Organizing personal information by folders or tags has proved to be effective for finding, remembering, and understanding information. However, past studies have shown that the cost of organization can be too high for some users to be worth the effort. Mixed‐initiative approaches attempt to reduce the burden of manual organization by automatically identifying and suggesting organizational units such as folders to users. However, little is known about how such mixed‐initiative approaches influence users' organizational experiences. In this paper, we explore a mixed‐initiative approach that suggests high‐level organizational units to users to facilitate e‐mail organization. In 2 in‐situ experiments with 34 knowledge workers, we study how our mixed‐initiative approach influenced users' experience with organization. We show that our approach made it easier to create organizational units without negatively affecting recall of those units, and led to the creation of units that otherwise would have not been created. Our findings suggest ways computers and people can most effectively work together to organize information.

Immersive experiences that mix digital and real-world objects are becoming reality, but they raise serious privacy concerns as they require real-time sensor input. These experiences are already present on smartphones and game consoles via Kinect, and will eventually emerge on the web platform. However, browsers do not expose the display interfaces needed to render immersive experiences. Previous security research focuses on controlling application access to sensor input alone, and do not deal with display interfaces. Recent research in human computer interactions has explored a variety of high-level rendering interfaces for immersive experiences, but these interfaces reveal sensitive data to the application. Bringing immersive experiences to the web requires a high-level interface that mitigates privacy concerns. This paper presents Surround Web, the first 3D web browser, which provides the novel functionality of rendering web content onto a room while tackling many of the inherent privacy challenges. Following the principle of least privilege, we propose three abstractions for immersive rendering: 1) the room skeleton lets applications place content in response to the physical dimensions and locations of render able surfaces in a room, 2) the detection sandbox lets applications declaratively place content near recognized objects in the room without revealing if the object is present, and 3) satellite screens let applications display content across devices registered with Surround Web. Through user surveys, we validate that these abstractions limit the amount of revealed information to an acceptable degree. In addition, we show that a wide range of immersive experiences can be implemented with acceptable performance.

Modern applications increasingly rely on continuous monitoring of video, audio, or other sensor data to provide their functionality, particularly in platforms such as the Microsoft Kinect and Google Glass. Continuous sensing by untrusted applications poses significant privacy challenges for both device users and bystanders. Even honest users will struggle to manage application permissions using existing approaches.

Modern client platforms, such as iOS, Android, Windows Phone, and Windows 8, have progressed from a per-user isolation policy, where users are isolated but a user's applications run in the same isolation container, to an application isolation policy, where different applications are isolated from one another. However, this is not enough because mutually distrusting content can interfere with one another inside a single application. For example, an attacker-crafted image may compromise a photo editor application and steal other images processed by the editor.

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks are one of the top threats on the web today. These attacks exploit ambient authority in browsers (eg cookies, HTTP authentication state), turning them into confused deputies and causing undesired side effects on vulnerable web sites. Existing defenses against CSRFs fall short in their coverage and/or ease of deployment. In this paper, we present a browser/server solution, Allowed Referrer Lists (ARLs), that addresses the root cause of CSRFs and removes ambient authority for participating web sites that want to be resilient to CSRF attacks. Our solution is easy for web sites to adopt and does not affect any functionality on non-participating sites. We have implemented our design in Firefox and have evaluated it with real-world sites. We found that ARLs successfully block CSRF attacks, are simpler to implement than existing defenses, and do not significantly impact browser performance.

