VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Felix Fischer 0001
dblp:f/FelixFischer-1
· DBLP profile ↗
6ranked-venue papers
4as first author
2since 2021 · last 2023
0000-0002-9724-5965ORCID · verified
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 5 · 4 first-author · 2 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | The Effectiveness of Security Interventions on GitHubabstractIn 2017, GitHub was the first online open source platform to show security alerts to its users. It has since introduced further security interventions to help developers improve the security of their open source software. In this study, we investigate and compare the effects of these interventions. This offers a valuable empirical perspective on security interventions in the context of software development, enriching the predominantly qualitative and survey-based literature landscape with substantial data-driven insights. We conduct a time series analysis on security-altering commits covering the entire history of a large-scale sample of over 50,000 GitHub repositories to infer the causal effects of the security alert, security update, and code scanning interventions. Our analysis shows that while all of GitHub's security interventions have a significant positive effect on security, they differ greatly in their effect size. By comparing the design of each intervention, we identify the building blocks that worked well and those that did not. We also provide recommendations on how practitioners can improve the design of their interventions to enhance their effectiveness. Felix Fischer 0001, Jonas Höbenreich, Jens Grossklags |
CCS | 1 |
| 2021 | The Effect of Google Search on Software Security: Unobtrusive Security Interventions via Content Re-rankingabstractGoogle Search is where most developers start their Web journey looking for code examples to reuse. It is highly likely that code that is linked to the top results will be among those candidates that find their way into production software. However, as a large amount of secure and insecure code has been identified on the Web, the question arises how the providing webpages are ranked by Google and whether the ranking has an effect on software security. We investigate how secure and insecure cryptographic code examples from Stack Overflow are ranked by Google Search. Our results show that insecure code ends up in the top results and is clicked on more often. There is at least a 22.8% chance that one out of the top three Google Search results leads to insecure code. We introduce security-based re-ranking, where the rank of Google Search is updated based on the security and relevance of the provided source code in the results. We tested our re-ranking approach and compared it to Google's original ranking in an online developer study. Participants that used our modified search engine to look for help online submitted more secure and functional results, with statistical significance. In contrast to prior work on helping developers to write secure code, security-based re-ranking completely eradicates the requirement for any action performed by developers. Our intervention remains completely invisible, and therefore the probability of adoption is greatly increased. We believe security-based re-ranking allows Internet-wide improvement of code security and prevents the far-reaching spread of insecure code found on the Web. Felix Fischer 0001, Yannick Stachelscheid, Jens Grossklags |
CCS | 1 |
| 2019 | How reliable is the crowdsourced knowledge of security implementation?abstractStack Overflow (SO) is the most popular online Q&A site for developers to share their expertise in solving programming issues. Given multiple answers to a certain question, developers may take the accepted answer, the answer from a person with high reputation, or the one frequently suggested. However, researchers recently observed that SO contains exploitable security vulnerabilities in the suggested code of popular answers, which found their way into security-sensitive high-profile applications that millions of users install every day. This observation inspires us to explore the following questions: How much can we trust the security implementation suggestions on SO? If suggested answers are vulnerable, can developers rely on the community's dynamics to infer the vulnerability and identify a secure counterpart? To answer these highly important questions, we conducted a comprehensive study on security-related SO posts by contrasting secure and insecure advice with the community-given content evaluation. Thereby, we investigated whether SO's gamification approach on incentivizing users is effective in improving security properties of distributed code examples. Moreover, we traced the distribution of duplicated samples over given answers to test whether the community behavior facilitates or prevents propagation of secure and insecure code suggestions within SO. We compiled 953 different groups of similar security-related code examples and labeled their security, identifying 785 secure answer posts and 644 insecure answer posts. Compared with secure suggestions, insecure ones had higher view counts (36,508 vs. 18,713), received a higher score (14 vs. 5), and had significantly more duplicates (3.8 vs. 3.0) on average. 34% of the posts provided by highly reputable so-called trusted users were insecure. Our findings show that based on the distribution of secure and insecure code on SO, users being laymen in security rely on additional advice and guidance. However, the community-given feedback does not allow differentiating secure from insecure choices. The reputation mechanism fails in indicating trustworthy users with respect to security questions, ultimately leaving other users wandering around alone in a software security minefield. Mengsu Chen, Felix Fischer 0001, Na Meng 0001, Xiaoyin Wang, Jens Grossklags |
ICSE | 2 |
| 2019 | Stack Overflow Considered Helpful! Deep Learning Security Nudges Towards Stronger Cryptography
Felix Fischer 0001, Huang Xiao, Ching-Yu Kao, Yannick Stachelscheid, Benjamin Johnson 0001, Danial Razar, Paul Fawkesley, Nat Buckley, Konstantin Böttinger, Paul Muntean 0001, Jens Grossklags |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |
| 2017 | Stack Overflow Considered Harmful? The Impact of Copy&Paste on Android Application SecurityabstractOnline programming discussion platforms such as Stack Overflow serve as a rich source of information for software developers. Available information include vibrant discussions and oftentimes ready-to-use code snippets. Previous research identified Stack Overflow as one of the most important information sources developers rely on. Anecdotes report that software developers copy and paste code snippets from those information sources for convenience reasons. Such behavior results in a constant flow of community-provided code snippets into production software. To date, the impact of this behaviour on code security is unknown. We answer this highly important question by quantifying the proliferation of security-related code snippets from Stack Overflow in Android applications available on Google Play. Access to the rich source of information available on Stack Overflow including ready-to-use code snippets provides huge benefits for software developers. However, when it comes to code security there are some caveats to bear in mind: Due to the complex nature of code security, it is very difficult to provide ready-to-use and secure solutions for every problem. Hence, integrating a security-related code snippet from Stack Overflow into production software requires caution and expertise. Unsurprisingly, we observed insecure code snippets being copied into Android applications millions of users install from Google Play every day. To quantitatively evaluate the extent of this observation, we scanned Stack Overflow for code snippets and evaluated their security score using a stochastic gradient descent classifier. In order to identify code reuse in Android applications, we applied state-of-the-art static analysis. Our results are alarming: 15.4% of the 1.3 million Android applications we analyzed, contained security-related code snippets from Stack Overflow. Out of these 97.9% contain at least one insecure code snippet. Felix Fischer 0001, Konstantin Böttinger, Huang Xiao, Christian Stransky, Yasemin Acar, Michael Backes 0001, Sascha Fahl |
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy | 1 |
| 2014 | Hey, NSA: Stay Away from my Market! Future Proofing App Markets against Powerful AttackersabstractMobile devices are evolving as the dominant computing platform and consequently application repositories and app markets are becoming the prevalent paradigm for deploying software. Due to their central and trusted position in the software ecosystem, coerced, hacked or malicious app markets pose a serious threat to user security. Currently, there is little that hinders a nation state adversary (NSA) or other powerful attackers from using such central and trusted points of software distribution to deploy customized (malicious) versions of apps to specific users. Due to intransparencies in the current app installation paradigm, this kind of attack is extremely hard to detect. Sascha Fahl, Sergej Dechand, Henning Perl, Felix Fischer 0001, Jaromir Smrcek, Matthew Smith 0001 |
CCS | 4 |