We consider an extension to classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives are embedded within AI-generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. Leveraging advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to seamlessly integrate sponsored creatives with AI content and accurately estimate the context-aware benefits of differing insertion positions. However, this approach introduces novel challenges; substitution effects require rigorous treatment compared to standard position auction settings, where slots are independent of each other.

The analysis of the privacy properties of Privacy-Preserving Ads APIs is an area of research that has received strong interest from academics, industry, and regulators.Despite this interest, the empirical study of these methods is severely hindered by the lack of publicly available data.Reliable empirical analysis of the privacy properties of an API, in fact, requires access to a dataset consisting of realistic API outputs for a large collection of users; however, privacy concerns prevent the general release of such data to the public.In this work, we address this problem by developing a novel methodology to construct synthetic API outputs that are simultaneously realistic enough to enable accurate study and provide strong privacy protections.We focus on one of the Privacy-Preserving Ads APIs: the Topics API, part of Google Chrome's Privacy Sandbox, which enables interest-based advertising without relying on third-party cookies.We developed a methodology to generate a differentially-private dataset that closely matches the re-identification risk properties of the real Topics API data.The use of differential privacy provides strong theoretical bounds on the leakage of private user information from this release.Our methodology is based on first computing a large number of differentially-private statistics describing how output API traces evolve over time.Then, we design a parameterized distribution over sequences of API traces and optimize its parameters so that they closely match the statistics obtained.Finally, we create the synthetic data by drawing from this distribution.Our work is complemented by an open-source release of the anonymized dataset obtained by this methodology.We hope this will enable external researchers to analyze the API in-depth and replicate prior and future work on a realistic large-scale dataset.

Online advertising channels commonly focus on maximizing total advertiser welfare to enhance channel health, and previous literature has studied augmenting ad auctions with machine learning predictions on advertiser values (also known asmachine-learned advice ) to improve total welfare. Yet, such improvements could come at the cost of individual bidders' welfare and do not shed light on how particular advertiser bidding strategies impact welfare. Motivated by this, we present an analysis on an individual bidder's welfare loss in the autobidding world for auctions with and without machine-learned advice, and also uncover how advertiser strategies relate to such losses. In particular, we demonstrate how ad platforms can utilize ML advice to improve welfare guarantee on the aggregate and individual bidder level by setting ML advice as personalized reserve prices when the platform consists ofautobidders who maximize value while respecting a return on ad spend (ROAS) constraint. Under parallel VCG auctions with such ML advice-based reserves, we present a worst-case welfare lower-bound guarantee for an individual autobidder, and show that the lower-bound guarantee is positively correlated with ML advice quality as well as the scale of bids induced by the autobidder's bidding strategies. Further, we show that no truthful, and possibly randomized mechanism with anonymous allocations can achieve universally better individual welfare guarantees than VCG, in the presence of personalized reserves based on ML-advice of equal quality. Moreover, we extend our individual welfare guarantee results to generalized first price (GFP) and generalized second price (GSP) auctions. Finally, we present numerical studies using semi-synthetic data derived from ad auction logs of a search ad platform to showcase improvements in individual welfare when setting personalized reserve prices with ML-advice.

We study the price of anarchy of the generalized second-price auction where bidders are value maximizers (i.e., autobidders). We show that in general the price of anarchy can be as bad as 0. For comparison, the price of anarchy of running VCG is 1/2 in the autobidding world. We further show a fined-grained price of anarchy with respect to the discount factors (i.e., the ratios of click probabilities between lower slots and the highest slot in each auction) in the generalized second-price auction, which highlights the qualitative relation between the smoothness of the discount factors and the efficiency of the generalized second-price auction.

