Auto-bidding plays an essential role in online advertising, allowing agents to automatically adjust bids for advertisers. Recently, the rise of Marketing Management service in e-commerce platforms has driven the evolution from auto-bidding to auto-marketing, enabling merchants to delegate their advertising bidding and product's coupon discounting decisions to agents. Auto-marketing requires agents to jointly decide on bidding and coupon discounting. Furthermore, compared to classic static constraints, auto-marketing agent faces a self-funding constraint (where the budget for both bidding and coupon discounting is entirely derived from the agent's commission revenue). Existing rule-based or RL-based methods often struggle with dynamic environments and complex sequential dependencies. To overcome these limitations, we propose a Generative Auto-Marketing framework (GAM), designed for performing joint sequential decisions on bidding and coupon discounting, and optimizing business objectives through post-training alignment. Furthermore, GAM employs a flexible, constraint-aware reward alignment module, and utilizes Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) to align the pre-trained model, thus empirically balancing objective maximization and constraint satisfaction. We construct an offline simulation environment based on large-scale real-world dataset, and demonstrate the effectiveness of GAM through extensive experimental results.

Identifying high-revenue mechanisms that are both dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually rational (IR) is a fundamental challenge in auction design. While theoretical approaches have encountered bottlenecks in multi-item combinatorial auctions, there has been much empirical progress in the automated design of such mechanisms using machine learning. However, existing research primarily focuses on randomized auctions, with less attention given to more practical deterministic auctions. Therefore, in this paper, we introduce OD-VVCA, an objective decomposition approach for automated designing revenue-maximizing deterministic Virtual Valuations Combinatorial Auctions (VVCAs), which are inherently DSIC and IR. We use a parallelizable dynamic programming algorithm to compute the allocation and revenue outcomes of a VVCA efficiently. We then decompose the revenue objective function into continuous and piecewise-constant discontinuous components, optimizing each using distinct methods. Extensive experiments show that OD-VVCA achieves high revenue in multi-item auctions, especially in large-scale settings where it outperforms both randomized and deterministic baselines, indicating its efficacy and scalability.

Optimizing the advertiser's cumulative value of winning impressions under budget constraints poses a complex challenge in online advertising, under the paradigm of AI-Generated Bidding (AIGB). Advertisers often have personalized objectives but limited historical interaction data, resulting in few-shot scenarios where traditional reinforcement learning (RL) methods struggle to perform effectively. Large Language Models (LLMs) offer a promising alternative for AIGB by leveraging their in-context learning capabilities to generalize from limited data. However, they lack the numerical precision required for fine-grained optimization. To address this limitation, we introduce GRPO-Adaptive, an efficient LLM post-training strategy that enhances both reasoning and numerical precision by dynamically updating the reference policy during training. Built upon this foundation, we further propose DARA, a novel dual-phase framework that decomposes the decision-making process into two stages: a few-shot reasoner that generates initial plans via in-context prompting, and a fine-grained optimizer that refines these plans using feedback-driven reasoning. This separation allows DARA to combine LLMs' in-context learning strengths with precise adaptability required by AIGB tasks. Extensive experiments on both real-world and synthetic data environments demonstrate that our approach consistently outperforms existing baselines in terms of cumulative advertiser value under budget constraints.

The canonical model for multi-channel marketing, Bandits with Knapsacks (BwK), optimizes cumulative rewards subject to resource constraints but typically assumes a fixed, exogenous budget. This assumption is tenuous in real-world systems requiring performance-adaptive investment, where pre-committing to a budget is challenging and suboptimal. We introduce Marketing Hosting, a paradigm modeling the budget as an endogenous, performance-dependent variable. This yields a new problem class, Bandits with Endogenous Knapsacks (BwEK), characterized by a challenging feedback loop coupling rewards with constraints. We develop a specialized primal-dual algorithm to manage this coupling. For settings with hard, per-round constraints, we design a novel risk-aware algorithm that mitigates the path-dependent risk of ruin, providing the first high-probability safety guarantee for such problems. Finally, we solve the strategic bi-level problem of learning the optimal reinvestment rate. We validate our theoretical results through extensive simulations, real-world data experiments, and a live A/B test.

