Dual-process theories play a central role in both psychology and neuroscience, figuring prominently in domains ranging from executive control to reward-based learning to judgment and decision making. In each of these domains, two mechanisms appear to operate concurrently, one relatively high in computational complexity, the other relatively simple. Why is neural information processing organized in this way? We propose an answer to this question based on the notion of compression. The key insight is that dual-process structure can enhance adaptive behavior by allowing an agent to minimize the description length of its own behavior. We apply a single model based on this observation to findings from research on executive control, reward-based learning, and judgment and decision making, showing that seemingly diverse dual-process phenomena can be understood as domain-specific consequences of a single underlying set of computational principles.

Large language models have shown tremendous performance in a variety of tasks. In-context learning -- the ability to improve at a task after being provided with a number of demonstrations -- is seen as one of the main contributors to their success. In the present paper, we demonstrate that the in-context learning abilities of large language models can be recursively improved via in-context learning itself. We coin this phenomenon meta-in-context learning. Looking at two idealized domains, a one-dimensional regression task and a two-armed bandit task, we show that meta-in-context learning adaptively reshapes a large language model's priors over expected tasks. Furthermore, we find that meta-in-context learning modifies the in-context learning strategies of such models. Finally, we broaden the scope of our investigation to encompass two diverse benchmarks: one focusing on real-world regression problems and the other encompassing multiple NLP tasks. In both cases, we observe competitive performance comparable to that of traditional learning algorithms. Taken together, our work improves our understanding of in-context learning and paves the way toward adapting large language models to the environment they are applied purely through meta-in-context learning rather than traditional finetuning.

Computational cognitive models are a fundamental tool in behavioral neuroscience. They embody in software precise hypotheses about the cognitive mechanisms underlying a particular behavior. Constructing these models is typically a difficult iterative process that requires both inspiration from the literature and the creativity of an individual researcher. Here, we adopt an alternative approach to learn parsimonious cognitive models directly from data. We fit behavior data using a recurrent neural network that is penalized for carrying excess information between timesteps, leading to sparse, interpretable representations and dynamics. When fitting synthetic behavioral data from known cognitive models, our method recovers the underlying form of those models. When fit to choice data from rats performing a bandit task, our method recovers simple and interpretable models that make testable predictions about neural mechanisms.

Real-world data is high-dimensional: a book, image, or musical performance can easily contain hundreds of thousands of elements even after compression. However, the most commonly used autoregressive models, Transformers, are prohibitively expensive to scale to the number of inputs and layers needed to capture this long-range structure. We develop Perceiver AR, an autoregressive, modality-agnostic architecture which uses cross-attention to map long-range inputs to a small number of latents while also maintaining end-to-end causal masking. Perceiver AR can directly attend to over a hundred thousand tokens, enabling practical long-context density estimation without the need for hand-crafted sparsity patterns or memory mechanisms. When trained on images or music, Perceiver AR generates outputs with clear long-term coherence and structure. Our architecture also obtains state-of-the-art likelihood on long-sequence benchmarks, including 64x64 ImageNet images and PG-19 books.

Recent work in large language modeling (LLMs) has used fine-tuning to align outputs with the preferences of a prototypical user. This work assumes that human preferences are static and homogeneous across individuals, so that aligning to a single "generic" user will confer more general alignment. Here, we embrace the heterogeneity of human preferences to consider a different challenge: how might a machine help people with diverse views find agreement? We fine-tune a 70 billion parameter LLM to generate statements that maximize the expected approval for a group of people with potentially diverse opinions. Human participants provide written opinions on thousands of questions touching on moral and political issues (e.g., "should we raise taxes on the rich?"), and rate the LLM's generated candidate consensus statements for agreement and quality. A reward model is then trained to predict individual preferences, enabling it to quantify and rank consensus statements in terms of their appeal to the overall group, defined according to different aggregation (social welfare) functions. The model produces consensus statements that are preferred by human users over those from prompted LLMs ($>70\%$) and significantly outperforms a tight fine-tuned baseline that lacks the final ranking step. Further, our best model's consensus statements are preferred over the best human-generated opinions ($>65\%$). We find that when we silently constructed consensus statements from only a subset of group members, those who were excluded were more likely to dissent, revealing the sensitivity of the consensus to individual contributions. These results highlight the potential to use LLMs to help groups of humans align their values with one another.

