In the above titled paper (ibid., vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 611-627, Dec. 09), due to a production error, the affiliations of two of the authors were listed incorrectly. The correct affiliations are presented here. Also, the name of the last author in the affiliations footnote was printed incorrectly. The correct name is P. Y. A. Ryan.

Scantegrity II is an enhancement for existing paper ballot systems. It allows voters to verify election integrity - from their selections on the ballot all the way to the final tally - by noting codes and checking for them online. Voters mark Scantegrity II ballots just as with conventional optical scan, but using a special ballot marking pen. Marking a selection with this pen makes legible an otherwise invisible preprinted confirmation code. Confirmation codes are independent and random for each potential selection on each ballot. To verify that their individual votes are recorded correctly, voters can look up their ballot serial numbers online and verify that their confirmation codes are posted correctly. The confirmation codes do not allow voters to prove how they voted. However, the confirmation codes constitute convincing evidence of error or malfeasance in the event that incorrect codes are posted online. Correctness of the final tally with respect to the published codes is proven by election officials in a manner that can be verified by any interested party. Thus, compromise of either ballot chain of custody or the software systems cannot undetectably affect election integrity. Scantegrity II has been implemented and tested in small elections in which ballots were scanned either at the polling place or centrally. Preparations for its use in a public sector election have commenced.

The 13 papers in this special issue focus on electronic voting.

Under the assumption that each pair of participants em communieatc secretly, we show that any reasonable multiparty protwol can be achieved if at least Q of the Participants am honest. The secrecy achieved is unconditional, It does not rely on any assumption about computational intractability. 1.

Today, individuals provide substantially the same identifying information to each organization with which they have a relationship. In a new paradigm, individuals provide different "pseudonyms" or alternate names to each organization. A critical advantage of systems based on such pseudonyms is that the information associated with each pseudonym can be insufficient to allow data on an individual to be linked and collected together, and thus they can prevent the formation of a dossier society reminiscent of Orwell's "1984".A system is proposed in which an individual's pseudonyms are created and stored in a computer held and trusted only by the individual. New cryptographic techniques allow an organization to securely exchange messages or payments with an individual known under a pseudonym--without the communication or payments systems providers being able to trace messages or payments. Other new techniques allow a digitally signed credential to be transformed by the individual, from the individual's pseudonym with the issuing organization, to the individual's pseudonym with a recipient organization. Credentials can be transformed only between pseudonyms of a single individual, and an individual can obtain at most one pseudonym with a particular organization, but even a conspiracy of all organizations can gain no information from the pseudonyms about their correspondence. The combination of these systems can prevent abuses by individuals, while averting the potential for a dossier society.