Modern client platforms, such as iOS, Android, Windows Phone, Windows 8, and web browsers, run each application in an isolated environment with limited privileges. A pressing open problem in such systems is how to allow users to grant applications access to user-owned resources, e.g., to privacy- and cost-sensitive devices like the camera or to user data residing in other applications. A key challenge is to enable such access in a way that is non-disruptive to users while still maintaining least-privilege restrictions on applications. In this paper, we take the approach of user-driven access control, whereby permission granting is built into existing user actions in the context of an application, rather than added as an afterthought via manifests or system prompts. To allow the system to precisely capture permission-granting intent in an application's context, we introduce access control gadgets (ACGs). Each user-owned resource exposes ACGs for applications to embed. The user's authentic UI interactions with an ACG grant the application permission to access the corresponding resource. Our prototyping and evaluation experience indicates that user-driven access control is a promising direction for enabling in-context, non-disruptive, and least-privilege permission granting on modern client platforms.

Widespread growth of open wireless hotspots has made it easy to carry out man-in-the-middle attacks and impersonate web sites. Although HTTPS can be used to prevent such attacks, its universal adoption is hindered by its performance cost and its inability to leverage caching at intermediate servers (such as CDN servers and caching proxies) while maintaining end-to-end security. To complement HTTPS, we revive an old idea from SHTTP, a protocol that offers end-to-end web integrity without confidentiality. We name the protocol HTTPi and give it an efficient design that is easy to deploy for today's web. In particular, we tackle several previously-unidentified challenges, such as supporting progressive page loading on the client's browser, handling mixed content, and defining access control policies among HTTP, HTTPi, and HTTPS content from the same domain. Our prototyping and evaluation experience show that HTTPi incurs negligible performance overhead over HTTP, can leverage existing web infrastructure such as CDNs or caching proxies without any modifications to them, and can make many of the mixed-content problems in existing HTTPS web sites easily go away. Based on this experience, we advocate browser and web server vendors to adopt HTTPi.

In this paper, we propose virtual data center (VDC) as the unit of resource allocation for multiple tenants in the cloud. VDCs are more desirable than physical data centers because the resources allocated to VDCs can be rapidly adjusted as tenants' needs change. To enable the VDC abstraction, we design a data center network virtualization architecture called SecondNet. SecondNet achieves scalability by distributing all the virtual-to-physical mapping, routing, and bandwidth reservation state in server hypervisors. Its port-switching based source routing (PSSR) further makes SecondNet applicable to arbitrary network topologies using commodity servers and switches. SecondNet introduces a centralized VDC allocation algorithm for bandwidth guaranteed virtual to physical mapping. Simulations demonstrate that our VDC allocation achieves high network utilization and low time complexity. Our implementation and experiments show that we can build SecondNet on top of various network topologies, and SecondNet provides bandwidth guarantee and elasticity, as designed.

Web browsers' access control policies have evolved piecemeal in an ad-hoc fashion with the introduction of new browser features. This has resulted in numerous incoherencies. In this paper, we analyze three major access control flaws in today's browsers: (1) principal labeling is different for different resources, raising problems when resources interplay, (2) runtime changes to principal identities are handled inconsistently, and (3) browsers mismanage resources belonging to the user principal. We show that such mishandling of principals leads to many access control incoherencies, presenting hurdles for web developers to construct secure web applications. A unique contribution of this paper is to identify the compatibility cost of removing these unsafe browser features. To do this, we have built WebAnalyzer, a crawler-based framework for measuring real-world usage of browser features, and used it to study the top 100,000 popular web sites ranked by Alexa. Our methodology and results serve as a guideline for browser designers to balance security and backward compatibility.

In this paper, we present Structon, a novel approach that uses Web mining together with inference and IP traceroute to geolocate IP addresses with significantly better accuracy than existing automated approaches. Structon is composed of three ideas which we realize in three corresponding steps. First, we extract geolocation information of Web server IP addresses from Web pages. Second, we devise heuristic algorithms to improve both the accuracy and the coverage of the IP geolocation database using these Web server IP addresses and their geolocations as input. Third, for those segments that are not covered in the first two steps, we use IP traceroute to identify the access routers of those segments. When the location of the access router is known, we can deduce the location of the associated segment since it is co-located together with the access router. By mining 500-million Web pages collected in China in 2006 (11 percent of the total Web pages in China at that time), we are able to identify the geolocations for 103 million IP addresses. This represents nearly 88 percent IP addresses allocated to China in March 2008. Structon is 87.4 percent accurate at city granularity and up to 93.5 percent accurate at province level. We also used 10 day Windows Live client log to evaluate our client IP addresses coverage: Structon identified geolocations of 98.9 percent of client IP addresses.