The intersection between neuroscience and artificial intelligence (AI) research has created synergistic effects in both fields. While neuroscientific discoveries have inspired the development of AI architectures, new ideas and algorithms from AI research have produced new ways to study brain mechanisms. A well-known example is the case of reinforcement learning (RL), which has stimulated neuroscience research on how animals learn to adjust their behavior to maximize reward. In this review article, we cover recent collaborative work between the two fields in the context of meta-learning and its extension to social cognition and consciousness. Meta-learning refers to the ability to learn how to learn, such as learning to adjust hyperparameters of existing learning algorithms and how to use existing models and knowledge to efficiently solve new tasks. This meta-learning capability is important for making existing AI systems more adaptive and flexible to efficiently solve new tasks. Since this is one of the areas where there is a gap between human performance and current AI systems, successful collaboration should produce new ideas and progress. Starting from the role of RL algorithms in driving neuroscience, we discuss recent developments in deep RL applied to modeling prefrontal cortex functions. Even from a broader perspective, we discuss the similarities and differences between social cognition and meta-learning, and finally conclude with speculations on the potential links between intelligence as endowed by model-based RL and consciousness. For future work we highlight data efficiency, autonomy and intrinsic motivation as key research areas for advancing both fields.

Neural networks have achieved success in a wide array of perceptual tasks but often fail at tasks involving both perception and higher-level reasoning. On these more challenging tasks, bespoke approaches (such as modular symbolic components, independent dynamics models or semantic parsers) targeted towards that specific type of task have typically performed better. The downside to these targeted approaches, however, is that they can be more brittle than general-purpose neural networks, requiring significant modification or even redesign according to the particular task at hand. Here, we propose a more general neural-network-based approach to dynamic visual reasoning problems that obtains state-of-the-art performance on three different domains, in each case outperforming bespoke modular approaches tailored specifically to the task. Our method relies on learned object-centric representations, self-attention and self-supervised dynamics learning, and all three elements together are required for strong performance to emerge. The success of this combination suggests that there may be no need to trade off flexibility for performance on problems involving spatio-temporal or causal-style reasoning. With the right soft biases and learning objectives in a neural network we may be able to attain the best of both worlds.

To help agents reason about scenes in terms of their building blocks, we wish to extract the compositional structure of any given scene (in particular, the configuration and characteristics of objects comprising the scene). This problem is especially difficult when scene structure needs to be inferred while also estimating the agent’s location/viewpoint, as the two variables jointly give rise to the agent’s observations. We present an unsupervised variational approach to this problem. Leveraging the shared structure that exists across different scenes, our model learns to infer two sets of latent representations from RGB video input alone: a set of "object" latents, corresponding to the time-invariant, object-level contents of the scene, as well as a set of "frame" latents, corresponding to global time-varying elements such as viewpoint. This factorization of latents allows our model, SIMONe, to represent object attributes in an allocentric manner which does not depend on viewpoint. Moreover, it allows us to disentangle object dynamics and summarize their trajectories as time-abstracted, view-invariant, per-object properties. We demonstrate these capabilities, as well as the model's performance in terms of view synthesis and instance segmentation, across three procedurally generated video datasets.

Collaborating with humans requires rapidly adapting to their individual strengths, weaknesses, and preferences. Unfortunately, most standard multi-agent reinforcement learning techniques, such as self-play (SP) or population play (PP), produce agents that overfit to their training partners and do not generalize well to humans. Alternatively, researchers can collect human data, train a human model using behavioral cloning, and then use that model to train "human-aware" agents ("behavioral cloning play", or BCP). While such an approach can improve the generalization of agents to new human co-players, it involves the onerous and expensive step of collecting large amounts of human data first. Here, we study the problem of how to train agents that collaborate well with human partners without using human data. We argue that the crux of the problem is to produce a diverse set of training partners. Drawing inspiration from successful multi-agent approaches in competitive domains, we find that a surprisingly simple approach is highly effective. We train our agent partner as the best response to a population of self-play agents and their past checkpoints taken throughout training, a method we call Fictitious Co-Play (FCP). Our experiments focus on a two-player collaborative cooking simulator that has recently been proposed as a challenge problem for coordination with humans. We find that FCP agents score significantly higher than SP, PP, and BCP when paired with novel agent and human partners. Furthermore, humans also report a strong subjective preference to partnering with FCP agents over all baselines.

