Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Randy C. Marchany
dblp:m/RandyCMarchany · also Randolph Marchany
· DBLP profile ↗
5ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0002-9048-3872ORCID · verified
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Computer networks · 4 · 1 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Network security · 100% | |
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Routing and switching · 100% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Network security › attack resilience › attack mitigation › denial-of-service defense
DDoS defense |
0.1 | 1 | 2007 | A Divide-and-Conquer Strategy for Thwarting Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks · IEEE Trans. Parallel Distributed Syst. 2007 |
Network security
IP traceback |
0.1 | 1 | 2007 | A Divide-and-Conquer Strategy for Thwarting Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks · IEEE Trans. Parallel Distributed Syst. 2007 |
Network security › IP traceback
packet marking |
0.1 | 1 | 2007 | A Divide-and-Conquer Strategy for Thwarting Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks · IEEE Trans. Parallel Distributed Syst. 2007 |
Routing and switching
router-based defense |
0.0 | 1 | 2007 | A Divide-and-Conquer Strategy for Thwarting Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks · IEEE Trans. Parallel Distributed Syst. 2007 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
pushback · 0.1divide-and-conquer · 0.1deterministic packet marking · 0.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Hermes: Boosting the Performance of Machine-Learning-Based Intrusion Detection System through Geometric Feature Learning
Chaoyu Zhang, Shanghao Shi, Ning Wang 0022, Xiangxiang Xu 0001, Shaoyu Li, Lizhong Zheng, Randy C. Marchany, Mark Gardner, Y. Thomas Hou 0001, Wenjing Lou |
MobiHoc | 7 |
| 2013 | Optimizing a network layer moving target defense for specific system architecturesabstractComplex defenses, such as moving target defenses, exist to help protect against threats. While these new forms of defense offer increased security, they are resource intensive and cannot be run on many new classes of network connected mobile systems. To provide security for these systems, a highly efficient defense must be used. Moving Target Defense for IPv6 (MT6D) is a network layer moving target defense that was originally designed using Python for portability to a variety of system architectures. Optimizing a moving target defense (MTD) for a specific system architecture increases performance to allow for these new defenses to be deployed in resource constrained environments. By transitioning from Python to C, and by using system specific networking features, MT6D can be successfully deployed to resource constrained network systems. Owen Hardman, Stephen Groat, Randy C. Marchany, Joseph G. Tront |
ANCS | 3 |
| 2011 | Cover-VT: Converged Security Visualization ToolabstractThe amount of data that floods today's networks is well beyond what security analysts can manage by textual means alone. In an effort to solve this problem, researchers have explored different methods of visualizing network security threats. There is little debate that humans can perceive more information visually than textually. The problem is that the majority of visualization tools in practice or proposed do not take efficient visualization techniques into consideration. As a result, it is difficult to get a high-level view of the network that facilitates rapid isolation of network attacks. We propose the Converged Security Visualization Tool (Cover-VT) to solve the efficient visualization problem. Cover-VT was designed to provide analysts with a high-level view of network threats using geographic information systems. The tool allows for rapid identification of threats by minimizing the cognitive obstacles to efficient threat location. Cover-VT includes the capability to drill-down on a node of interest for additional details and even filter out unwanted data. Cover-VT was designed with usability in mind, making it easy to comprehend while assisting the analyst in rapid threat identification. Many different security tools make up a security analyst's tool kit. Cover-VT was developed as an effective security visualization system that integrates existing security tools and network security systems. William Urbanski, Matthew Dunlop, Randy C. Marchany, Joseph G. Tront |
Integrated Network Management | 3 |
| 2007 | A Divide-and-Conquer Strategy for Thwarting Distributed Denial-of-Service AttacksabstractAttack mitigation schemes actively throttle attack traffic generated in Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. This paper presents Attack Diagnosis (AD), a novel attack mitigation scheme that adopts a divide-and-conquer strategy. AD combines the concepts of Pushback and packet marking, and its architecture is in line with the ideal DDoS attack countermeasure paradigm—attack detection is performed near the victim host and packet filtering is executed close to the attack sources. AD is a reactive defense mechanism that is activated by a victim host after an attack is detected. By instructing its upstream routers to mark packets deterministically, the victim can trace back one attack source and command an AD-enabled router close to the source to filter the attack packets. This process isolates one attacker and throttles it, which is repeated until the attack is mitigated. We also propose an extension to AD called Parallel Attack Diagnosis (PAD) that is capable of throttling traffic coming from a large number of attackers simultaneously. AD and PAD are analyzed and evaluated using the Skitter Internet map, Lumeta's Internet map, and the 6-degree complete tree topology model. Both schemes are shown to be robust against IP spoofing and to incur low false positive ratios. Ruiliang Chen, Jung-Min Park 0001, Randy C. Marchany |
IEEE Trans. Parallel Distributed Syst. | 3 |
| 2006 | RIM: Router Interface Marking for IP TracebackabstractDistributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks have become a major threat to the Internet. As a countermeasure against DDoS attacks, IP traceback schemes identify the network paths the attack traffic traverses. This paper presents a novel IP traceback scheme called Router Interface Marking (RIM). In RIM, a router probabilistically marks packets with a router interface's identifier. After collecting the packets marked by each router in an attack path, a victim machine can use the information in the marked packets to trace back to the attack source. Different from most existing IP traceback schemes, RIM marks packets with the information of router interfaces rather than that of router IP addresses. This difference endows RIM with several advantageous features, including fast traceback speed, last-hop traceback capability, small computation overhead, low occurrence of false positives, and enhanced security. Ruiliang Chen, Jung-Min Park 0001, Randy C. Marchany |
GLOBECOM | 3 |