Recent work has established the importance of automatic reverse engineering of protocol or file format specifications. However, the formats reverse engineered by previous tools have missed important information that is critical for security applications. In this paper, we present Tupni, a tool that can reverse engineer an input format with a rich set of information, including record sequences, record types, and input constraints. Tupni can generalize the format specification over multiple inputs. We have implemented a prototype of Tupni and evaluated it on ten different formats: five file formats (WMF, BMP, JPG, PNG and TIF) and five network protocols (DNS, RPC, TFTP, HTTP and FTP). Tupni identified all record sequences in the test inputs. We also show that, by aggregating over multiple WMF files, Tupni can derive a more complete format specification for WMF. Furthermore, we demonstrate the utility of Tupni by using the rich information it provides for zero-day vulnerability signature generation, which was not possible with previous reverse engineering tools.

The broadcast and tetherless nature of wireless networks and the widespread deployment of Wi-Fi hotspots makes it easy to remotely locate a user by observing her wireless signals. Location is private information and can be used by malicious individuals for blackmail, stalking, and other privacy violations. In this paper, we analyze the problem of location privacy in wireless networks and present a protocol for improving location privacy. Our basic approach is to obfuscate several types of privacy-compromising information revealed by a mobile node, including sender identity, time of transmission, and signal strength. Our design is driven by real-system implementation and field experiments along with analysis and simulations. Our system allows users to choose the level of privacy they desire, thereby increasing the performance of less private users (while not sacrificing private users' privacy at the same time). We evaluated our system based on real-life mobility data and wireless LAN coverage. Our results show that a user of our system can be indistinguishable from a thousand users in the same coverage area.

Web browsers have evolved from a single-principal platform on which one site is browsed at a time into a multi-principal platform on which data and code from mutually distrusting sites interact programmatically in a single page at the browser. Today's "Web 2.0" applications (or mashups) offer rich services, rivaling those of desktop PCs. However, the protection andcommunication abstractions offered by today's browsers remain suitable onlyfor a single-principal system--either no trust through completeisolation between principals (sites) or full trust by incorporating third party code as libraries. In this paper, we address this deficiency by identifying and designing the missing abstractions needed for a browser-based multi-principal platform. We have designed our abstractions to be backward compatible and easily adoptable. We have built a prototype system that realizes almost all of our abstractions and their associated properties. Our evaluation shows that our abstractions make it easy to build more secure and robust client-side Web mashups and can be easily implemented with negligible performance overhead.

In this paper, we present ShieldGen, a system for automatically generating a data patch or a vulnerability signature for an unknown vulnerability, given a zero-day attack instance. The key novelty in our work is that we leverage knowledge of the data format to generate new potential attack instances, which we call probes, and use a zero-day detector as an oracle to determine if an instance can still exploit the vulnerability; the feedback of the oracle guides our search for the vulnerability signature. We have implemented a ShieldGen prototype and experimented with three known vulnerabilities. The generated signatures have no false positives and a low rate of false negatives due to imperfect data format specifications and the sampling technique used in our probe generation. Overall, they are significantly more precise than the signatures generated by existing schemes. We have also conducted a detailed study of 25 vulnerabilities for which Microsoft has issued security bulletins between 2003 and 2006. We estimate that ShieldGen can produce high quality signatures for a large portion of those vulnerabilities and that the signatures are superior to the signatures generated by existing schemes.