Owing to their ability to both effectively integrate information over long time horizons and scale to massive amounts of data, self-attention architectures have recently shown breakthrough success in natural language processing (NLP). Harnessing the transformer’s ability to process long time horizons of information could provide a similar performance boost in partially observable reinforcement learning (RL) domains, but the large-scale transformers used in NLP have yet to be successfully applied to the RL setting. In this work we demonstrate that the standard transformer architecture is difficult to optimize, which was previously observed in the supervised learning setting but becomes especially pronounced with RL objectives. We propose architectural modifications that substantially improve the stability and learning speed of the original Transformer and XL variant. The proposed architecture, the Gated Transformer-XL (GTrXL), surpasses LSTMs on challenging memory environments and achieves state-of-the-art results on the multi-task DMLab-30 benchmark suite, exceeding the performance of an external memory architecture. We show that the GTrXL has stability and performance that consistently matches or exceeds a competitive LSTM baseline, including on more reactive tasks where memory is less critical.

When observing the actions of others, humans make inferences about why they acted as they did, and what this implies about the world; humans also use the fact that their actions will be interpreted in this manner, allowing them to act informatively and thereby communicate efficiently with others. Although learning algorithms have recently achieved superhuman performance in a number of two-player, zero-sum games, scalable multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms that can discover effective strategies and conventions in complex, partially observable settings have proven elusive. We present the Bayesian action decoder (BAD), a new multi-agent learning method that uses an approximate Bayesian update to obtain a public belief that conditions on the actions taken by all agents in the environment. BAD introduces a new Markov decision process, the public belief MDP, in which the action space consists of all deterministic partial policies, and exploits the fact that an agent acting only on this public belief state can still learn to use its private information if the action space is augmented to be over all partial policies mapping private information into environment actions. The Bayesian update is closely related to the theory of mind reasoning that humans carry out when observing others’ actions. We first validate BAD on a proof-of-principle two-step matrix game, where it outperforms policy gradient methods; we then evaluate BAD on the challenging, cooperative partial-information card game Hanabi, where, in the two-player setting, it surpasses all previously published learning and hand-coded approaches, establishing a new state of the art.

Human perception is structured around objects which form the basis for our higher-level cognition and impressive systematic generalization abilities. Yet most work on representation learning focuses on feature learning without even considering multiple objects, or treats segmentation as an (often supervised) preprocessing step. Instead, we argue for the importance of learning to segment and represent objects jointly. We demonstrate that, starting from the simple assumption that a scene is composed of multiple entities, it is possible to learn to segment images into interpretable objects with disentangled representations. Our method learns – without supervision – to inpaint occluded parts, and extrapolates to scenes with more objects and to unseen objects with novel feature combinations. We also show that, due to the use of iterative variational inference, our system is able to learn multi-modal posteriors for ambiguous inputs and extends naturally to sequences.

Theory of mind (ToM) broadly refers to humans’ ability to represent the mental states of others, including their desires, beliefs, and intentions. We design a Theory of Mind neural network {–} a ToMnet {–} which uses meta-learning to build such models of the agents it encounters. The ToMnet learns a strong prior model for agents’ future behaviour, and, using only a small number of behavioural observations, can bootstrap to richer predictions about agents’ characteristics and mental states. We apply the ToMnet to agents behaving in simple gridworld environments, showing that it learns to model random, algorithmic, and deep RL agents from varied populations, and that it passes classic ToM tasks such as the "Sally-Anne" test of recognising that others can hold false beliefs about the world.

