The widespread deployment of machine learning systems in critical real-world decision-making applications has highlighted the urgent need for counterfactual explainability methods that operate effectively. Global counterfactual explanations, expressed as actions to offer recourse, aim to provide succinct explanations and insights applicable to large population subgroups. High effectiveness, measured by the fraction of the population that is provided recourse, ensures that the actions benefit as many individuals as possible. Keeping the cost of actions low ensures the proposed recourse actions remain practical and actionable. Limiting the number of actions that provide global counterfactuals is essential to maximize interpretability. The primary challenge, therefore, is to balance these trade-offs—maximizing effectiveness, minimizing cost, while maintaining a small number of actions. We introduce GLANCE, a versatile and adaptive algorithm that employs a novel agglomerative approach, jointly considering both the feature space and the space of counterfactual actions, thereby accounting for the distribution of points in a way that aligns with the model's structure. This design enables the careful balancing of the trade-offs among the three key objectives, with the size objective functioning as a tunable parameter to keep the actions few and easy to interpret. Our extensive experimental evaluation demonstrates that GLANCE consistently shows greater robustness and performance compared to existing methods across various datasets and models.

Abstract In this work we are concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms while eliciting limited information from the agents. First, we study the performance of sampling approximations in facility location games. Our key result is to show that for any $$\epsilon > 0$$ ϵ > 0 , a sample of size $$c(\epsilon ) = \varTheta (1/\epsilon ^2)$$ c ( ϵ ) = Θ ( 1 / ϵ 2 ) yields in expectation a $$1 + \epsilon $$ 1 + ϵ approximation with respect to the optimal social cost of the generalized median mechanism on the metric space $$(\mathbb {R}^d, \Vert \cdot \Vert _1)$$ ( R d , ‖ · ‖ 1 ) , while the number of agents $$n \rightarrow \infty $$ n → ∞ . Moreover, we study a series of exemplar environments from auction theory through a communication complexity framework, measuring the expected number of bits elicited from the agents; we posit that any valuation can be expressed with k bits, and we mainly assume that k is independent of the number of agents n . In this context, we show that Vickrey’s rule can be implemented with an expected communication of $$1 + \epsilon $$ 1 + ϵ bits from an average bidder, for any $$\epsilon > 0$$ ϵ > 0 , asymptotically matching the trivial lower bound. As a corollary, we provide a compelling method to increment the price in an English auction. We also leverage our single-item format with an efficient encoding scheme to prove that the same communication bound can be recovered in the domain of additive valuations through simultaneous ascending auctions, assuming that the number of items is a constant. Finally, we propose an ascending-type multi-unit auction under unit demand bidders; our mechanism announces at every round two separate prices and is based on a sampling algorithm that performs approximate selection with limited communication, leading again to asymptotically optimal communication. Our results do not require any prior knowledge on the agents’ valuations, and mainly follow from natural sampling techniques.

We consider the Online Facility Location (OFL) problem in the framework of learning-augmented online algorithms. In Online Facility Location (OFL), demands arrive one-by-one in a metric space and must be (irrevocably) assigned to an open facility upon arrival, without any knowledge about future demands. We focus on uniform facility opening costs and present an online algorithm for OFL that exploits potentially imperfect predictions on the locations of the optimal facilities. We prove that the competitive ratio decreases from sublogarithmic in the number n of demands to constant as the so-called η1 error, i.e., the sum of distances of the predicted locations to the optimal facility locations, decreases towards zero. E.g., our analysis implies that if for some ε > 0, η1 = OPT / n^ε, where OPT is the cost of the optimal solution, the competitive ratio is O(1/ε). We complement our analysis with a matching lower bound establishing that the dependence of the algorithm's competitive ratio on the η1 error is optimal, up to constant factors.

We consider committee election of k >= 3 (out of m >= k + 1) candidates, where the voters and the candidates are associated with locations on the real line. Each voter’s cardinal preferences over candidates correspond to her distance to the candidate locations, and each voter’s cardinal preferences over committees is defined as her distance to the nearest candidate elected in the committee. We consider a setting where the true distances and the locations are unknown. We can nevertheless have access to degraded information which consists of an order of candidates for each voter. We investigate the best possible distortion (a worst-case performance criterion) w.r.t. the social cost achieved by deterministic committee election rules based on ordinal preferences submitted by n voters and few additional distance queries. We show that for any k >= 3, the best possible distortion of any deterministic rule that uses at most k−3 distance queries cannot be bounded by any function of n, m and k. We present deterministic rules for k-committee election with distortion of O(n) with O(k) distance queries and O(1) with O(k log(n)) distance queries.

We consider a learning augmented framework for NP-hard permutation problems. The algorithm has access to predictions telling, given a pair $u,v$ of elements, whether $u$ is before $v$ or not in an optimal solution. Building on the work of Braverman and Mossel (SODA 2008), we show that for a class of optimization problems including scheduling, network design and other graph permutation problems, these predictions allow to solve them in polynomial time with high probability, provided that predictions are true with probability at least $1/2+\epsilon$. Moreover, this can be achieved with a parsimonious access to the predictions.