In recent years, the growing adoption of autobidding has motivated the study of auction design with value-maximizing auto-bidders. It is known that under mild assumptions, uniform bid-scaling is an optimal bidding strategy in truthful auctions, e.g., Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction (VCG), and the price of anarchy for VCG is 2. However, for other auction formats like First-Price Auction (FPA) and Generalized Second-Price auction (GSP), uniform bid-scaling may not be an optimal bidding strategy, and bidders have incentives to deviate to adopt strategies with non-uniform bid-scaling. Moreover, FPA can achieve optimal welfare if restricted to uniform bid-scaling, while its price of anarchy becomes 2 when non-uniform bid-scaling strategies are allowed.

We investigate auction mechanisms to support the emerging format of AI-generated content. We in particular study how to aggregate several LLMs in an incentive compatible manner. In this problem, the preferences of each agent over stochastically generated contents are described/encoded as an LLM. A key motivation is to design an auction format for AI-generated ad creatives to combine inputs from different advertisers. We argue that this problem, while generally falling under the umbrella of mechanism design, has several unique features. We propose a general formalism---the token auction model---for studying this problem. A key feature of this model is that it acts on a token-by-token basis and lets LLM agents influence generated contents through single dimensional bids.

We introduce the ParClusterers Benchmark Suite (PCBS)---a collection of highly scalable parallel graph clustering algorithms and benchmarking tools that streamline comparing different graph clustering algorithms and implementations. The benchmark includes clustering algorithms that target a wide range of modern clustering use cases, including community detection, classification, and dense subgraph mining. The benchmark toolkit makes it easy to run and evaluate multiple instances of different clustering algorithms with respect to both the running time and quality. We evaluate the PCBS algorithms empirically and find that they deliver both the state of the art quality and the running time. In terms of the running time, they are on average over 4x faster than the fastest library we compared to. In terms of quality, the correlation clustering algorithm [Shi et al., VLDB'21] optimizing for the LambdaCC objective, which does not have a direct counterpart in other libraries, delivers the highest quality in the majority of datasets that we used.

We study autobidding ad auctions with user costs, where each bidder is value-maximizing subject to a return-over-investment (ROI) constraint, and the seller aims to maximize the social welfare taking into consideration the user’s cost of viewing an ad. We show that in the worst case, the approximation ratio of social welfare by running the vanilla VCG auctions with user costs could as bad as 0. To improve the performance of VCG, We propose a new variant of VCG based on properly chosen cost multipliers, and prove that there exist auction-dependent and bidder-dependent cost multipliers that guarantee approximation ratios of 1/2 and 1/4 respectively in terms of the social welfare.

Compact user representations (such as embeddings) form the backbone of personalization services. In this work, we present a new theoretical framework to measure re-identification risk in such user representations. Our framework, based on hypothesis testing, formally bounds the probability that an attacker may be able to obtain the identity of a user from their representation. As an application, we show how our framework is general enough to model important real-world applications such as the Chrome's Topics API for interest-based advertising. We complement our theoretical bounds by showing provably good attack algorithms for re-identification that we use to estimate the re-identification risk in the Topics API. We believe this work provides a rigorous and interpretable notion of re-identification risk and a framework to measure it that can be used to inform real-world applications.

We introduce TeraHAC, a (1+ε)-approximate hierarchical agglomerative clustering (HAC) algorithm which scales to trillion-edge graphs. Our algorithm is based on a new approach to computing (1+ε)-approximate HAC, which is a novel combination of the nearest-neighbor chain algorithm and the notion of (1+ε)-approximate HAC. Our approach allows us to partition the graph among multiple machines and make significant progress in computing the clustering within each partition before any communication with other partitions is needed. We evaluate TeraHAC on a number of real-world and synthetic graphs of up to 8 trillion edges. We show that TeraHAC requires over 100x fewer rounds compared to previously known approaches for computing HAC. It is up to 8.3x faster than SCC, the state-of-the-art distributed algorithm for hierarchical clustering, while achieving 1.16x higher quality. In fact, TeraHAC essentially retains the quality of the celebrated HAC algorithm while significantly improving the running time.