To achieve end-to-end security, traditional machine-to-machine security measures are insufficient if the integrity of the human-computer interface is compromised. GUI logic flaws are a category of software vulnerabilities that result from logic bugs in GUI design/implementation. Visual spoofing attacks that exploit these flaws can lure even security- conscious users to perform unintended actions. The focus of this paper is to formulate the problem of GUI logic flaws and to develop a methodology for uncovering them in software implementations. Specifically, based on an in-depth study of key subsets of Internet Explorer (IE) browser source code, we have developed a formal model for the browser GUI logic and have applied formal reasoning to uncover new spoofing scenarios, including nine for status bar spoofing and four for address bar spoofing. The IE development team has confirmed all these scenarios and has fixed most of them in their latest build. Through this work, we demonstrate that a crucial subset of visual spoofing vulnerabilities originate from GUI logic flaws, which have a well-defined mathematical meaning allowing a systematic analysis.

Code injection attacks are a top threat to today's Internet. With zero-day attacks on the rise, randomization techniques have been introduced to diversify software and operation systems of networked hosts so that attacks that succeed on one host cannot succeed on others. Two most notable system-wide randomization techniques are Instruction Set Randomization (ISR) and Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR). The former randomizes instruction set for each process, while the latter randomizes the memory address space layout. Both suffer from a number of attacks. In this paper, we advocate and demonstrate that by combining ISR and ASLR effectively, we can offer much more robust protection than each of them individually. However, trivial combination of both schemes is not sufficient. To this end, we make the key observation that system call instructions matter the most to attackers for code injection. Our system, RandSys, uses system call instruction randomization and the general technique of ASLR along with a number of new enhancements to thwart code injection attacks. We have built a prototype for both Linux and Windows platforms. Our experiments show that RandSys can effectively thwart a wide variety of code injection attacks with a small overhead.

Combining data and code from third-party sources has enabled a new wave of web mashups that add creativity and functionality to web applications. However, browsers are poorly designed to pass data between domains, often forcing web developers to abandon security in the name of functionality. To address this deficiency, we developed Subspace, a cross-domain communication mechanism that allows efficient communication across domains without sacrificing security. Our prototype requires only a small JavaScript library, and works across all major browsers. We believe Subspace can serve as a new secure communication primitive for web mashups.

Vulnerability-driven filtering of network data can offer a fast and easy-to-deploy alternative or intermediary to software patching, as exemplified in Shield [Wang et al. 2004]. In this article, we take Shield's vision to a new domain, inspecting and cleansing not just static content, but also dynamic content. The dynamic content we target is the dynamic HTML in Web pages, which have become a popular vector for attacks. The key challenge in filtering dynamic HTML is that it is undecidable to statically determine whether an embedded script will exploit the browser at runtime. We avoid this undecidability problem by rewriting web pages and any embedded scripts into safe equivalents, inserting checks so that the filtering is done at runtime. The rewritten pages contain logic for recursively applying runtime checks to dynamically generated or modified web content, based on known vulnerabilities. We have built and evaluated BrowserShield , a general framework that performs this dynamic instrumentation of embedded scripts, and that admits policies for customized runtime actions like vulnerability-driven filtering. We also explore other applications on top of BrowserShield.

Remote code injection exploits inflict a significant societal cost, and an active underground economy has grown up around these continually evolving attacks. We present a methodology for inferring the phylogeny, or evolutionary tree, of such exploits. We have applied this methodology to traffic captured at several vantage points, and we demonstrate that our methodology is robust to the observed polymorphism. Our techniques revealed non-trivial code sharing among different exploit families, and the resulting phylogenies accurately captured the subtle variations among exploits within each family. Thus, we believe our methodology and results are a helpful step to better understanding the evolution of remote code injection exploits on the Internet.