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Abstract In this work, we generalize the ideas of Kaiming initialization to Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) and propose a new scheme (G-Init) that reduces oversmoothing, leading to very good results in node and graph classification tasks. GNNs are commonly initialized using methods designed for other types of Neural Networks, overlooking the underlying graph topology. We analyze theoretically the variance of signals flowing forward and gradients flowing backward in the class of convolutional GNNs. We then simplify our analysis to the case of the GCN and propose a new initialization method. Results indicate that the new method (G-Init) reduces oversmoothing in deep GNNs, facilitating their effective use. Our approach achieves an accuracy of 61.60% on the CS dataset (32-layer GCN) and 69.24% on Cora (64-layer GCN), surpassing state-of-the-art initialization methods by 25.6 and 8.6 percentage points, respectively. Extensive experiments confirm the robustness of our method across multiple benchmark datasets, highlighting its effectiveness in diverse settings. Furthermore, our experimental results support the theoretical findings, demonstrating the advantages of deep networks in scenarios with no feature information for unlabeled nodes (i.e., “cold start” scenario).

Abstract The performance of Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) diminishes as their depth increases. That is mainly attributed to oversmoothing, which leads to similar node representations through repeated graph convolutions. To enable deep GNNs, several approaches have been proposed, among which the use of residual connections. Residual connections have proven effective in benchmark datasets, but the way in which they improve the performance of deep GNNs has not been fully studied. We show that residual connections force the model to focus on the local neighborhood of graph nodes, making the GNN equivalent to the sum of shallow GCNs. We explain theoretically why this is the case and verify the theoretical results experimentally. However, our findings raise the question of whether residual connections are helpful in cases where deep networks are necessary. We assess this experimentally, in two situations: (a) in the presence of the “cold start" problem, i.e. when there is no feature information about unlabeled nodes; and (b) in a new synthetic dataset of controllable long-interactions. These experiments highlight the drawbacks of GNNs using residual connections, while showing that simpler methods can be more effective.

Abstract In this work we investigate an observation made by Kipf and Welling (5th International Conference on Learning Representations, 2017), who suggested that untrained Graph Convolutional Networks (GCNs) can generate meaningful node embeddings. In particular, we investigate the effect of training only a single layer of a GCN or a GAT (Graph Attention Network), while keeping the rest of the layers frozen. We propose a basis on which the effect of the untrained layers and their contribution to the generation of embeddings can be predicted. Moreover, we show that network width influences the dissimilarity of node embeddings produced after the initial node features pass through the untrained part of the model. Additionally, we establish a connection between partially trained GCNs and oversmoothing, showing that they are capable of reducing it. We verify our theoretical results experimentally and show the benefits of using deep networks that resist oversmoothing, in a “cold start” scenario, where there is a lack of feature information for unlabeled nodes.

Abstract Label Ranking (LR) corresponds to the problem of learning a hypothesis that maps features to rankings over a finite set of labels. We adopt a nonparametric regression approach to LR and obtain theoretical performance guarantees for this fundamental practical problem. We introduce a generative model for Label Ranking, in noiseless and noisy nonparametric regression settings. In the noiseless setting, we focus on the computational aspects of the LR problem with full rankings and provide guarantees for time-efficient learning algorithms using decision trees and random forests in the high-dimensional regime. In the noisy setting, we consider the more general cases of LR with incomplete rankings from a statistical viewpoint and obtain sample complexity bounds using the One-Versus-One approach of multiclass classification. Lastly, we complement our theoretical contributions with experiments, aiming to understand how the input regression noise affects the observed output.

The performance of Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) deteriorates as the depth of the network increases. That performance drop is mainly attributed to oversmoothing, which leads to similar node representations through repeated graph convolutions. We show that in deep GNNs the activation function plays a crucial role in oversmoothing. We explain theoretically why this is the case and propose a simple modification to the slope of ReLU to reduce oversmoothing. The proposed approach enables deep networks without the need to change the network architecture or to add residual connections. We verify the theoretical results experimentally and further show that deep networks, which do not suffer from oversmoothing, are beneficial in the presence of the “cold start” problem, i.e. when there is no feature information about unlabeled nodes.

Graph connectivity is a fundamental combinatorial optimization problem that arises in many practical applications, where usually a spanning subgraph of a network is used for its operation. However, in the real world, links may fail unexpectedly deeming the networks non-operational, while checking whether a link is damaged is costly and possibly erroneous. After an event that has damaged an arbitrary subset of the edges, the network operator must find a spanning tree of the network using non-damaged edges by making as few checks as possible. Motivated by such questions, we study the problem of finding a spanning tree in a network, when we only have access to noisy queries of the form "Does edge e exist?". We design efficient algorithms, even when edges fail adversarially, for all possible error regimes; 2-sided error (where any answer might be erroneous), false positives (where "no" answers are always correct) and false negatives (where "yes" answers are always correct). In the first two regimes we provide efficient algorithms and give matching lower bounds for general graphs. In the False Negative case we design efficient algorithms for large interesting families of graphs (e.g. bounded treewidth, sparse). Using the previous results, we provide tight algorithms for the practically useful family of planar graphs in all error regimes.

Deep Neural Networks and Reinforcement Learning methods have empirically shown great promise in tackling challenging combinatorial problems. In those methods a deep neural network is used as a solution generator which is then trained by gradient-based methods (e.g., policy gradient) to successively obtain better solution distributions. In this work we introduce a novel theoretical framework for analyzing the effectiveness of such methods. We ask whether there exist generative models that (i) are expressive enough to generate approximately optimal solutions; (ii) have a tractable, i.e, polynomial in the size of the input, number of parameters; (iii) their optimization landscape is benign in the sense that it does not contain sub-optimal stationary points. Our main contribution is a positive answer to this question. Our result holds for a broad class of combinatorial problems including Max- and Min-Cut, Max-$k$-CSP, Maximum-Weight-Bipartite-Matching, and the Traveling Salesman Problem. As a byproduct of our analysis we introduce a novel regularization process over vanilla gradient descent and provide theoretical and experimental evidence that it helps address vanishing-gradient issues and escape bad stationary points.