We study the private k-median and k-means clustering problem in d dimensional Euclidean space. By leveraging tree embeddings, we give an efficient and easy to implement algorithm, that is empirically competitive with state of the art non private methods. We prove that our method computes a solution with cost at most O(d3/2 log n)⁆ OPT + O(kd2 log2 n/ε2), where ε is the privacy guarantee. (The dimension term, d, can be replaced with O(log k) using standard dimension reduction techniques.) Although the worst-case guarantee is worse than that of state of the art private clustering methods, the algorithm we propose is practical, runs in near-linear, Õ (nkd), time and scales to tens of millions of points. We also show that our method is amenable to parallelization in large-scale distributed computing environments. In particular we show that our private algorithms can be implemented in logarithmic number of MPC rounds in the sublinear memory regime. Finally, we complement our theoretical analysis with an empirical evaluation demonstrating the algorithm's efficiency and accuracy in comparison to other privacy clustering baselines.

We study the problem of designing privacy-enhanced solutions for interest-based advertisement (IBA). IBA is a key component of the online ads ecosystem and provides a better ad experience to users. Indeed, IBA enables advertisers to show users impressions that are relevant to them. Nevertheless, the current way ad tech companies achieve this is by building detailed interest profiles for individual users. In this work we ask whether such fine grained personalization is required, and present mechanisms that achieve competitive performance while giving privacy guarantees to the end users. More precisely we present the first detailed exploration of how to implement Chrome's Federated Learning of Cohorts (FLoC) API. We define the privacy properties required for the API and evaluate multiple hashing and clustering algorithms discussing the trade-offs between utility, privacy, and ease of implementation.

The second price auction has been the prevalent auction format used by advertising exchanges because of its simplicity and desirable incentive properties. However, even with an optimized choice of reserve prices, this auction is not revenue optimal when the bidders are heterogeneous and their valuation distributions differ significantly. In order to optimize the revenue of advertising exchanges, we propose an auction format called the boosted second price auction, which assigns a boost value to each bidder. The auction favors bidders with higher boost values and allocates the item to the bidder with the highest boosted bid. We propose a data-driven approach to optimize boost values using the previous bids of the bidders. Our analysis of auction data from Google's online advertising exchange shows that the boosted second price auction with data-optimized boost values outperforms the second price auction and empirical Myerson auction by up to 6% and 3%, respectively.

Auto-bidding has become one of the main options for bidding in online advertisements, in which advertisers only need to specify high-level objectives and leave the complex task of bidding to auto-bidders. In this paper, we propose a family of auctions with boosts to improve welfare in auto-bidding environments with both return on ad spend constraints and budget constraints. Our empirical results validate our theoretical findings and show that both the welfare and revenue can be improved by selecting the weight of the boosts properly.

Graph clustering and community detection are central problems in modern data mining. The increasing need for analyzing billion-scale data calls for faster and more scalable algorithms for these problems. There are certain trade-offs between the quality and speed of such clustering algorithms. In this paper, we design scalable algorithms that achieve high quality when evaluated based on ground truth. We develop a generalized sequential and shared-memory parallel framework based on the LAMBDACC objective (introduced by Veldt et al.), which encompasses modularity and correlation clustering. Our framework consists of highly-optimized implementations that scale to large data sets of billions of edges and that obtain high-quality clusters compared to ground-truth data, on both unweighted and weighted graphs. Our empirical evaluation shows that this framework improves the state-of-the-art trade-offs between speed and quality of scalable community detection. For example, on a 30-core machine with two-way hyper-threading, our implementations achieve orders of magnitude speedups over other correlation clustering baselines, and up to 28.44× speedups over our own sequential baselines while maintaining or improving quality.

An incentive-compatible auction incentivizes buyers to truthfully reveal their private valuations. However, many ad auction mechanisms deployed in practice are not incentive-compatible, such as first-price auctions (for display advertising) and the generalized second-price auction (for search advertising). We introduce a new metric to quantify incentive compatibility in both static and dynamic environments. Our metric is data-driven and can be computed directly through black-box auction simulations without relying on reference mechanisms or complex optimizations. We provide interpretable characterizations of our metric and prove that it is monotone in auction parameters for several mechanisms used in practice, such as soft floors and dynamic reserve prices. We empirically evaluate our metric on ad auction data from a major ad exchange and a major search engine to demonstrate its broad applicability in practice.