Meta-learning agents excel at rapidly learning new tasks from open-ended task distributions; yet, they forget what they learn about each task as soon as the next begins. When tasks reoccur {–} as they do in natural environments {–} meta-learning agents must explore again instead of immediately exploiting previously discovered solutions. We propose a formalism for generating open-ended yet repetitious environments, then develop a meta-learning architecture for solving these environments. This architecture melds the standard LSTM working memory with a differentiable neural episodic memory. We explore the capabilities of agents with this episodic LSTM in five meta-learning environments with reoccurring tasks, ranging from bandits to navigation and stochastic sequential decision problems.

Learning to cooperate with friends and compete with foes is a key component of multi-agent reinforcement learning. Typically to do so, one requires access to either a model of or interaction with the other agent(s). Here we show how to learn effective strategies for cooperation and competition in an asymmetric information game with no such model or interaction. Our approach is to encourage an agent to reveal or hide their intentions using an information-theoretic regularizer. We consider both the mutual information between goal and action given state, as well as the mutual information between goal and state. We show how to stochastically optimize these regularizers in a way that is easy to integrate with policy gradient reinforcement learning. Finally, we demonstrate that cooperative (competitive) policies learned with our approach lead to more (less) reward for a second agent in two simple asymmetric information games.

We learn recurrent neural network optimizers trained on simple synthetic functions by gradient descent. We show that these learned optimizers exhibit a remarkable degree of transfer in that they can be used to efficiently optimize a broad range of derivative-free black-box functions, including Gaussian process bandits, simple control objectives, global optimization benchmarks and hyper-parameter tuning tasks. Up to the training horizon, the learned optimizers learn to trade-off exploration and exploitation, and compare favourably with heavily engineered Bayesian optimization packages for hyper-parameter tuning.

Domain adaptation is an important open problem in deep reinforcement learning (RL). In many scenarios of interest data is hard to obtain, so agents may learn a source policy in a setting where data is readily available, with the hope that it generalises well to the target domain. We propose a new multi-stage RL agent, DARLA (DisentAngled Representation Learning Agent), which learns to see before learning to act. DARLA’s vision is based on learning a disentangled representation of the observed environment. Once DARLA can see, it is able to acquire source policies that are robust to many domain shifts – even with no access to the target domain. DARLA significantly outperforms conventional baselines in zero-shot domain adaptation scenarios, an effect that holds across a variety of RL environments (Jaco arm, DeepMind Lab) and base RL algorithms (DQN, A3C and EC).

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have advanced performance on a wide range of complex tasks, rapidly outpacing our understanding of the nature of their solutions. While past work sought to advance our understanding of these models, none has made use of the rich history of problem descriptions, theories, and experimental methods developed by cognitive psychologists to study the human mind. To explore the potential value of these tools, we chose a well-established analysis from developmental psychology that explains how children learn word labels for objects, and applied that analysis to DNNs. Using datasets of stimuli inspired by the original cognitive psychology experiments, we find that state-of-the-art one shot learning models trained on ImageNet exhibit a similar bias to that observed in humans: they prefer to categorize objects according to shape rather than color. The magnitude of this shape bias varies greatly among architecturally identical, but differently seeded models, and even fluctuates within seeds throughout training, despite nearly equivalent classification performance. These results demonstrate the capability of tools from cognitive psychology for exposing hidden computational properties of DNNs, while concurrently providing us with a computational model for human word learning.

Humans and animals are capable of evaluating actions by considering their long-run future rewards through a process described using model-based reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms. The mechanisms by which neural circuits perform the computations prescribed by model-based RL remain largely unknown; however, multiple lines of evidence suggest that neural circuits supporting model-based behavior are structurally homologous to and overlapping with those thought to carry out model-free temporal difference (TD) learning. Here, we lay out a family of approaches by which model-based computation may be built upon a core of TD learning. The foundation of this framework is the successor representation, a predictive state representation that, when combined with TD learning of value predictions, can produce a subset of the behaviors associated with model-based learning, while requiring less decision-time computation than dynamic programming. Using simulations, we delineate the precise behavioral capabilities enabled by evaluating actions using this approach, and compare them to those demonstrated by biological organisms. We then introduce two new algorithms that build upon the successor representation while progressively mitigating its limitations. Because this framework can account for the full range of observed putatively model-based behaviors while still utilizing a core TD framework, we suggest that it represents a neurally plausible family of mechanisms for model-based evaluation.

