The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) add data origin authentication and data integrity to the Domain Name System (DNS), the naming system of the Internet. With DNSSEC, signatures are added to the information provided in the DNS using public key cryptography. Advances in both cryptography and cryptanalysis make it necessary to deploy new algorithms in DNSSEC, as well as deprecate those with weakened security. If this process is easy, then the protocol has achieved what the IETF terms "algorithm agility".

The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) add authenticity and integrity to the naming system of the Internet. Resolvers that validate information in the DNS need to know the cryptographic public key used to sign the root zone of the DNS. Eight years after its introduction and one year after the originally scheduled date, this key was replaced by ICANN for the first time in October 2018. ICANN considered this event, called a rollover, "an overwhelming success" and during the rollover they detected "no significant outages". In this paper, we independently follow the process of the rollover starting from the events that led to its postponement in 2017 until the removal of the old key in 2019. We collected data from multiple vantage points in the DNS ecosystem for the entire duration of the rollover process. Using this data, we study key events of the rollover. These events include telemetry signals that led to the rollover being postponed, a near real-time view of the actual rollover in resolvers and a significant increase in queries to the root of the DNS once the old key was revoked. Our analysis contributes significantly to identifying the causes of challenges observed during the rollover. We show that while from an end-user perspective, the roll indeed passed without major problems, there are many opportunities for improvement and important lessons to be learned from events that occurred over the entire duration of the rollover. Based on these lessons, we propose improvements to the process for future rollovers.

The amount of computing resources currently available on Clouds is large and easily available with pay per use cost model. E-Science applications that need on-demand execution benefit from Clouds, because no permanent computing resources to support peak demand has to be acquired. In this paper, we present AMOS, a system that automates creation and management of temporary Grids on a Cloud to execute (parts of) application workflows. We performed experiments with AMOS and a representative e-Science application on a research Grid and on the Amazon EC2 Cloud. The results show that AMOS is a viable approach to manage and execute e-Science applications in a flexible Grid environment and to explore novel mechanisms that allow optimal utilization of Cloud resources. Furthermore, we consider AMOS as a step towards an operating system for (virtual) infrastructures that enables Grid applications to control their computational resources at run-time.