We study fundamental graph problems such as graph connectivity, minimum spanning forest (MSF), and approximate maximum (weight) matching in a distributed setting. In particular, we focus on the Adaptive Massively Parallel Computation (AMPC) model, which is a theoretical model that captures MapReduce-like computation augmented with a distributed hash table. We show the first AMPC algorithms for all of the studied problems that run in a constant number of rounds and use only O ( n ϵ ) space per machine, where 0 < ϵ < 1. Our results improve both upon the previous results in the AMPC model, as well as the best-known results in the MPC model, which is the theoretical model underpinning many popular distributed computation frameworks, such as MapReduce, Hadoop, Beam, Pregel and Giraph. Finally, we provide an empirical comparison of the algorithms in the MPC and AMPC models in a fault-tolerant distributed computation environment. We empirically evaluate our algorithms on a set of large real-world graphs and show that our AMPC algorithms can achieve improvements in both running time and round-complexity over optimized MPC baselines.

Web-based services often run randomized experiments to improve their products. A popular way to run these experiments is to use geographical regions as units of experimentation, since this does not require tracking of individual users or browser cookies. Since users may issue queries from multiple geographical locations, geo-regions cannot be considered independent and interference may be present in the experiment. In this paper, we study this problem, and first present GeoCUTS, a novel algorithm that forms geographical clusters to minimize interference while preserving balance in cluster size. We use a random sample of anonymized traffic from Google Search to form a graph representing user movements, then construct a geographically coherent clustering of the graph. Our main technical contribution is a statistical framework to measure the effectiveness of clusterings. Furthermore, we perform empirical evaluations showing that the performance of GeoCUTS is comparable to hand-crafted geo-regions with respect to both novel and existing metrics.

Motivated by the increasing need to preserve privacy in digital devices, we introduce the on-device public-private model of computation. Our motivation comes from social-network based recommender systems in which the users want to receive recommendations based on the information available on their devices, as well as the suggestions of their social contacts, without sharing such information or contacts with the central recommendation system. Our model allows us to solve many algorithmic problems while providing absolute (deterministic) guarantees of the privacy of on-device data and the user's contacts. In fact, we ensure that the private data and private contacts are never revealed to the central system. Our restrictive model of computation presents several interesting algorithmic challenges because any computation based on private information and contacts must be performed on local devices of limited capabilities. Despite these challenges, under realistic assumptions of inter-device communication, we show several efficient algorithms for fundamental data mining and machine learning problems, ranging from k-means clustering to heavy hitters. We complement this analysis with strong impossibility results for efficient private algorithms without allowing inter-device communication. In our experimental evaluation, we show that our private algorithms provide results almost as accurate as those of the non-private ones while speeding up the on-device computations by orders of magnitude.

Our deployment of cache-aware load balancing in the Google web search backend reduced cache misses by ~0.5x, contributing to a double-digit percentage increase in the throughput of our serving clusters by relieving a bottleneck. This innovation has benefited all production workloads since 2015, serving billions of queries daily. A load balancer forwards each query to one of several identical serving replicas. The replica pulls each term's postings list into RAM from flash, either locally or over the network. Flash bandwidth is a critical bottleneck, motivating an application-directed RAM cache on each replica. Sending the same term reliably to the same replica would increase the chance it hits cache, and avoid polluting the other replicas' caches. However, most queries contain multiple terms and we have to send the whole query to one replica, so it is not possible to achieve a perfect partitioning of terms to replicas. We solve this via a voting scheme, whereby the load balancer conducts a weighted vote by the terms in each query, and sends the query to the winning replica. We develop a multi-stage scalable algorithm to learn these weights. We first construct a large-scale term-query graph from logs and apply a distributed balanced graph partitioning algorithm to cluster each term to a preferred replica. This yields a good but simplistic initial voting table, which we then iteratively refine via cache simulation to capture feedback effects.