In this work, we present Fairness Aware Counterfactuals for Subgroups (FACTS), a framework for auditing subgroup fairness through counterfactual explanations. We start with revisiting (and generalizing) existing notions and introducing new, more refined notions of subgroup fairness. We aim to (a) formulate different aspects of the difficulty of individuals in certain subgroups to achieve recourse, i.e. receive the desired outcome, either at the micro level, considering members of the subgroup individually, or at the macro level, considering the subgroup as a whole, and (b) introduce notions of subgroup fairness that are robust, if not totally oblivious, to the cost of achieving recourse. We accompany these notions with an efficient, model-agnostic, highly parameterizable, and explainable framework for evaluating subgroup fairness. We demonstrate the advantages, the wide applicability, and the efficiency of our approach through a thorough experimental evaluation on different benchmark datasets.

Abstract We study opinion formation games based on the famous model proposed by Friedkin and Johsen (FJ model). In today’s huge social networks the assumption that in each round agents update their opinions by taking into account the opinions of all their friends is unrealistic. So, we are interested in the convergence properties of simple and natural variants of the FJ model that use limited information exchange in each round and converge to the same stable point. As in the FJ model, we assume that each agent i has an intrinsic opinion $$s_i \in [0,1]$$ s i ∈ [ 0 , 1 ] and maintains an expressed opinion $$x_i(t) \in [0,1]$$ x i ( t ) ∈ [ 0 , 1 ] in each round t. To model limited information exchange, we consider an opinion formation process where each agent i meets with one random friend j at each round t and learns only her current opinion $$x_j(t)$$ x j ( t ) . The amount of influence j imposes on i is reflected by the probability $$p_{ij}$$ p ij with which i meets j. Then, agent i suffers a disagreement cost that is a convex combination of $$(x_i(t) - s_i)^2$$ ( x i ( t ) - s i ) 2 and $$(x_i(t) - x_j(t))^2$$ ( x i ( t ) - x j ( t ) ) 2 . An important class of dynamics in this setting are no regret dynamics, i.e. dynamics that ensure vanishing regret against the experienced disagreement cost to the agents. We show an exponential gap between the convergence rate of no regret dynamics and of more general dynamics that do not ensure no regret. We prove that no regret dynamics require roughly $$\varOmega (1/\varepsilon )$$ Ω ( 1 / ε ) rounds to be within distance $$\varepsilon $$ ε from the stable point of the FJ model. On the other hand, we provide an opinion update rule that does not ensure no regret and converges to $$x^*$$ x ∗ in $$\tilde{O}(\log ^2(1/\varepsilon ))$$ O ~ ( log 2 ( 1 / ε ) ) rounds. Finally, in our variant of the FJ model, we show that the agents can adopt a simple opinion update rule that ensures no regret to the experienced disagreement cost and results in an opinion vector that converges to the stable point $$x^*$$ x ∗ of the FJ model within distance $$\varepsilon $$ ε in $$\textrm{poly}(1/\varepsilon )$$ poly (

We study the performance of voting mechanisms from a utilitarian standpoint, under the recently introduced framework of metric-distortion, offering new insights along two main lines. First, if d represents the doubling dimension of the metric space, we show that the distortion of STV is O(d log log m), where m represents the number of candidates. For doubling metrics this implies an exponential improvement over the lower bound for general metrics, and as a special case it effectively answers a question left open by Skowron and Elkind (AAAI '17) regarding the distortion of STV under low-dimensional Euclidean spaces. More broadly, this constitutes the first nexus between the performance of any voting rule and the ``intrinsic dimensionality'' of the underlying metric space. We also establish a nearly-matching lower bound, refining the construction of Skowron and Elkind. Moreover, motivated by the efficiency of STV, we investigate whether natural learning rules can lead to low-distortion outcomes. Specifically, we introduce simple, deterministic and decentralized exploration/exploitation dynamics, and we show that they converge to a candidate with O(1) distortion.

We provide computationally efficient, differentially private algorithms for the classical regression settings of Least Squares Fitting, Binary Regression and Linear Regression with unbounded covariates. Prior to our work, privacy constraints in such regression settings were studied under strong a priori bounds on covariates. We consider the case of Gaussian marginals and extend recent differentially private techniques on mean and covariance estimation (Kamath et al., 2019; Karwa and Vadhan, 2018) to the sub-gaussian regime. We provide a novel technical analysis yielding differentially private algorithms for the above classical regression settings. Through the case of Binary Regression, we capture the fundamental and widely-studied models of logistic regression and linearly-separable SVMs, learning an unbiased estimate of the true regression vector, up to a scaling factor.

Label Ranking (LR) corresponds to the problem of learning a hypothesis that maps features to rankings over a finite set of labels. We adopt a nonparametric regression approach to LR and obtain theoretical performance guarantees for this fundamental practical problem. We introduce a generative model for Label Ranking, in noiseless and noisy nonparametric regression settings, and provide sample complexity bounds for learning algorithms in both cases. In the noiseless setting, we study the LR problem with full rankings and provide computationally efficient algorithms using decision trees and random forests in the high-dimensional regime. In the noisy setting, we consider the more general cases of LR with incomplete and partial rankings from a statistical viewpoint and obtain sample complexity bounds using the One-Versus-One approach of multiclass classification. Finally, we complement our theoretical contributions with experiments, aiming to understand how the input regression noise affects the observed output.