Despite recent breakthroughs in the applications of deep neural networks, one setting that presents a persistent challenge is that of "one-shot learning." Traditional gradient-based networks require a lot of data to learn, often through extensive iterative training. When new data is encountered, the models must inefficiently relearn their parameters to adequately incorporate the new information without catastrophic interference. Architectures with augmented memory capacities, such as Neural Turing Machines (NTMs), offer the ability to quickly encode and retrieve new information, and hence can potentially obviate the downsides of conventional models. Here, we demonstrate the ability of a memory-augmented neural network to rapidly assimilate new data, and leverage this data to make accurate predictions after only a few samples. We also introduce a new method for accessing an external memory that focuses on memory content, unlike previous methods that additionally use memory location-based focusing mechanisms.

Human behavior has long been recognized to display hierarchical structure: actions fit together into subtasks, which cohere into extended goal-directed activities. Arranging actions hierarchically has well established benefits, allowing behaviors to be represented efficiently by the brain, and allowing solutions to new tasks to be discovered easily. However, these payoffs depend on the particular way in which actions are organized into a hierarchy, the specific way in which tasks are carved up into subtasks. We provide a mathematical account for what makes some hierarchies better than others, an account that allows an optimal hierarchy to be identified for any set of tasks. We then present results from four behavioral experiments, suggesting that human learners spontaneously discover optimal action hierarchies.

This paper introduces a novel classification method for functional magnetic resonance imaging datasets with tens of classes. The method is designed to make predictions using information from as many brain locations as possible, instead of resorting to feature selection, and does this by decomposing the pattern of brain activation into differently informative sub-regions. We provide results over a complex semantic processing dataset that show that the method is competitive with state-of-the-art feature selection and also suggest how the method may be used to perform group or exploratory analyses of complex class structure.

The canonical technique for analyzing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data, statistical parametric mapping, produces maps of brain locations that are more active during performance of a task than during a control condition. In recent years, there has been increasing awareness of the fact that there is information in the entire pattern of brain activation and not just in saliently active locations. Classifiers have been the tool of choice for capturing this information and used to make predictions ranging from what kind of object a subject is thinking about to what decision they will make. Such classifiers are usually trained on a selection of voxels from the 3D grid that makes up the activation pattern; often this means the best accuracy is obtained using few voxels, from all across the brain, and that different voxels will be chosen in different cross-validation folds, making the classifiers hard to interpret. The increasing commonality of datasets with tens to hundreds of classes makes this problem even more acute. In this paper we introduce a method for identifying informative subsets of adjacent voxels, corresponding to brain patches that distinguish subsets of classes. These patches can then be used to train classifiers for the distinctions they support and used as "pattern features" for a meta-classifier. We show that this method permits classification at a higher accuracy than that obtained with traditional voxel selection, and that the sets of voxels used are more reproducible across cross-validation folds than those identified with voxel selection, and lie in plausible brain locations.

Research in animal learning and behavioral neuroscience has distinguished between two forms of action control: a habit-based form, which relies on stored action values, and a goal-directed form, which forecasts and compares action outcomes based on a model of the environment. While habit-based control has been the subject of extensive computational research, the computational principles underlying goal-directed control in animals have so far received less attention. In the present paper, we advance a computational framework for goal-directed control in animals and humans. We take three empirically motivated points as founding premises: (1) Neurons in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex represent action policies, (2) Neurons in orbitofrontal cortex represent rewards, and (3) Neural computation, across domains, can be appropriately understood as performing structured probabilistic inference. On a purely computational level, the resulting account relates closely to previous work using Bayesian inference to solve Markov decision problems, but extends this work by introducing a new algorithm, which provably converges on optimal plans. On a cognitive and neuroscientific level, the theory provides a unifying framework for several different forms of goal-directed action selection, placing emphasis on a novel form, within which orbitofrontal reward representations directly drive policy selection.