Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Karen A. Oostendorp
dblp:82/1459
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 1997
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Systems and software security · 33% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 33% Authentication and access control · 33% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Operating systems · 100% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Authentication and access control › access control models
domain and type enforcement |
0.0 | 1 | 1996 | Confining Root Programs with Domain and Type Enforcement · USENIX Security Symposium 1996 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
message authentication codes |
0.0 | 1 | 1996 | Confining Root Programs with Domain and Type Enforcement · USENIX Security Symposium 1996 |
Systems and software security
operating system security |
0.0 | 1 | 1996 | Confining Root Programs with Domain and Type Enforcement · USENIX Security Symposium 1996 |
Operating systems › system security › operating system security
access control |
0.0 | 1 | 1996 | Confining Root Programs with Domain and Type Enforcement · USENIX Security Symposium 1996 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
domain and type enforcement · 0.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1997 | Domain and Type Enforcement FirewallsabstractInternet connected organizations often employ an Internet firewall to mitigate risks of system penetration, data theft, data destruction, and other security breaches. Conventional Internet firewalls, however, impose an overly simple inside vs outside model of security that is incompatible with many business practices that require extending limited trust to external entities. The paper reports on our experience with an enhanced security firewall based on Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE), a strong but flexible form of access control. A DTE firewall provides several benefits. First, it runs application level proxies in restrictive domains, thereby increasing security, and runs network services such as HTTP and FTP under DTE controls, thereby reducing risks that network based attacks will compromise local resources. Second, a DTE firewall coordinates role based security policies that span networks by passing DTE security attributes between DTE clients and servers. These attributes allow security policies at the endpoints to be coordinated; such coordination adds defense in depth to the traditional firewall security perimeter: this permits safe exportation of normally risky services such as NFS. Finally, a DTE firewall interoperates with "non DTE" systems and associates DTE security attributes with these systems so their interaction with DTE clients or servers can be controlled. We describe the design of a prototype DTE firewall system and informally evaluate its security, compatibility, functionality, and performance. Karen A. Oostendorp, Lee Badger, C. D. Vance, W. G. Morrison, Michael J. Petkac, David L. Sherman, Daniel F. Sterne |
ACSAC | 1 |
| 1996 | Confining Root Programs with Domain and Type Enforcement
Kenneth M. Walker, Daniel F. Sterne, Lee Badger, Michael J. Petkac, David L. Sherman, Karen A. Oostendorp |
USENIX Security Symposium | 6 |