Label Ranking (LR) is the supervised task of learning a sorting function that maps feature vectors $x \in \mathbb{R}^d$ to rankings $\sigma(x) \in \mathbb S_k$ over a finite set of $k$ labels. We focus on the fundamental case of learning linear sorting functions (LSFs) under Gaussian marginals: $x$ is sampled from the $d$-dimensional standard normal and the ground truth ranking $\sigma^\star(x)$ is the ordering induced by sorting the coordinates of the vector $W^\star x$, where $W^\star \in \mathbb{R}^{k \times d}$ is unknown. We consider learning LSFs in the presence of bounded noise: assuming that a noiseless example is of the form $(x, \sigma^\star(x))$, we observe $(x, \pi)$, where for any pair of elements $i \neq j$, the probability that the order of $i, j$ is different in $\pi$ than in $\sigma^\star(x)$ is at most $\eta < 1/2$. We design efficient non-proper and proper learning algorithms that learn hypotheses within normalized Kendall's Tau distance $\epsilon$ from the ground truth with $N= \widetilde{O}(d\log(k)/\epsilon)$ labeled examples and runtime $\mathrm{poly}(N, k)$. For the more challenging top-$r$ disagreement loss, we give an efficient proper learning algorithm that achieves $\epsilon$ top-$r$ disagreement with the ground truth with $N = \widetilde{O}(d k r /\epsilon)$ samples and $\mathrm{poly}(N)$ runtime.

In this work, we study how to efficiently obtain perfect samples from a discrete distribution $\mathcal{D}$ given access only to pairwise comparisons of elements of its support. Specifically, we assume access to samples $(x, S)$, where $S$ is drawn from a distribution over sets $\mathcal{Q}$ (indicating the elements being compared), and $x$ is drawn from the conditional distribution $\mathcal{D}_S$ (indicating the winner of the comparison) and aim to output a clean sample $y$ distributed according to $\mathcal{D}$. We mainly focus on the case of pairwise comparisons where all sets $S$ have size 2. We design a Markov chain whose stationary distribution coincides with $\mathcal{D}$ and give an algorithm to obtain exact samples using the technique of Coupling from the Past. However, the sample complexity of this algorithm depends on the structure of the distribution $\mathcal{D}$ and can be even exponential in the support of $\mathcal{D}$ in many natural scenarios. Our main contribution is to provide an efficient exact sampling algorithm whose complexity does not depend on the structure of $\mathcal{D}$. To this end, we give a parametric Markov chain that mixes significantly faster given a good approximation to the stationary distribution. We can obtain such an approximation using an efficient learning from pairwise comparisons algorithm (Shah et al., JMLR 17, 2016). Our technique for speeding up sampling from a Markov chain whose stationary distribution is approximately known is simple, general and possibly of independent interest.

Sampling random nodes is a fundamental algorithmic primitive in the analysis of massive networks, with many modern graph mining algorithms critically relying on it. We consider the task of generating a large collection of random nodes in the network assuming limited query access (where querying a node reveals its set of neighbors). In current approaches, based on long random walks, the number of queries per sample scales linearly with the mixing time of the network, which can be prohibitive for large real-world networks. We propose a new method for sampling multiple nodes that bypasses the dependence in the mixing time by explicitly searching for less accessible components in the network. We test our approach on a variety of real-world and synthetic networks with up to tens of millions of nodes, demonstrating a query complexity improvement of up to x20 compared to the state of the art.

In this work, we study the metric distortion problem in voting theory under a limited amount of ordinal information. Our primary contribution is threefold. First, we consider mechanisms that perform a sequence of pairwise comparisons between candidates. We show that a popular deterministic mechanism employed in many knockout phases yields distortion O(log m) while eliciting only m − 1 out of the Θ(m2 ) possible pairwise comparisons, where m represents the number of candidates. Our analysis for this mechanism leverages a powerful technical lemma developed by Kempe (AAAI ‘20). We also provide a matching lower bound on its distortion. In contrast, we prove that any mechanism which performs fewer than m−1 pairwise comparisons is destined to have unbounded distortion. Moreover, we study the power of deterministic mechanisms under incomplete rankings. Most notably, when agents provide their k-top preferences we show an upper bound of 6m/k + 1 on the distortion, for any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}. Thus, we substantially improve over the previous bound of 12m/k established by Kempe (AAAI ‘20), and we come closer to matching the best-known lower bound. Finally, we are concerned with the sample complexity required to ensure near-optimal distortion with high probability. Our main contribution is to show that a random sample of Θ(m/ϵ2 ) voters suffices to guarantee distortion 3 + ϵ with high probability, for any sufficiently small ϵ > 0. This result is based on analyzing the sensitivity of the deterministic mechanism introduced by Gkatzelis, Halpern, and Shah (FOCS ‘20). Importantly, all of our sample-complexity bounds are distribution-independent. From an experimental standpoint, we present several empirical findings on real-life voting applications, comparing the scoring systems employed in practice with a mechanism explicitly minimizing (metric) distortion. Interestingly, for our case studies, we find that the winner in the actual competition is typically the candidate who minimizes the distortion.

Modern large-scale computing deployments consist of complex elastic applications running over machine clusters. A current trend adopted by providers is to set unused virtual machines, or else spot instances, in low prices to take advantage of spare capacity. In this paper we present a group of efficient allocation and pricing policies that can be used by vendors for their spot price mechanisms. We model the procedure of acquiring virtual machines as a truthful knapsack auction and we deploy dynamic allocation and pricing rules that achieve near-optimal revenue and social welfare. As the problem is NP-hard our solutions are based on approximate algorithms. First, we propose two solutions that do not use prior knowledge. Then, we enhance them with three learning algorithms. We evaluate them with simulations on the Google Cluster dataset and we benchmark them against the Uniform Price, the Optimal Single Price and the Ex-CORE mechanisms. Our proposed dynamic mechanism is robust, achieves revenue up to 89% of the Optimal Single Price auction, and computes the allocation in polynomial time making our contribution computationally tractable in realtime scenarios.