We present distributed algorithms for several classes of submodular optimization problems such as k-cover, set cover, facility location, and probabilistic coverage. The new algorithms enjoy almost optimal space complexity, optimal approximation guarantees, optimal communication complexity (and run in only four rounds of computation), addressing major shortcomings of prior work. We first present a distributed algorithm for k-cover using only Õ(n) space per machine, and then extend it to several submodular optimization problems, improving previous results for all the above problems-e.g., our algorithm for facility location problem improves the space of the best-known algorithm (Lindgren et al.). Our algorithms are implementable in various distributed frameworks such as MapReduce and RAM models. On the hardness side, we demonstrate the limitations of uniform sampling via an information theoretic argument. Furthermore, we perform an extensive empirical study of our algorithms (implemented in MapReduce) on a variety of datasets. We observe that using sketches 30-600 times smaller than the input, one can solve the coverage maximization problem with quality very close to that of the state-of-the-art single machine algorithm. Finally, we demonstrate an application of our algorithm in large-scale feature selection

Cluster-based randomized experiments are popular designs for mitigating the bias of standard estimators when interference is present and classical causal inference and experimental design assumptions (such as SUTVA or ITR) do not hold. Without an exact knowledge of the interference structure, it can be challenging to understand which partitioning of the experimental units is optimal to minimize the estimation bias. In the paper, we introduce a monotonicity condition under which a novel two-stage experimental design allows us to determine which of two cluster-based designs yields the least biased estimator. We then consider the setting of online advertising auctions and show that reserve price experiments satisfy the monotonicity condition and the proposed framework and methodology apply. We validate our findings on an advertising auction dataset.

In a typical learning problem, one key step is to use training data to pick one model from a collection of models that optimizes an objective function. In many multi-agent settings, the training data is generated through the actions of the agents, and the model is used to make a decision (e.g., how to sell an item) that affects the agents. An illustrative example of this is the problem of learning the reserve price in an auction. In such cases, the agents have an incentive to influence the training data (e.g., by manipulating their bids in the case of an auction) to game the system and achieve a more favorable outcome. In this paper, we study such incentive-aware learning problem in a general setting and show that it is possible to approximately optimize the objective function under two assumptions: (i) each individual agent is a "small" (part of the market); and (ii) there is a cost associated with manipulation. For our illustrative application, this nicely translates to a mechanism for setting approximately optimal reserve prices in auctions where no individual agent has significant market share. For this application, we also show that the second assumption (that manipulations are costly) is not necessary since we can "perturb" any auction to make it costly for the agents to manipulate.

Dynamic mechanisms are a powerful technique in designing revenue-maximizing repeated auctions. Despite their strength, these types of mechanisms have not been widely adopted in practice for several reasons, e.g., for their complexity, and for their sensitivity to the accuracy of predicting buyers» value distributions. In this paper, we aim to address these shortcomings and develop simple dynamic mechanisms that can be implemented efficiently, and provide theoretical guidelines for decreasing the sensitivity of dynamic mechanisms on prediction accuracy of buyers» value distributions. We prove that the dynamic mechanism we propose is provably dynamic incentive compatible, and introduce a notion of buyers» regret in dynamic mechanisms, and show that our mechanism achieves bounded regret while improving revenue and social welfare compared to a static reserve pricing policy. Finally, we confirm our theoretical analysis via an extensive empirical study of our dynamic auction on real data sets from online adverting. For example, we show our dynamic mechanisms can provide a +17% revenue lift with relative regret less than 0.2%.

