ecosystem that we learned from our deployment.

This paper introduces a panel discussion on establishing assurance evidence that mobile code applications perform as expected by the user, without the side effects that have been demonstrated as possible in constructed examples of malicious or "rogue" applets. The paper's principal authors, Schaefer and Pinsky, have been engaged in cooperative research with the JavaSoft community to gain understanding of the complexities of assurance for mobile code applications. The paper discusses part of this on-going research. The panel adds the voices and experience of a continuing researcher, Dean, and of active practitioners from the principal vendors of mobile-code-enabled (and enabling) products. The panel actively debates the issues of providing compelling assurance evidence relating to the control of such code.