On e-commerce platforms, sellers typically bid for impressions from ad traffic to promote their products. However, for most sellers, the majority of their sales come from organic traffic. Consequently, the relationship between their ad spending and total sales remains uncertain, resulting in operational inefficiency. To address this issue, e-commerce platforms have recently introduced a novel platform-wide marketing service known as QuanZhanTui, which has reportedly enhanced marketing efficiency for sellers and driven substantial revenue growth for platforms. QuanZhanTui allows sellers to bid for impressions from the platform's entire traffic to boost their total sales without compromising the platform's user experience. In this paper, we investigate the mechanism design problem that arises from QuanZhanTui. The problem is formulated as a multi-objective optimization to balance sellers' welfare and platform's user experience. We first introduce the stock-constrained value maximizer model, which reflects sellers' dual requirements on marketing efficiency and platform-wide ROI. Then, we propose the Liquid Payment Auction (LPA), an auction designed to optimize the balanced objectives while accounting for sellers' requirements in the auto-bidding environment. It employs a simple payment rule based on sellers' liquid welfare, providing a clearer link between their investment and total sales. Under mild assumptions, we theoretically prove desirable properties of LPA, such as optimality and incentive compatibility. Extensive experiments demonstrate LPA's superior performance over conventional auctions in QuanZhanTui.

In online advertising, advertisers commonly utilize auto-bidding services to bid for impression opportunities. A typical objective of the auto-bidder is to optimize the advertiser's cumulative value of winning impressions within specified budget constraints. However, such a problem is challenging due to the complex bidding environment faced by diverse advertisers. To address this challenge, we introduce ABPlanner, a few-shot adaptable budget planner designed to improve budget-constrained auto-bidding. ABPlanner is based on a hierarchical bidding framework that decomposes the bidding process into shorter, manageable stages. Within this framework, ABPlanner allocates the budget across all stages, allowing a low-level auto-bidder to bids based on the budget allocation plan. The adaptability of ABPlanner is achieved through a sequential decision-making approach, inspired by in-context reinforcement learning. For each advertiser, ABPlanner adjusts the budget allocation plan episode by episode, using data from previous episodes as prompt for current decisions. This enables ABPlanner to quickly adapt to different advertisers with few-shot data, providing a sample-efficient solution. Extensive simulation experiments and real-world A/B testing validate the effectiveness of ABPlanner, demonstrating its capability to enhance the cumulative value achieved by auto-bidders.

Auto-bidding is crucial in facilitating online advertising by automatically providing bids for advertisers. While previous work has made great efforts to model bidding environments for better ad performance, it has limitations in generalizability across environments since these models are typically tailored for specific bidding scenarios. To this end, we approach the scenario-independent principles through a unified function that estimates the achieved effect under specific bids, such as budget consumption, gross merchandise volume (GMV), page views, etc. Then, we propose a bidding foundation model Bid2X to learn this fundamental function from data in various scenarios. Our Bid2X is built over uniform series embeddings that encode heterogeneous data through tailored embedding methods. To capture complex inter-variable and dynamic temporal dependencies in bidding data, we propose two attention mechanisms separately treating embeddings of different variables and embeddings at different times as attention tokens for representation learning. On top of the learned variable and temporal representations, a variable-aware fusion module is used to perform adaptive bidding outcome prediction. To model the unique bidding data distribution, we devise a zero-inflated projection module to incorporate the estimated non-zero probability into its value prediction, which makes up a joint optimization objective containing classification and regression. The objective is proven to converge to the zero-inflated distribution.

The standard framework of online bidding algorithm design assumes that the seller commits himself to faithfully implementing the rules of the adopted auction.However, the seller may attempt to cheat in execution to increase his revenue if the auction belongs to the class of non-credible auctions.For example, in a second-price auction, the seller could create a fake bid between the highest bid and the second highest bid.This paper focuses on one such case of online bidding in repeated second-price auctions.At each time 𝑡, the winner with bid 𝑏 𝑡 is charged not the highest competing bid 𝑑 𝑡 but a manipulated price 𝑝 𝑡 = 𝛼 0 𝑑 𝑡 + (1 -𝛼 0 )𝑏 𝑡 , where the parameter 𝛼 0 ∈ [0, 1] in essence measures the seller's credibility.Unlike classic repeated-auction settings where the bidder has access to samples (𝑑 𝑠 ) 𝑡 -1 𝑠=1 , she can only receive mixed signals of𝑠=1 and 𝛼 0 in this problem.The task for the bidder is to learn not only the bid distributions of her competitors but also the seller's credibility.We establish regret lower bounds in various information models and provide corresponding online bidding algorithms that can achieve near-optimal performance.Specifically, * Both authors contributed equally to this research.