In online advertising, advertisers purchase ad placements by participating in a long sequence of repeated auctions. One of the most important features advertising platforms often provide, and advertisers often use, is budget management, which allows advertisers to control their cumulative expenditures. Advertisers typically declare the maximum daily amount they are willing to pay, and the platform adjusts allocations and payments to guarantee that cumulative expenditures do not exceed budgets. There are multiple ways to achieve this goal, and each one, when applied to all budget-constrained advertisers simultaneously, steers the system toward a different equilibrium. While previous research focused on online stochastic optimization techniques or game-theoretic equilibria of such settings, our goal in this paper is to compare the ``system equilibria'' of a range of budget management strategies in terms of the seller's profit and buyers' utility. In particular, we consider six different budget management strategies including probabilistic throttling, thresholding, bid shading, reserve pricing, and multiplicative boosting. We show these methods admit a system equilibrium in a rather general setting, and prove dominance relations between them in a simplified setting. Our study sheds light on the impact of budget management strategies on the tradeoff between the seller's profit and buyers' utility. Finally, we also empirically compare the system equilibria of these strategies using real ad auction data in sponsored search and randomly generated bids. The empirical study confirms our theoretical findings about the relative performances of budget management strategies.

Billions of dollars worth of display advertising are sold via contracts and deals. This paper presents a formal study of preferred deals, a new generation of contracts for selling online advertisement, that generalize the traditional reservation contracts; these contracts are suitable for advertisers with advanced targeting capabilities. We propose a constant-factor approximation algorithm for maximizing the revenue that can be obtained from these deals. We show, both theoretically and via data analysis, that deals, with appropriately chosen minimum-purchase guarantees, can yield significantly higher revenue than auctions. We evaluate our algorithm using data from Google's ad exchange platform. Our algorithm obtains about 90% of the optimal revenue where the second-price auction, even with personalized reserve, obtains at most 52% of the benchmark.

Balanced partitioning is often a crucial first step in solving large-scale graph optimization problems: in some cases, a big graph is chopped into pieces that fit on one machine to be processed independently before stitching the results together, leading to certain suboptimality from the interaction among different pieces. In other cases, links between different parts may show up in the running time and/or network communications cost, hence the desire to have small cut size.

We introduce the public-private model of graphs. In this model, we have a public graph and each node in the public graph has an associated private graph. The motivation for studying this model stems from social networks, where the nodes are the users, the public graph is visible to everyone, and the private graph at each node is visible only to the user at the node. From each node's viewpoint, the graph is just a union of its private graph and the public graph.

As a fundamental tool in modeling and analyzing social, and information networks, large-scale graph mining is an important component of any tool set for big data analysis. Processing graphs with hundreds of billions of edges is only possible via developing distributed algorithms under distributed graph mining frameworks such as MapReduce, Pregel, Gigraph, and alike. For these distributed algorithms to work well in practice, we need to take into account several metrics such as the number of rounds of computation and the communication complexity of each round. For example, given the popularity and ease-of-use of MapReduce framework, developing practical algorithms with good theoretical guarantees for basic graph algorithms is a problem of great importance.

In this paper, we present a study of the community structure of ego-networks---the graphs representing the connections among the neighbors of a node---for several online social networks. Toward this goal, we design a new technique to efficiently build and cluster all the ego-nets of a graph in parallel (note that even just building the ego-nets efficiently is challenging on large networks). Our experimental findings are quite compelling: at a microscopic level it is easy to detect high quality communities. Leveraging on this fact we, then, develop new features for friend suggestion based on co-occurrences of two nodes in different ego-nets' communities. Our new features can be computed efficiently on very large scale graphs by just analyzing the neighborhood of each node. Furthermore, we prove formally on a stylized model, and by experimental analysis that this new similarity measure outperforms the classic local features employed for friend suggestions.

In this paper we consider efficient construction of "composable core-sets" for basic diversity and coverage maximization problems. A core-set for a point-set in a metric space is a subset of the point-set with the property that an approximate solution to the whole point-set can be obtained given the core-set alone. A composable core-set has the property that for a collection of sets, the approximate solution to the union of the sets in the collection can be obtained given the union of the composable core-sets for the point sets in the collection. Using composable core-sets one can obtain efficient solutions to a wide variety of massive data processing applications, including nearest neighbor search, streaming algorithms and map-reduce computation.

