Conventional methods supporting Java binary security mainly rely on the security of the host Java Virtual Machine (JVM). However, malicious Java binaries keep exploiting the vulnerabilities of JVMs, escaping their sandbox restrictions and allowing attacks on end-user systems. Administrators must confront the difficulties and dilemmas brought on by security upgrades. On the other hand, binary rewriting techniques have been advanced to allow users to enforce security policies directly on the mobile code. They have the advantages of supporting a richer set of security policies and a self-constrained written code. However, the high administrative and performance overhead caused by security configuration and code rewriting have prevented rewriters from becoming a practical security tool. In this paper, we address these problems by integrating binary code rewriters with Web caching proxies and build the security system called PB-JARS, a Proxy-based JAva Rewriting System. PB-JARS works as a complimentary system to existing JVM security mechanisms by placing another line of defense between users and their end-user systems. It gives system administrators centralized security control and management for the mobile code and security policies. We evaluated PB-JARS using a real Java binary traffic model derived from analyzing real Web trace records. Our results show that adding binary rewriting to a Web caching system can be very efficient in improving end-host security at a low cost.

Binary rewriting techniques have been developed to allow users to enforce security policies directly on mobile code. However, the performance overheads incurred for improved security, particularly in large organizations with many end-hosts, accentuate the inherent challenges of code rewriting and limit the rate of improvement in these systems. We integrate a binary code rewriter with a web caching proxy and build the security system called PBJARS, a Proxy-based JAva Rewriting System. PBJARS compliments existing JVM security mechanisms by placing another line of security defense in the code path code associated with code downloads. It gives system administrators centralized security control at the level of administrative domains at proxy servers. We evaluated PB-JARS using real Java binary traffic models derived from analyzing real web trace records. Our experimental results show that the overhead added by binary rewriting can be significantly amortized by web caching and PB-JARS adds negligible performance impact on proxy servers.