We consider the problem of learning the true ordering of a set of alternatives from largely incomplete and noisy rankings. We introduce a natural generalization of both the Mallows model, a popular model of ranking distributions, and the extensively studied model of ranking from pairwise comparisons. Our selective Mallows model outputs a noisy ranking on any given subset of alternatives, based on an underlying Mallows distribution. Assuming a sequence of subsets where each pair of alternatives appears frequently enough, we obtain strong asymptotically tight upper and lower bounds on the sample complexity of learning the underlying complete central ranking and the (identities and the) ranking of the top k alternatives from selective Mallows rankings. Moreover, building on the work of (Braverman and Mossel, 2009), we show how to efficiently compute the maximum likelihood complete ranking from selective Mallows rankings.

For many learning problems one may not have access to fine grained label information; e.g., an image can be labeled as husky, dog, or even animal depending on the expertise of the annotator. In this work, we formalize these settings and study the problem of learning from such coarse data. Instead of observing the actual labels from a set $\mathcal{Z}$, we observe coarse labels corresponding to a partition of $\mathcal{Z}$ (or a mixture of partitions). Our main algorithmic result is that essentially any problem learnable from fine grained labels can also be learned efficiently when the coarse data are sufficiently informative. We obtain our result through a generic reduction for answering Statistical Queries (SQ) over fine grained labels given only coarse labels. The number of coarse labels required depends polynomially on the information distortion due to coarsening and the number of fine labels $|\mathcal{Z}|$. We also investigate the case of (infinitely many) real valued labels focusing on a central problem in censored and truncated statistics: Gaussian mean estimation from coarse data. We provide an efficient algorithm when the sets in the partition are convex and establish that the problem is NP-hard even for very simple non-convex sets.

We investigate the polynomial-time approximability of the multistage version of Min-Sum Set Cover (Mult-MSSC), a natural and intriguing generalization of the classical List Update problem. In Mult-MSSC, we maintain a sequence of permutations (π⁰, π¹, …, π^T) on n elements, based on a sequence of requests ℛ = (R¹, …, R^T). We aim to minimize the total cost of updating π^{t-1} to π^{t}, quantified by the Kendall tau distance d_{KT}(π^{t-1}, π^t), plus the total cost of covering each request R^t with the current permutation π^t, quantified by the position of the first element of R^t in π^t. Using a reduction from Set Cover, we show that Mult-MSSC does not admit an O(1)-approximation, unless P = NP, and that any o(log n) (resp. o(r)) approximation to Mult-MSSC implies a sublogarithmic (resp. o(r)) approximation to Set Cover (resp. where each element appears at most r times). Our main technical contribution is to show that Mult-MSSC can be approximated in polynomial-time within a factor of O(log² n) in general instances, by randomized rounding, and within a factor of O(r²), if all requests have cardinality at most r, by deterministic rounding.

In this work, we study dynamic clustering problems from the perspective of online learning. We consider an online learning problem, called \textit{Dynamic $k$-Clustering}, in which $k$ centers are maintained in a metric space over time (centers may change positions) such as a dynamically changing set of $r$ clients is served in the best possible way. The connection cost at round $t$ is given by the \textit{$p$-norm} of the vector formed by the distance of each client to its closest center at round $t$, for some $p\geq 1$. We design a \textit{$\Theta\left( \min(k,r) \right)$-regret} polynomial-time online learning algorithm, while we show that, under some well-established computational complexity conjectures, \textit{constant-regret} cannot be achieved in polynomial-time. In addition to the efficient solution of Dynamic $k$-Clustering, our work contributes to the long line of research of combinatorial online learning.

In this paper, we devise identity tests for ranking data that is generated from Mallows model both in the \emph{asymptotic} and \emph{non-asymptotic} settings. First we consider the case when the central ranking is known, and devise two algorithms for testing the spread parameter of the Mallows model. The first one is obtained by constructing a Uniformly Most Powerful Unbiased (UMPU) test in the asymptotic setting and then converting it into a sample-optimal non-asymptotic identity test. The resulting test is, however, impractical even for medium sized data, because it requires computing the distribution of the sufficient statistic. The second non-asymptotic test is derived from an optimal learning algorithm for the Mallows model. This test is both easy to compute and is sample-optimal for a wide range of parameters. Next, we consider testing Mallows models for the unknown central ranking case. This case can be tackled in the asymptotic setting by introducing a bias that exponentially decays with the sample size. We support all our findings with extensive numerical experiments and show that the proposed tests scale gracefully with the number of items to be ranked.

We study the problem of uniformity testing for statistical data that consists of rankings over $m$ items where the alternative class is restricted to Mallows models with single parameter. Testing ranking data is challenging because of the size of the large domain that is factorial in $m$, therefore the tester needs to take advantage of some structure of the alternative class. We show that uniform distribution can be distinguished from Mallows model with $O(m^{-1/2})$ samples based on simple pairwise statistics, which allows us to test uniformity using only two samples, if $m$ is large enough. We also consider uniformity testing with central and locally differential private (DP) constraints. We present a central DP algorithm that requires $O\left(\max \{ 1/\epsilon_0, 1/\sqrt{m} \} \right)$ where $\epsilon_0$ is the privacy budget parameter. Interestingly, our uniformity testing algorithm is straightforward to apply in the local DP scenario by its nature, since it works with binary statistics that is extracted from the ranking data. We carry out large-scale experiments, including $m=10000$, to show that these testing algorithms scales very gracefully with the number of items.