Display ads on the Internet are often sold by publishers to advertisers in bundles of thousands or millions of impressions over a particular time period. The ad delivery systems assign ads to pages on behalf of publishers to satisfy these contracts, and at the same time, try to maximize the overall quality of assignment. This is usually modeled in the literature as an online allocation problem, where contracts are represented by overall delivery constraints.

We study the problem of computing similarity rankings in large-scale multi-categorical bipartite graphs, where the two sides of the graph represent actors and items, and the items are partitioned into an arbitrary set of categories. The problem has several real-world applications, including identifying competing advertisers and suggesting related queries in an online advertising system or finding users with similar interests and suggesting content to them. In these settings, we are interested in computing on-the-fly rankings of similar actors, given an actor and an arbitrary subset of categories of interest. Two main challenges arise: First, the bipartite graphs are huge and often lopsided (e.g. the system might receive billions of queries while presenting only millions of advertisers). Second, the sheer number of possible combinations of categories prevents the pre-computation of the results for all of them. We present a novel algorithmic framework that addresses both issues for the computation of several graph-theoretical similarity measures, including # common neighbors, and Personalized PageRank. We show how to tackle the imbalance in the graphs to speed up the computation and provide efficient real-time algorithms for computing rankings for an arbitrary subset of categories. Finally, we show experimentally the accuracy of our approach with real-world data, using both public graphs and a very large dataset from Google AdWords.

E-commerce web-sites such as Ebay as well as advertising exchanges (AdX) such as DoubleClick's, RightMedia, or AdECN work as intermediaries who sell items (e.g. page-views) on behalf of a seller (e.g. a publisher) to buyers on the opposite side of the market (e.g., advertisers). These platforms often use fixed-percentage sharing schemes, according to which (i) the platform runs an auction amongst buyers, and (ii) gives the seller a constant-fraction (e.g., 80%) of the auction proceeds. In these settings, the platform faces asymmetric information regarding both the valuations of buyers for the item (as in a standard auction environment) as well as about the seller's opportunity cost of selling the item. Moreover, platforms often face intense competition from similar market places, and such competition is likely to favor auction rules that secure high payoffs to sellers. In such an environment, what selling mechanism should platforms employ? Our goal in this paper is to study optimal mechanism design in settings plagued by competition and two-sided asymmetric information, and identify conditions under which the current practice of employing constant cuts is indeed optimal.

Aggregator websites typically present documents in the form of representative clusters. In order for users to get a broader perspective, it is important to deliver a diversified set of representative documents in those clusters. One approach to diversification is to maximize the average dissimilarity among documents. Another way to capture diversity is to avoid showing several documents from the same category (e.g. from the same news channel). We combine the above two diversification concepts by modeling the latter approach as a (partition) matroid constraint, and study diversity maximization problems under matroid constraints. We present the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for this problem, using a new technique. Our local search 0.5-approximation algorithm is also the first constant-factor approximation for the max-dispersion problem under matroid constraints. Our combinatorial proof technique for maximizing diversity under matroid constraints uses the existence of a family of Latin squares which may also be of independent interest.

Display ads on the Internet are often sold in bundles of thousands or millions of impressions over a particular time period, typically weeks or months. Ad serving systems that assign ads to pages on behalf of publishers must satisfy these contracts, but at the same time try to maximize overall quality of placement. This is usually modeled in the literature as an online allocation problem, where contracts are represented by overall delivery constraints over a finite time horizon. However this model misses an important aspect of ad delivery: time homogeneity. Advertisers who buy these packages expect their ad to be shown smoothly throughout the purchased time period, in order to reach a wider audience, to have a sustained impact, and to support the ads they are running on other media (e.g., television). In this paper we formalize this problem using several nested packing constraints, and develop a tight (1-1/e)-competitive online algorithm for this problem. Our algorithms and analysis require novel techniques as they involve online computation of multiple dual variables per ad. We then show the effectiveness of our algorithms through exhaustive simulation studies on real data sets.