Online advertising platforms leverage a two-stage auction architecture to deliver personalized ads to users with low latency. The first stage efficiently selects a small subset of promising candidates out of the complete pool of ads. In the second stage, an auction is conducted within the subset to determine the winning ad for display, using click-through-rate predictions from the second-stage machine learning model. In this work, we investigate the online learning process of the first-stage subset selection policy, while ensuring game-theoretic properties in repeated two-stage ad auctions. Specifically, we model the problem as designing a combinatorial bandit mechanism with a general reward function, as well as additional requirements of truthfulness and individual rationality (IR). We establish an O(T) regret lower bound for truthful bandit mechanisms, which demonstrates the challenge of simultaneously achieving allocation efficiency and truthfulness. To circumvent this impossibility result, we introduce truthful α-approximation oracles and evaluate the bandit mechanism through α-approximation regret. Two mechanisms are proposed, both of which are ex-post truthful and ex-post IR. The first mechanism is an explore-then-commit mechanism with regret O(T2/3 ), and the second mechanism achieves an improved O(log T /ΔΦ2) regret where ΔΦ is a distribution-dependent gap, but requires additional assumptions on the oracles and information about the strategic bidders.

Auto-bidding plays a crucial role in facilitating online advertising by automatically providing bids for advertisers. Reinforcement learning (RL) has gained popularity for auto-bidding. However, most current RL auto-bidding methods are modeled through the Markovian Decision Process (MDP), which assumes the Markovian state transition. This assumption restricts the ability to perform in long horizon scenarios and makes the model unstable when dealing with highly random online advertising environments. To tackle this issue, this paper introduces AI-Generated Bidding (AIGB), a novel paradigm for auto-bidding through generative modeling. In this paradigm, we propose DiffBid, a conditional diffusion modeling approach for bid generation. DiffBid directly models the correlation between the return and the entire trajectory, effectively avoiding error propagation across time steps in long horizons. Additionally, DiffBid offers a versatile approach for generating trajectories that maximize given targets while adhering to specific constraints. Extensive experiments conducted on the real-world dataset and online A/B test on Alibaba advertising platform demonstrate the effectiveness of DiffBid, achieving 2.81% increase in GMV and 3.36% increase in ROI.

In online advertising, advertisers participate in ad auctions to acquire ad opportunities, often by utilizing auto-bidding tools provided by demand-side platforms (DSPs). The current auto-bidding algorithms typically employ reinforcement learning (RL). However, due to safety concerns, most RL-based auto-bidding policies are trained in simulation, leading to a performance degradation when deployed in online environments. To narrow this gap, we can deploy multiple auto-bidding agents in parallel to collect a large interaction dataset. Offline RL algorithms can then be utilized to train a new policy. The trained policy can subsequently be deployed for further data collection, resulting in an iterative training framework, which we refer to as iterative offline RL. In this work, we identify the performance bottleneck of this iterative offline RL framework, which originates from the ineffective exploration and exploitation caused by the inherent conservatism of offline RL algorithms. To overcome this bottleneck, we propose Trajectory-wise Exploration and Exploitation (TEE), which introduces a novel data collecting and data utilization method for iterative offline RL from a trajectory perspective. Furthermore, to ensure the safety of online exploration while preserving the dataset quality for TEE, we propose Safe Exploration by Adaptive Action Selection (SEAS). Both offline experiments and real-world experiments on Alibaba display advertising platform demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method.

On typical e-commerce platforms, a product can be displayed to users in two possible forms, as an ad item or an organic item. Usually, ad and organic items are separately selected by the advertising system and recommendation system, and then combined by a content merging mechanism. Although the design of the content merging mechanism has been extensively studied, little attention has been given to a crucial situation where there is an overlap between candidate ad and organic items. Despite its common occurrence, this situation is not correctly handled by almost all existing works, potentially leading to incentive problems for advertisers and the violation of economic constraints. To address these issues, we revisit the design of the content merging mechanism. We introduce a necessary property called form stability, and provide simplification results of the mechanism design problem. Furthermore, we design two simple mechanisms strictly ensuring desired economic properties including incentive compatibility, and demonstrate their guaranteed performance through competitive ratio analysis under certain conditions.