We study the K-Facility Reallocation problem on the real line, where we maintain K facility locations over T stages, based on the stage-dependent locations of n agents. Each agent is connected to the nearest facility at each stage, and the facilities may move from one stage to another, to accommodate different agent locations. The objective is to minimize the connection cost of the agents plus the total moving cost of the facilities, over all stages. The K-Facility Reallocation problem was introduced by de Keijzer and Wojtczak, where they mostly focused on the special case of a single facility. Using an LP-based approach, we present a polynomial time algorithm that computes the optimal solution for any number of facilities. We also consider the online K-Facility Reallocation problem, where the algorithm becomes aware of agent locations in a stage-by-stage fashion. By exploiting an interesting connection to the classical K-server problem, we present a constant-competitive algorithm for K=2 facilities.

We study the problem of estimating the parameters of a Boolean product distribution in $d$ dimensions, when the samples are truncated by a set $S \subset \{0, 1\}^d$ accessible through a membership oracle. This is the first time that the computational and statistical complexity of learning from truncated samples is considered in a discrete setting. We introduce a natural notion of \emph{fatness} of the truncation set $S$, under which truncated samples reveal enough information about the true distribution. We show that if the truncation set is sufficiently fat, samples from the true distribution can be generated from truncated samples. A stunning consequence is that virtually any statistical task (e.g., learning in total variation distance, parameter estimation, uniformity or identity testing) that can be performed efficiently for Boolean product distributions, can also be performed from truncated samples, with a small increase in sample complexity. We generalize our approach to ranking distributions over $d$ alternatives, where we show how fatness implies efficient parameter estimation of Mallows models from truncated samples. Exploring the limits of learning discrete models from truncated samples, we identify three natural conditions that are necessary for efficient identifiability: (i) the truncation set $S$ should be rich enough; (ii) $S$ should be accessible through membership queries; and (iii) the truncation by $S$ should leave enough randomness in all directions. By carefully adapting the Stochastic Gradient Descent approach of (Daskalakis et al., FOCS 2018), we show that these conditions are also sufficient for efficient learning of truncated Boolean product distributions.

International audience

In this work, we seek a more refined understanding of the complexity of local optimum computation for Max-Cut and pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) computation for congestion games with weighted players and linear latency functions. We show that computing a PNE of linear weighted congestion games is PLS-complete either for very restricted strategy spaces, namely when player strategies are paths on a series-parallel network with a single origin and destination, or for very restricted latency functions, namely when the latency on each resource is equal to the congestion. Our results reveal a remarkable gap regarding the complexity of PNE in congestion games with weighted and unweighted players, since in case of unweighted players, a PNE can be easily computed by either a simple greedy algorithm (for series-parallel networks) or any better response dynamics (when the latency is equal to the congestion). For the latter of the results above, we need to show first that computing a local optimum of a natural restriction of Max-Cut, which we call Node-Max-Cut, is PLS-complete. In Node-Max-Cut, the input graph is vertex-weighted and the weight of each edge is equal to the product of the weights of its endpoints. Due to the very restricted nature of Node-Max-Cut, the reduction requires a careful combination of new gadgets with ideas and techniques from previous work. We also show how to compute efficiently a (1+ε)-approximate equilibrium for Node-Max-Cut, if the number of different vertex weights is constant.

We consider a natural model of online preference aggregation, where sets of preferred items R1, R2, ..., Rt, ..., along with a demand for kt items in each Rt, appear online. Without prior knowledge of (Rt, kt), the learner maintains a ranking \pit aiming that at least kt items from Rt appear high in \pi_t. This is a fundamental problem in preference aggregation with applications to e.g., ordering product or news items in web pages based on user scrolling and click patterns. The widely studied Generalized Min-Sum-Set-Cover (GMSSC) problem serves as a formal model for the setting above. GMSSC is NP-hard and the standard application of no-regret online learning algorithms is computationally inefficient, because they operate in the space of rankings. In this work, we show how to achieve low regret for GMSSC in polynomial-time. We employ dimensionality reduction from rankings to the space of doubly stochastic matrices, where we apply Online Gradient Descent. A key step is to show how subgradients can be computed efficiently, by solving the dual of a configuration LP. Using deterministic and randomized rounding schemes, we map doubly stochastic matrices back to rankings with a small loss in the GMSSC objective.

We study incentive compatible mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions where the bidders have submodular (or XOS) valuations and are budget-constrained. Our objective is to maximize the liquid welfare, a notion of efficiency for budgetconstrained bidders introduced by Dobzinski and Paes Leme (2014). We show that some of the known truthful mechanisms that best-approximate the social welfare for Combinatorial Auctions with submodular bidders through demand query oracles can be adapted, so that they retain truthfulness and achieve asymptotically the same approximation guarantees for the liquid welfare. More specifically, for the problem of optimizing the liquid welfare in Combinatorial Auctions with submodular bidders, we obtain a universally truthful randomized O(log m)-approximate mechanism, where m is the number of items, by adapting the mechanism of Krysta and Vöcking (2012).Additionally, motivated by large market assumptions often used in mechanism design, we introduce a notion of competitive markets and show that in such markets, liquid welfare can be approximated within a constant factor by a randomized universally truthful mechanism. Finally, in the Bayesian setting, we obtain a truthful O(1)-approximate mechanism for the case where bidder valuations are generated as independent samples from a known distribution, by adapting the results of Feldman, Gravin and Lucier (2014).