Attackers and defenders of computer systems both strive to gain complete control over the system. To maximize their control, both attackers and defenders have migrated to low-level, operating system code. In this paper, we assume the perspective of the attacker, who is trying to run malicious software and avoid detection. By assuming this perspective, we hope to help defenders understand and defend against the threat posed by a new class of rootkits. We evaluate a new type of malicious software that gains qualitatively more control over a system. This new type of malware, which we call a virtual-machine based rootkit (VMBR), installs a virtual-machine monitor underneath an existing operating system and hoists the original operating system into a virtual machine. Virtual-machine based rootkits are hard to detect and remove because their state cannot be accessed by software running in the target system. Further, VMBRs support general-purpose malicious services by allowing such services to run in a separate operating system that is protected from the target system. We evaluate this new threat by implementing two proof-of-concept VMBRs. We use our proof-of-concept VMBRs to subvert Windows XP and Linux target systems, and we implement four example malicious services using the VMBR platform. Last, we use what we learn from our proof-of-concept VMBRs to explore ways to defend against this new threat. We discuss possible ways to detect and prevent VMBRs, and we implement a defense strategy suitable for protecting systems against this threat

Recent work [27, 15] introduced a novel peer-to-peer application that leverages content sharing and aggregation among the peers to diagnose misconfigurations on a desktop PC. This application poses interesting challenges in preserving privacy of user configuration data and in maintaining integrity of troubleshooting results. In this paper, we provide a much more rigorous cryptographic and yet practical solution for preserving privacy, and we investigate and analyze solutions for ensuring integrity.

Software patching has not been effective as a first-line defense against large-scale worm attacks, even when patches have long been available for their corresponding vulnerabilities. Generally, people have been reluctant to patch their systems immediately, because patches are perceived to be unreliable and disruptive to apply. To address this problem, we propose a first-line worm defense in the network stack, using shields -- vulnerability-specific, exploit-generic network filters installed in end systems once a vulnerability is discovered, but before a patch is applied. These filters examine the incoming or outgoing traffic of vulnerable applications, and correct traffic that exploits vulnerabilities. Shields are less disruptive to install and uninstall, easier to test for bad side effects, and hence more reliable than traditional software patches. Further, shields are resilient to polymorphic or metamorphic variations of exploits [43].In this paper, we show that this concept is feasible by describing a prototype Shield framework implementation that filters traffic above the transport layer. We have designed a safe and restrictive language to describe vulnerabilities as partial state machines of the vulnerable application. The expressiveness of the language has been verified by encoding the signatures of several known vulnerabilites. Our evaluation provides evidence of Shield's low false positive rate and small impact on application throughput. An examination of a sample set of known vulnerabilities suggests that Shield could be used to prevent exploitation of a substantial fraction of the most dangerous ones.

No abstract available.

We consider the problem of distributing "live" streaming media content to a potentially large and highly dynamic population of hosts. Peer-to-peer content distribution is attractive in this setting because the bandwidth available to serve content scales with demand. A key challenge, however, is making content distribution robust to peer transience. Our approach to providing robustness is to introduce redundance; both in network paths and in data. We use multiple, diverse distribution trees to provide redundancy in network paths and multiple description coding (MDC) to provide redundancy in data. We present a simple tree management algorithm that provides the necessary path diversity and describe an adaptation framework for MDC based on scalable receiver feedback. We evaluate these using MDC applied to real video data coupled with real usage traces from a major news site that experienced a large flash crowd for live streaming content. Our results show very significant benefits in using multiple distribution trees and MDC, with a 22 dB improvement in PSNR in some cases.

Structured peer-to-peer overlay networks such as CAN, Chord, Pastry, and Tapestry can be used to implement Internet-scale application-level multicast. There are two general approaches to accomplishing this: tree building and flooding. This paper evaluates these two approaches using two different types of structured overlay: 1) overlays which use a form of generalized hypercube routing, e.g., Chord, Pastry and Tapestry, and 2) overlays which use a numerical distance metric to route through a Cartesian hyperspace, e.g., CAN. Pastry and CAN are chosen as the representatives of each type of overlay. To the best of our knowledge, this paper reports the first head-to-head comparison of CAN-style versus Pastry-style overlay networks, using multicast communication workloads running on an identical simulation infrastructure. The two approaches to multicast are independent of overlay network choice, and we provide a comparison of flooding versus tree-based multicast on both overlays. Results show that the tree-based approach consistently outperforms the flooding approach. Finally, for tree-based multicast, we show that Pastry provides better performance than CAN.

