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Ernie Cohen

dblp:84/4905 · DBLP profile ↗
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18ranked-venue papers
12as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Theory of computation · 13 · 9 first-authorSoftware engineering, systems software and programming languages · 8 · 4 first-authorSecurity and privacy · 3 · 2 first-authorDatabases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 first-authorApplied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 52% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 48%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
3 papers
Program verification · 90% Operating systems · 10%
Theoretical computer science
2 papers
Automated reasoning and model checking · 100%

Topics — the 8 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
key management
0.412019
A Machine-Checked Proof of Security for AWS Key Management Service · CCS 2019
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
provable security
0.412019
A Machine-Checked Proof of Security for AWS Key Management Service · CCS 2019
Program verification
concurrent program verification
0.112010
Local Verification of Global Invariants in Concurrent Programs · CAV 2010
Automated reasoning and model checking › program verification
program invariants
0.112010
Local Verification of Global Invariants in Concurrent Programs · CAV 2010
Program verification › system verification › systems code verification
hypervisor verification
0.112006
Validating the Microsoft Hypervisor · FM 2006
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
security protocol analysis
0.012000
TAPS: A First-Order Verifier for Cryptographic Protocols · CAV 2000
Automated reasoning and model checking
theorem proving
0.012000
TAPS: A First-Order Verifier for Cryptographic Protocols · CAV 2000
Operating systems › virtualization
hypervisor
0.012006
Validating the Microsoft Hypervisor · FM 2006

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

machine-checked proof · 0.4rely-guarantee reasoning · 0.2compositional verification · 0.2theorem proving · 0.1first-order logic · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2019 A Machine-Checked Proof of Security for AWS Key Management Service
José Bacelar Almeida, Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, Matthew Campagna, Ernie Cohen, Benjamin Grégoire, Vitor Pereira 0002, Bernardo Portela, Pierre-Yves Strub, Serdar Tasiran
CCS5
2018 Object-Oriented Security Proofs
Ernie Cohen
FM1
2013 Theory of Multi Core Hypervisor Verification
Ernie Cohen, Wolfgang J. Paul, Sabine Schmaltz
SOFSEM1
2011 The 1st Verified Software Competition: Experience Report
Vladimir Klebanov, Peter Müller 0001, Natarajan Shankar, Gary T. Leavens, Valentin Wüstholz, Eyad Alkassar, Rob Arthan, Derek Bronish, Roderick Chapman, Ernie Cohen, Mark A. Hillebrand, Bart Jacobs 0002, K. Rustan M. Leino, Rosemary Monahan, Frank Piessens, Nadia Polikarpova, Tom Ridge, Jan Smans, Stephan Tobies, Thomas Tuerk, Mattias Ulbrich, Benjamin Weiß 0001
FM10
2010 Local Verification of Global Invariants in Concurrent Programs
Ernie Cohen, Michal Moskal, Wolfram Schulte, Stephan Tobies
CAV1
2010 Verifying shadow page table algorithms
Eyad Alkassar, Ernie Cohen, Mark A. Hillebrand, Mikhail Kovalev, Wolfgang J. Paul
FMCAD2
2010 Modular specification and verification of interprocess communication
Eyad Alkassar, Ernie Cohen, Mark A. Hillebrand, Hristo Pentchev
FMCAD2
2010 From Total Store Order to Sequential Consistency: A Practical Reduction Theorem
Ernie Cohen, Norbert Schirmer
ITP1
2006 Validating the Microsoft Hypervisor
Ernie Cohen
FM1
2006 Optimistic synchronization-based state-space reduction
Scott D. Stoller, Ernie Cohen
Formal Methods Syst. Des.2
2003 Optimistic Synchronization-Based State-Space Reduction
Scott D. Stoller, Ernie Cohen
TACAS2
2003 First-order Verification of Cryptographic Protocols
abstract
We describe a verification method for cryptographic protocols, based on first-order invariants. For typical protocols, a suitable invariant can be generated mechanically from the program text, allowing safety properties to be proved by ordinary first-order reasoning. The method has been implemented in an automatic verifier, TAPS, that proves safety properties comparable to those in published Isabelle verifications, but does so much faster with little or no guidance from the user. TAPS has verified properties of about 100 protocols, including all but three protocols from the Clark and Jacob survey; on average, these verifications require less than a second of CPU time and less than 4 bytes of hints from the user.
Ernie Cohen
J. Comput. Secur.1
2000 TAPS: A First-Order Verifier for Cryptographic Protocols
Ernie Cohen
CAV1
2000 TAPS: A First-Order Verifier for Cryptographic Protocols
abstract
We describe a proof method for cryptographic protocols, based on a strong secrecy invariant that catalogues conditions under which messages can be published. For typical protocols, a suitable first-order invariant can be generated automatically from the program text, independent of the properties being verified, allowing safety properties to be proved by ordinary first-order reasoning. We have implemented the method in an automatic verifier, TAPS, that proves safety properties roughly equivalent to those in published Isabelle verifications, but does so much faster (usually within a few seconds) and with little or no guidance from the user. We have used TAPS to analyze about 60 protocols, including all but three protocols from the Clark and Jacob survey; on average, these verifications each require less than 4 seconds of CPU time and less than 4 bytes of hints from the user.
Ernie Cohen
CSFW1
2000 Separation and Reduction
Ernie Cohen
MPC1
2000 A note on the complexity of propositional Hoare logic
abstract
We provide a simpler alternative proof of the PSPACE -hardness of propositional Hoare logic (PHL).
Ernie Cohen, Dexter Kozen
ACM Trans. Comput. Log.1
1998 Reduction in TLA
Ernie Cohen, Leslie Lamport
CONCUR1
1994 The Convergence Span of Greedy Load Balancing
Ernie Cohen
Inf. Process. Lett.1