Understanding an unfamiliar codebase is an essential task for developers in various scenarios, such as during the onboarding process. Especially when the codebase is large and time is limited, achieving a decent level of comprehension remains challenging for both experienced and novice developers, even with the assistance of large language models (LLMs). Existing studies have shown that LLMs often fail to support users in understanding code structures or to provide user-centered, adaptive, and dynamic assistance in real-world settings.

We conduct the first comprehensive security study on two widely used port forwarding services (PFS), which emerge in recent years and make the web services deployed in internal networks available on the Internet along with better usability but less complexity compared to traditional techniques (e.g., NAT traversal techniques). Our study is made possible through a set of effective and efficient methodologies, which are designed to uncover the technical mechanisms of PFS, experiment attack scenarios for PFS protocols, automatically discover and snapshot port-forwarded websites (PFWs) at scale, and classify PFWs into well-observed categories. Leveraging these methodologies, we have observed the widespread adoption of PFS with millions of PFWs distributed across tens of thousands of ISPs worldwide. Furthermore, 32.31% PFWs have been classified into website categories that serve access to critical infrastructure or data, such as, web consoles for industrial control systems, IoT controllers, code repositories, and office automation systems. And 18.57% PFWs did not enforce any access control for external visitors. Also identified are two types of attacks inherent in the protocols of Oray (one well-adopted PFS provider), and the notable abuse of PFSes by malicious actors in activities such as malware distribution, botnet operation and phishing.

Smart contracts are decentralized applications built atop blockchains like Ethereum. Recent research has shown that large language models (LLMs) have potential in auditing smart contracts, but the state-of-the-art indicates that even GPT-4 can achieve only 30% precision (when both decision and justification are correct). This is likely because off-the-shelf LLMs were primarily pre-trained on a general text/code corpus and not fine-tuned on the specific domain of Solidity smart contract auditing. In this paper, we propose iAudit, a general framework that combines fine-tuning and LLM-based agents for intuitive smart contract auditing with justifications. Specifically, iAudit is inspired by the observation that expert human auditors first perceive what could be wrong and then perform a detailed analysis of the code to identify the cause. As such, iAudit employs a two-stage fine-tuning approach: it first tunes a Detector model to make decisions and then tunes a Reasoner model to generate causes of vulnerabilities. However, fine-tuning alone faces challenges in accurately identifying the optimal cause of a vulnerability. Therefore, we introduce two LLM-based agents, the Ranker and Critic, to iteratively select and debate the most suitable cause of vulnerability based on the output of the fine-tuned Reasoner model. To evaluate iAudit, we collected a balanced dataset with 1,734 positive and 1,810 negative samples to fine-tune iAudit. We then compared it with traditional fine-tuned models (CodeBERT, GraphCodeBERT, CodeT5, and UnixCoder) as well as prompt learning-based LLMs (GPT4, GPT-3.5, and CodeLlama-13b/34b). On a dataset of 263 real smart contract vulnerabilities, iAudit achieves an F1 score of 91.21% and an accuracy of 91.11%. The causes generated by iAudit achieved a consistency of about 38% compared to the ground truth causes.

Smart contracts are prone to various vulnerabilities, leading to substantial financial losses over time. Current analysis tools mainly target vulnerabilities with fixed control- or data-flow patterns, such as re-entrancy and integer overflow. However, a recent study on Web3 security bugs revealed that about 80% of these bugs cannot be audited by existing tools due to the lack of domain-specific property description and checking. Given recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs), it is worth exploring how Generative Pre-training Transformer (GPT) could aid in detecting logic vulnerabilities.

Although Decentralized Finance (DeFi) applications facilitate tamper-proof transactions among multiple anonymous users, since attackers can access the smart contract bytecode directly, vulnerabilities in the transaction mechanism, contract code, or third-party components can be easily exploited to manipulate token prices, leading to financial losses. Since price manipulation often relies on specific states and complex trading sequences, existing detection tools have limitations in addressing this problem. In addition, to swiftly identify the root cause of an attack and implement targeted defense and remediation measures, auditors typically prioritize understanding the methodology behind the attack, emphasizing 'how' it occurred rather than simply confirming its existence. To address these problems, this paper presents a novel automatic price manipulation detection and analysis framework, named DeFort, which contains a price manipulation behavior model to guide on-chain detection, multiple price monitoring strategies to detect pools with abnormal token prices, and various profit calculation mechanisms to confirm attacks. Based on behavioral models, DeFort can automatically locate transactions and functions that cause abnormal price fluctuations and identify attackers and victims. Experimental results demonstrate that DeFort can outperform state-of-the-art price manipulation detection methods. Furthermore, after monitoring 441 real-world projects for two months, DeFort successfully detected five price manipulation attacks.

The burgeoning landscape of blockchain technology has made the security of deployed smart contracts an imperative concern. While existing security measures excel in pre-deployment testing, they fall short in protecting smart contracts once they are deployed, leaving them susceptible to malicious attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel Smart Contract Firewall framework designed to bridge this security gap. Functioning as a dynamic gateway, the framework employs real-time transaction inspection through adaptable filtering rules, enabling the identification and rollback of malicious transactions as they occur. Our empirical analysis demonstrates the framework's efficacy in mitigating a majority of existing vulnerabilities in the deployed smart contracts. Although the added layer of security comes at a cost, we prove that the increased gas expenses could be limited to 30 % -50 % for most transactions. This trade-off, we argue, is a small price to pay for significantly enhanced security.

It is a big challenge to clearly identify the boundary between positive and negative streams. Several attempts have used negative feedback to solve this challenge; however, there are two issues for using negative relevance feedback to improve the effectiveness of information filtering. The first one is how to select constructive negative samples in order to reduce the space of negative documents. The second issue is how to decide noisy extracted features that should be updated based on the selected negative samples. This paper proposes a pattern mining based approach to select some offenders from the negative documents, where an offender can be used to reduce the side effects of noisy features. It also classifies extracted features (i.e., terms) into three categories: positive specific terms, general terms, and negative specific terms. In this way, multiple revising strategies can be used to update extracted features. An iterative learning algorithm is also proposed to implement this approach on RCV1, and substantial experiments show that the proposed approach achieves encouraging performance.