The Mallows model, introduced in the seminal paper of Mallows 1957, is one of the most fundamental ranking distribution over the symmetric group $S_m$. To analyze more complex ranking data, several studies considered the Generalized Mallows model defined by Fligner and Verducci 1986. Despite the significant research interest of ranking distributions, the exact sample complexity of estimating the parameters of a Mallows and a Generalized Mallows Model is not well-understood. The main result of the paper is a tight sample complexity bound for learning Mallows and Generalized Mallows Model. We approach the learning problem by analyzing a more general model which interpolates between the single parameter Mallows Model and the $m$ parameter Mallows model. We call our model Mallows Block Model – referring to the Block Models that are a popular model in theoretical statistics. Our sample complexity analysis gives tight bound for learning the Mallows Block Model for any number of blocks. We provide essentially matching lower bounds for our sample complexity results. As a corollary of our analysis, it turns out that, if the central ranking is known, one single sample from the Mallows Block Model is sufficient to estimate the spread parameters with error that goes to zero as the size of the permutations goes to infinity. In addition, we calculate the exact rate of the parameter estimation error.

In this paper, we consider a variant of the facility location problem. Imagine the scenario where facilities are categorized into multiple types such as schools, hospitals, post offices, etc. and the cost of connecting a client to a facility is realized by the distance between them. Each client has a total budget on the distance she/he is willing to travel. The goal is to open the minimum number of facilities such that the aggregate distance of each client to multiple types is within her/his budget. This problem closely resembles to the set cover and r-domination problems. Here, we study this problem in different settings. Specifically, we present some positive and negative results in the general setting, where no assumption is made on the distance values. Then we show that better results can be achieved when clients and facilities lie in a metric space.

Greedy algorithms are known to provide, in polynomial time, near optimal approximation guarantees for Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) with multidimensional bidders. It is known that truthful greedy-like mechanisms for CAs with multi-minded bidders do not achieve good approximation guarantees. In this work, we seek a deeper understanding of greedy mechanism design and investigate under which general assumptions, we can have efficient and truthful greedy mechanisms for CAs. Towards this goal, we use the framework of priority algorithms and weak and strong verification, where the bidders are not allowed to overbid on their winning set or on any subset of this set, respectively. We provide a complete characterization of the power of weak verification showing that it is sufficient and necessary for any greedy fixed priority algorithm to become truthful with the use of money or not, depending on the ordering of the bids. Moreover, we show that strong verification is sufficient and necessary to obtain a 2-approximate truthful mechanism with money, based on a known greedy algorithm, for the problem of submodular CAs in finite bidding domains. Our proof is based on an interesting structural analysis of the strongly connected components of the declaration graph.

Algorithmic Mechanism Design attempts to marry computation and incentives, mainly by leveraging monetary transfers between designer and selfish agents involved. This is principally because in absence of money, very little can be done to enforce truthfulness. However, in certain applications, money is unavailable, morally unacceptable or might simply be at odds with the objective of the mechanism. For example, in combinatorial auctions (CAs), the paradigmatic problem of the area, we aim at solutions of maximum social welfare but still charge the society to ensure truthfulness. Additionally, truthfulness of CAs is poorly understood already in the case in which bidders happen to be interested in only two different sets of goods. We focus on the design of incentive-compatible CAs without money in the general setting of k -minded bidders. We trade monetary transfers with the observation that the mechanism can detect certain lies of the bidders: i.e., we study truthful CAs with verification and without money. We prove a characterization of truthful mechanisms, which makes an interesting parallel with the well-understood case of CAs with money for single-minded bidders. We then give a host of upper bounds on the approximation ratio obtained by either deterministic or randomized truthful mechanisms when the sets and valuations are private knowledge of the bidders. (Most of these mechanisms run in polynomial time and return solutions with (nearly) best possible approximation guarantees.) We complement these positive results with a number of lower bounds (some of which are essentially tight) that hold in the easier case of public sets. We thus provide an almost complete picture of truthfully approximating CAs in this general setting with multi-dimensional bidders.

We consider temporal graphs with discrete time labels and investigate the size and the approximability of minimum temporally connected spanning subgraphs. We present a family of minimally connected temporal graphs with n vertices and Omega(n^2) edges, thus resolving an open question of (Kempe, Kleinberg, Kumar, JCSS 64, 2002) about the existence of sparse temporal connectivity certificates. Next, we consider the problem of computing a minimum weight subset of temporal edges that preserve connectivity of a given temporal graph either from a given vertex r (r-MTC problem) or among all vertex pairs (MTC problem). We show that the approximability of r-MTC is closely related to the approximability of Directed Steiner Tree and that r-MTC can be solved in polynomial time if the underlying graph has bounded treewidth. We also show that the best approximation ratio for MTC is at least O(2^{log^{1-epsilon}(n)} and at most O(min{n^{1+epsilon},(Delta*M)^{2/3+epsilon}), for any constant epsilon > 0, where M is the number of temporal edges and Delta is the maximum degree of the underlying graph. Furthermore, we prove that the unweighted version of MTC is APX-hard and that MTC is efficiently solvable in trees and 2-approximable in cycles.

We introduce a general approach based on selective verification and obtain approximate mechanisms without money for maximizing the social welfare in the general domain of Utilitarian Voting. Having a good allocation in mind, a mechanism with verification selects few critical agents and detects, using a verification oracle, whether they have reported truthfully. If yes, the mechanism produces the desired allocation. Otherwise, the mechanism ignores any misreports and proceeds recursively with the remaining agents. We obtain randomized truthful (or almost truthful) mechanisms without money that verify only O(ln m/eps) agents, where m is the number of outcomes, independently of the total number of agents, and are (1-eps)-approximate for the social welfare. We also show that any truthful mechanism with a constant approximation ratio needs to verify Omega(log m) agents. A remarkable property of our mechanisms is immunity (to agent misreports), namely that their outcome depends only on the reports of the truthful agents.

