VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Mira Meyerovich
dblp:81/6016
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2007
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 40% Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 20% Authentication and access control · 17% |
Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security
electronic cash |
0.1 | 1 | 2007 | Endorsed E-Cash · S&P 2007 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
fair exchange |
0.1 | 1 | 2007 | Endorsed E-Cash · S&P 2007 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › fair exchange
optimistic fair exchange |
0.1 | 1 | 2007 | Endorsed E-Cash · S&P 2007 |
Privacy and data protection
anonymity |
0.1 | 1 | 2006 | How to win the clonewars: efficient periodic n-times anonymous authentication · CCS 2006 |
Authentication and access control
anonymous authentication |
0.1 | 1 | 2006 | How to win the clonewars: efficient periodic n-times anonymous authentication · CCS 2006 |
Network security › anonymity networks
onion routing |
0.0 | 1 | 2007 | Endorsed E-Cash · S&P 2007 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
protocol design · 0.1endorsement representation · 0.1revocation · 0.1e-cash construction · 0.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2007 | Endorsed E-CashabstractAn electronic cash (e-cash) scheme lets a user withdraw money from a bank and then spend it anonymously. E-cash can be used only if it can be securely and fairly exchanged for electronic goods or services. In this paper, we introduce and realize endorsed e-cash. An endorsed e-coin consists of a lightweight endorsement x and the rest of the coin which is meaningless without x. We reduce the problem of exchanging e-cash to that of exchanging endorsements. We demonstrate the usefulness of endorsed e-cash by exhibiting simple and efficient solutions to two important problems: (1) optimistic and unlinkable fair exchange of e-cash for digital goods and services; and (2) onion routing with incentives and accountability for the routers. Finally, we show how to represent a set of n endorsements using just one endorsement; this means that the complexity of the fair exchange protocol for n coins is the same as for one coin, making e-cash all the more scalable and suitable for applications. Our fair exchange of multiple e-coins protocol can be applied to fair exchanges of (almost) any secrets. Jan Camenisch, Anna Lysyanskaya, Mira Meyerovich |
S&P | 3 |
| 2006 | How to win the clonewars: efficient periodic n-times anonymous authenticationabstractWe create a credential system that lets a user anonymously authenticate at most $n$ times in a single time period. A user withdraws a dispenser of n e-tokens. She shows an e-token to a verifier to authenticate herself; each e-token can be used only once, however, the dispenser automatically refreshes every time period. The only prior solution to this problem, due to Damgård et al. [29], uses protocols that are a factor of k slower for the user and verifier, where k is the security parameter. Damgård et al. also only support one authentication per time period, while we support n. Because our construction is based on e-cash, we can use existing techniques to identify a cheating user, trace all of her e-tokens, and revoke her dispensers. We also offer a new anonymity service: glitch protection for basically honest users who (occasionally) reuse e-tokens. The verifier can always recognize a reused e-token; however, we preserve the anonymity of users who do not reuse e-tokens too often. Jan Camenisch, Susan Hohenberger, Markulf Kohlweiss, Anna Lysyanskaya, Mira Meyerovich |
CCS | 5 |