Online bidding and auction are crucial aspects of the online advertising industry. Conventionally, there is only one slot for ad display and most current studies focus on it. Nowadays, multi-slot display advertising is gradually becoming popular where many ads could be displayed in a list and shown as a whole to users. However, multi-slot display advertising leads to different cost-effectiveness. Advertisers have the incentive to adjust bid prices so as to win the most economical ad positions. In this study, we introduce bid shading into multi-slot display advertising for bid price adjustment with a Multi-task End-to-end Bid Shading~(MEBS) method. We prove the optimality of our method theoretically and examine its performance experimentally. Through extensive offline and online experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our method, and we obtain a 7.01% lift in Gross Merchandise Volume, a 7.42% lift in Return on Investment, and a 3.26% lift in ad buy count.

Learning-based ad auctions have increasingly been adopted in online advertising. However, existing approaches neglect externalities, such as the interaction between ads and organic items. In this paper, we propose a general framework, namely Score-Weighted VCG, for designing learning-based ad auctions that account for externalities. The framework decomposes the optimal auction design into two parts: designing a monotone score function and an allocation algorithm, which facilitates data-driven implementation. Theoretical results demonstrate that this framework produces the optimal incentive-compatible and individually rational ad auction under various externality-aware CTR models while being data-efficient and robust. Moreover, we present an approach to implement the proposed framework with a matching-based allocation algorithm. Experiment results on both real-world and synthetic data illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

Powered by machine learning techniques, online advertising platforms have launched various automated bidding strategy services to facilitate intelligent decision-making for advertisers. However, advertisers experience heterogeneous advertising environments, and thus the unified bidding strategies widely used in both academia and industry suffer from severe unfairness issues, resulting in significant ad performance disparity among advertisers. In this work, to resolve the unfairness issue and improve the overall system performance, we propose a personalized automated bidding framework, namely PerBid, shifting the classical automated bidding strategy with a unified agent to multiple context-aware agents corresponding to different advertiser clusters. Specifically, we first design an ad campaign profiling network to model dynamic advertising environments. By clustering the advertisers with similar profiles and generating context-aware automated bidding agents for each cluster, we can match advertisers with personalized automated bidding strategies. Experiments conducted on the real-world dataset and online A/B test on Alibaba display advertising platform demonstrate the effectiveness of PerBid in improving overall ad performance and guaranteeing fairness among heterogeneous advertisers.

In online e-commerce platforms, sponsored ads are always mixed with non-sponsored organic content (recommended items). To guarantee user experience, online platforms always impose strict limitations on the number of ads displayed, becoming the bottleneck for advertising revenue. To boost advertising space, we introduce a novel advertising business paradigm called Augment Advertising, where once a user clicks on a leading ad on the main page, instead of being shown the corresponding products, a collection of mini-detail ads relevant to the clicked ad is displayed. A key component for augment advertising is to design ad auctions to jointly select leading ads on the main page and mini-detail ads on the augment ad page. In this work, we decouple the ad auction into a two-stage auction, including a leading ad auction and a mini-detail ad auction. We design the Potential Generalized Second Price (PGSP) auction with Symmetric Nash Equilibrium (SNE) for leading ads, and adopt GSP auction for mini-detail ads. We have deployed augment advertising on Taobao advertising platform, and conducted extensive offline evaluations and online A/B tests. The evaluation results show that augment advertising could guarantee user experience while improving the ad revenue and the PGSP auction outperforms baselines in terms of revenue and user experience in augment advertising.

