Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Cosmin Barsan
dblp:82/8733
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2010
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Systems and software security · 100% |
Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Systems and software security › trusted computing
trusted computing base |
0.1 | 1 | 2010 | Retaining sandbox containment despite bugs in privileged memory-safe code · CCS 2010 |
Systems and software security
memory safety |
0.0 | 1 | 2010 | Retaining sandbox containment despite bugs in privileged memory-safe code · CCS 2010 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
sandbox design · 0.1privilege separation · 0.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | Retaining sandbox containment despite bugs in privileged memory-safe codeabstractFlaws in the standard libraries of secure sandboxes represent a major security threat to billions of devices worldwide. The standard libraries are hard to secure because they frequently need to perform low-level operations that are forbidden in untrusted application code. Existing designs have a single, large trusted computing base that contains security checks at the boundaries between trusted and untrusted code. Unfortunately, flaws in the standard library often allow an attacker to escape the security protections of the sandbox. Justin Cappos, Armon Dadgar, Jeff Rasley, Justin Samuel, Ivan Beschastnikh, Cosmin Barsan, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Thomas E. Anderson |
CCS | 6 |