The problem of inferring the packet loss characteristics of Internet links using server-based measurements is investigated. Unlike much of existing work on network tomography that is based on active probing, we make inferences based on passive observation of end-to-end client-server traffic. Our work on passive network tomography focuses on identifying lossy links (i.e., the trouble spots in the network). We have developed three techniques for this purpose based on random sampling, linear optimization, and Bayesian inference using Gibbs sampling, respectively. We evaluate the accuracy of these techniques using both simulations and Internet packet traces. We find that these techniques can identify most of the lossy links in the network with a manageable false positive rate. For instance, simulation results indicate that the Gibbs sampling technique has over 80% coverage with a false positive rate under 5%. Furthermore, this technique provides a confidence indicator on its inference. We also perform inference based on Internet traces gathered at the busy microsoft.com Web site. However, validating these inferences is a challenging problem. We present a method for indirect validation that suggests that the false positive rate is manageable.

No abstract available.

In this paper, we discuss the problem of distributing streaming media content, both live and on-demand, to a large number of hosts in a scalable way. Our work is set in the context of the traditional client-server framework. Specifically, we consider the problem that arises when the server is overwhelmed by the volume of requests from its clients. As a solution, we propose Cooperative Networking (CoopNet), where clients cooperate to distribute content, thereby alleviating the load on the server. We discuss the proposed solution in some detail, pointing out the interesting research issues that arise, and present a preliminary evaluation using traces gathered at a busy news site during the ash crowd that occurred on September 11, 2001.

Advances in the Internet and telecommunications technologies have spurred many research efforts in Internet-based unified communication systems, which integrate heterogeneous devices and networks (PSTN, cellular networks, or the pager networks). Nonetheless, these systems lack support for a systematic, easy, flexible way of customizing and creating services at the system level as well as at the user level. In this paper, we present such a service creation model by exposing a limited set of primitives from a call model that is network and device independent. Our model and framework not only supports the traditional telephony call services easily but also enables novel ways of creating third party services such as application-specific billing services.

Because of the emergence of heterogeneous access devices and diverse wired and wireless networks, and a substantial lack of support for integrating these networks, we are building a communication network and a service infrastructure that provides integrated telephony and data services across these networks. We generalize the basic call service to support communication between two or more call parties using any number of devices through any media. Call setup has already been addressed by protocols such as the session initiation protocol (SIP), so we focus on a missing component: scalable and fault-tolerant call session maintenance and control after call setup. In this paper, we present a new signaling protocol that offers scalability, high availability, robustness, and flexibility in creating new call processing services. The protocol is compatible with existing call setup protocols, but provides lightweight call session management using a completely decentralized, soft-state group control protocol. We show that this approach simplifies the implementation of the basic call service, including multi-device calling and service handoff between diverse access networks. The design of our protocol follows the principle of separation of control (signaling information) from data. The signaling protocol has been implemented in ICEBERG, an IP-based core network testbed with access to heterogeneous networks.

Aggregation in traditional database systems is performed in batch mode: a query is submitted, the system processes a large volume of data over a long period of time, and, eventually, the final answer is returned. This archaic approach is frustrating to users and has been abandoned in most other areas of computing. In this paper we propose a new online aggregation interface that permits users to both observe the progress of their aggregation queries and control execution on the fly. After outlining usability and performance requirements for a system supporting online aggregation, we present a suite of techniques that extend a database system to meet these requirements. These include methods for returning the output in random order, for providing control over the relative rate at which different aggregates are computed, and for computing running confidence intervals. Finally, we report on an initial implementation of online aggregation in POSTGRES.