It has long been known, since the classical work of (Arora, Karger, Karpinski, JCSS'99), that MAX-CUT admits a PTAS on dense graphs, and more generally, MAX-k-CSP admits a PTAS on "dense" instances with Omega(n^k) constraints. In this paper we extend and generalize their exhaustive sampling approach, presenting a framework for (1-epsilon)-approximating any MAX-k-CSP problem in sub-exponential time while significantly relaxing the denseness requirement on the input instance. Specifically, we prove that for any constants delta in (0, 1] and epsilon > 0, we can approximate MAX-k-CSP problems with Omega(n^{k-1+delta}) constraints within a factor of (1-epsilon) in time 2^{O(n^{1-delta}*ln(n) / epsilon^3)}. The framework is quite general and includes classical optimization problems, such as MAX-CUT, MAX-DICUT, MAX-k-SAT, and (with a slight extension) k-DENSEST SUBGRAPH, as special cases. For MAX-CUT in particular (where k=2), it gives an approximation scheme that runs in time sub-exponential in n even for "almost-sparse" instances (graphs with n^{1+delta} edges). We prove that our results are essentially best possible, assuming the ETH. First, the density requirement cannot be relaxed further: there exists a constant r < 1 such that for all delta > 0, MAX-k-SAT instances with O(n^{k-1}) clauses cannot be approximated within a ratio better than r in time 2^{O(n^{1-delta})}. Second, the running time of our algorithm is almost tight for all densities. Even for MAX-CUT there exists r<1 such that for all delta' > delta >0, MAX-CUT instances with n^{1+delta} edges cannot be approximated within a ratio better than r in time 2^{n^{1-delta'}}.

We investigate how and to which extent one can exploit risk-aversion and modify the perceived cost of the players in selfish routing so that the Price of Anarchy ( $$\mathrm {PoA}$$ ) is improved. We introduce small random perturbations to the edge latencies so that the expected latency does not change, but the perceived cost of the players increases due to risk-aversion. We adopt the model of $$\gamma $$ -modifiable routing games, a variant of routing games with restricted tolls. We prove that computing the best $$\gamma $$ -enforceable flow is $$\mathrm {NP}$$ -hard for parallel-link networks with affine latencies and two classes of heterogeneous risk-averse players. On the positive side, we show that for parallel-link networks with heterogeneous players and for series-parallel networks with homogeneous players, there exists a nicely structured $$\gamma $$ -enforceable flow whose $$\mathrm {PoA}$$ improves fast as $$\gamma $$ increases. We show that the complexity of computing such a $$\gamma $$ -enforceable flow is determined by the complexity of computing a Nash flow of the original game. Moreover, we prove that the $$\mathrm {PoA}$$ of this flow is best possible in the worst-case, in the sense that there are instances where (i) the best $$\gamma $$ -enforceable flow has the same $$\mathrm {PoA}$$ , and (ii) considering more flexible modifications does not lead to any further improvement.

The theme of this paper is how to find all instances of a given “sample” graph in a larger “data graph,” using a single round of map-reduce. For the simplest sample graph, the triangle, we improve upon the best known such algorithm. We then examine the general case, considering both the communication cost between mappers and reducers and the total computation cost at the reducers. To minimize communication cost, we exploit the techniques of [1] for computing multiway joins (evaluating conjunctive queries) in a single map-reduce round. Several methods are shown for translating sample graphs into a union of conjunctive queries with as few queries as possible. We also address the matter of optimizing computation cost. Many serial algorithms are shown to be “convertible,” in the sense that it is possible to partition the data graph, explore each partition in a separate reducer, and have the total computation cost at the reducers be of the same order as the computation cost of the serial algorithm.

We consider k-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations on the real line, and a mechanism maps them to k facilities. Each agent seeks to minimize his connection cost, given by a nonnegative increasing function of his distance to the nearest facility. Departing from previous work, that mostly considers the identity cost function, we are interested in mechanisms without payments that are (group) strategyproof for any given cost function, and achieve a good approximation ratio for the social cost and/or the maximum cost of the agents.

We present the first one-pass memoryless algorithm for metric Facility Location that maintains a set of facilities approximating the optimal facility configuration within a constant factor. The algorithm is randomized and very simple to state and implement. It processes the demand points one-by-one as they arrive, and keeps in memory only the facility locations currently open. We prove that its competitive ratio is less than 14 in the special case of uniform facility costs, and less than 49 in the general case of nonuniform facility costs.

We consider algorithmic questions concerning the existence, tractability, and quality of Nash equilibria, in atomic congestion games among users participating in selfish coalitions. We introduce a coalitional congestion model among atomic players and demonstrate many interesting similarities with the noncooperative case. For example, there exists a potential function proving the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE) in the unrelated parallel links setting; in the network setting, the finite improvement property collapses as soon as we depart from linear delays, but there is an exact potential (and thus PNE) for linear delays. The price of anarchy on identical parallel links demonstrates a quite surprising threshold behavior: It persists on being asymptotically equal to that in the case of the noncooperative KP-model, unless the number of coalitions is sublogarithmic . We also show crucial differences, mainly concerning the hardness of algorithmic problems that are solved efficiently in the noncooperative case. Although we demonstrate convergence to robust PNE, we also prove the hardness of computing them. On the other hand, we propose a generalized fully mixed Nash equilibrium that can be efficiently constructed in most cases. Finally, we propose a natural improvement policy and prove its convergence in pseudopolynomial time to PNE which are robust against (even dynamically forming) coalitions of small size.