Most graph decomposition procedures seek to partition a graph into disjoint sets of vertices. Motivated by applications of clustering in distributed computation, we describe a graph decomposition algorithm for the paradigm where the partitions intersect. This algorithm covers the vertex set with a collection of overlapping clusters. Each vertex in the graph is well-contained within some cluster in the collection. We then describe a framework for distributed computation across a collection of overlapping clusters and describe how this framework can be used in various algorithms based on the graph diffusion process. In particular, we focus on two illustrative examples: (i) the simulation of a randomly walking particle and (ii) the solution of a linear system, e.g. PageRank. Our simulation results for these two cases show a significant reduction in swapping between clusters in a random walk, a significant decrease in communication volume during a linear system solve in a geometric mesh, and some ability to reduce the communication volume during a linear system solve in an information network.

Consider an online ad campaign run by an advertiser. The ad serving companies that handle such campaigns record users ’ behavior that leads to impressions of campaign ads, as well as users ’ responses to such impressions. This is summarized and reported to the advertisers to help them evaluate the performance of their campaigns and make better budget allocation decisions. The most popular reporting statistics are the click-through rate and the conversion rate. While these are indicative of the effectiveness of an ad campaign, the advertisers often seek to understand more sophisticated long-term effects of their ads on the brand awareness and the user behavior that leads to the conversion, thus creating a need for the reporting measures that can capture both the duration and the

We discuss the use of social networks in implementing viral marketing strategies. In the first part of this tutorial, we study influence maximization or how the structure of the social network affects the spread of behaviors and technologies. In the second part, we then consider how one might monopolize these natural processes to generate revenue in a revenue maximization setting.

Ad auctions in sponsored search support "broad match" that allows an advertiser to target a large number of queries while bidding only on a limited number. While giving more expressiveness to advertisers, this feature makes it challenging to optimize bids to maximize their returns: choosing to bid on a query as a broad match because it provides high profit results in one bidding for related queries which may yield low or even negative profits.

High-quality, personalized recommendations are a key feature in many online systems. Since these systems often have explicit knowledge of social network structures, the recommendations may incorporate this information. This paper focuses on networks that represent trust and recommendation systems that incorporate these trust relationships. The goal of a trust-based recommendation system is to generate personalized recommendations by aggregating the opinions of other users in the trust network.In analogy to prior work on voting and ranking systems, we use the axiomatic approach from the theory of social choice. We develop a set of five natural axioms that a trust-based recommendation system might be expected to satisfy. Then, we show that no system can simultaneously satisfy all the axioms. However, for any subset of four of the five axioms we exhibit a recommendation system that satisfies those axioms. Next we consider various ways of weakening the axioms, one of which leads to a unique recommendation system based on random walks. We consider other recommendation systems, including systems based on personalized PageRank, majority of majorities, and minimum cuts, and search for alternative axiomatizations that uniquely characterize these systems.Finally, we determine which of these systems are incentive compatible, meaning that groups of agents interested in manipulating recommendations can not induce others to share their opinion by lying about their votes or modifying their trust links. This is an important property for systems deployed in a monetized environment.

Most current banner advertising is sold through negotiation thereby incurring large transaction costs and possibly suboptimal allocations. We propose a new automated system for selling banner advertising. In this system, each advertiser specifies a collection of host webpages which are relevant to his product, a desired total quantity of impressions on these pages, and a maximum per-impression price. The system selects a subset of advertisers as 'winners' and maps each winner to a set of impressions on pages within his desired collection. The distinguishing feature of our system as opposed to current combinatorial allocation mechanisms is that, mimicking the current negotiation system, we guarantee that winners receive at least as many advertising opportunities as they requested or else receive ample compensation in the form of a monetary payment by the host. Such guarantees are essential in markets like banner advertising where a major goal of the advertising campaign is developing brand recognition.

We discuss the use of social networks in implementing viral marketing strategies. While influence maximization has been studied in this context (see Chapter 24 of [10]), we study revenue maximization, arguably, a more natural objective. In our model, a buyer's decision to buy an item is influenced by the set of other buyers that own the item and the price at which the item is offered.