In online advertising, auto-bidding has become an essential tool for advertisers to optimize their preferred ad performance metrics by simply expressing high-level campaign objectives and constraints. Previous works designed auto-bidding tools from the view of single-agent, without modeling the mutual influence between agents. In this paper, we instead consider this problem from a distributed multi-agent perspective, and propose a general \underlineM ulti-\underlineA gent reinforcement learning framework for \underlineA uto-\underlineB idding, namely MAAB, to learn the auto-bidding strategies. First, we investigate the competition and cooperation relation among auto-bidding agents, and propose a temperature-regularized credit assignment to establish a mixed cooperative-competitive paradigm. By carefully making a competition and cooperation trade-off among agents, we can reach an equilibrium state that guarantees not only individual advertiser's utility but also the system performance (i.e., social welfare). Second, to avoid the potential collusion behaviors of bidding low prices underlying the cooperation, we further propose bar agents to set a personalized bidding bar for each agent, and then alleviate the revenue degradation due to the cooperation. Third, to deploy MAAB in the large-scale advertising system with millions of advertisers, we propose a mean-field approach. By grouping advertisers with the same objective as a mean auto-bidding agent, the interactions among the large-scale advertisers are greatly simplified, making it practical to train MAAB efficiently. Extensive experiments on the offline industrial dataset and Alibaba advertising platform demonstrate that our approach outperforms several baseline methods in terms of social welfare and revenue.

For the scalability of industrial online advertising systems, a two-stage auction architecture is widely used to enable efficient ad allocation on a large set of corpus within a limited response time. The current deployed two-stage ad auction usually retrieves an ad subset by a coarse ad quality metric in a pre-auction stage, and then determines the auction outcome by a refined metric in the subsequent stage. However, this simple and greedy solution suffers from performance degradation, as it regards the decision in each stage separately, leading to an improper ad selection metric for the pre-auction stage. In this work, we explicitly investigate the relation between the coarse and refined ad quality metrics, and design a two-stage ad auction by taking the decision interaction between the two stages into account. We decouple the design of the two-stage auction by solving a stochastic subset selection problem in the pre-auction stage and conducting a general second price (GSP) auction in the second stage. We demonstrate that this decouple still preserves the incentive compatibility of the auction mechanism. As the proposed formulation of the pre-auction stage is an NP-hard problem, we propose a scalable approximation solution by defining a new subset selection metric, namely Pre-Auction Score (PAS). Experiment results on both public and industrial dataset demonstrate the improvement on social welfare and revenue of the proposed two-stage ad auction, than the intuitive greedy two-stage auction and other baselines.

In e-commerce advertising, it is crucial to jointly consider various performance metrics, e.g., user experience, advertiser utility, and platform revenue. Traditional auction mechanisms, such as GSP and VCG auctions, can be suboptimal due to their fixed allocation rules to optimize a single performance metric (e.g., revenue or social welfare). Recently, data-driven auctions, learned directly from auction outcomes to optimize multiple performance metrics, have attracted increasing research interests. However, the procedure of auction mechanisms involves various discrete calculation operations, making it challenging to be compatible with continuous optimization pipelines in machine learning. In this paper, we design Deep Neural Auctions (DNAs) to enable end-to-end auction learning by proposing a differentiable model to relax the discrete sorting operation, a key component in auctions. We optimize the performance metrics by developing deep models to efficiently extract contexts from auctions, providing rich features for auction design. We further integrate the game theoretical conditions within the model design, to guarantee the stability of the auctions. DNAs have been successfully deployed in the e-commerce advertising system at Taobao. Experimental evaluation results on both large-scale data set as well as online A/B test demonstrated that DNAs significantly outperformed other mechanisms widely adopted in industry.

In e-commerce advertising, the ad platform usually relies on auction mechanisms to optimize different performance metrics, such as user experience, advertiser utility, and platform revenue. However, most of the state-of-the-art auction mechanisms only focus on optimizing a single performance metric, e.g., either social welfare or revenue, and are not suitable for e-commerce advertising with various, dynamic, difficult to estimate, and even conflicting performance metrics. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism called Deep GSP auction, which leverages deep learning to design new rank score functions within the celebrated GSP auction framework. These new rank score functions are implemented via deep neural network models under the constraints of monotone allocation and smooth transition. The requirement of monotone allocation ensures Deep GSP auction nice game theoretical properties, while the requirement of smooth transition guarantees the advertiser utilities would not fluctuate too much when the auction mechanism switches among candidate mechanisms to achieve different optimization objectives. We deployed the proposed mechanisms in a leading e-commerce ad platform and conducted comprehensive experimental evaluations with both offline simulations and online A/B tests. The results demonstrated the effectiveness of the Deep GSP auction compared to the state-of-the-art auction mechanisms.