Data poisoning attacks on clustering algorithms have received limited attention, with existing methods struggling to scale efficiently as dataset sizes and feature counts increase. These attacks typically require re-clustering the entire dataset multiple times to generate predictions and assess the attacker’s objectives, significantly hindering their scalability. This paper addresses these limitations by proposing Sonic , a novel genetic data poisoning attack that leverages incremental and scalable clustering algorithms, e.g., FISHDBC, as surrogates to accelerate poisoning attacks against graph-based and density-based clustering methods, such as HDBSCAN. We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of Sonic in poisoning the target clustering algorithms. We then conduct a comprehensive analysis of the factors affecting the scalability and transferability of poisoning attacks against clustering algorithms, and we conclude by examining the robustness of hyperparameters in our attack strategy Sonic . An illustrative example of a data poisoning attack against the clustering algorithm HDBSCAN* is shown. In the top row, we depict the scenario when the data are untainted, with HDBSCAN* correctly grouping the samples into three distinct clusters. In the bottom row, we depict a scenario where an attacker manipulates two red triangle data samples in the dataset to mislead the clustering algorithm. Specifically, the attack uses our fast and effective Sonic data poisoning method to perturb these samples, moving them from their original cluster (triangles) to a target cluster (squares), thereby maliciously influencing the clustering algorithm’s results. As a result, this adversarial manipulation causes the HDBSCAN* algorithm to merge the blue and green samples into a single cluster, thus degrading the clustering performance. • We propose Sonic , a fast genetic data poisoning attack against clustering algorithms for high-dimensional data. • We empirically demonstrate that Sonic significantly accelerates the poisoning optimization process on high-dimensional data by leveraging incremental clustering algorithms. • We investigate the trade-off between clustering approximation quality and attack speed. • We explore the transferability of data poisoning attacks across different clustering algorithms. • We analyze the empirical convergence of Sonic and provide an ablation study on its hyperparameters.

Fixed-budget attacks aim to generate adversarial examples—carefully crafted inputs designed to induce misclassifications during inference—while adhering to a predefined perturbation budget. These attacks maximize misclassification confidence and benefit from the transferability property, enabling the generated adversarial examples to remain effective even against multiple unknown models. However, to preserve their transferability, such attacks often yield perceptible perturbations, compromising the visual integrity of the adversarial examples. In this paper, we introduce HORNET, an extension of gradient-based fixed-budget attacks designed to minimize the perturbation magnitude of adversarial examples while maintaining their transferability against the target model. HORNET utilizes a distinct source model to craft the adversarial examples and employs a limited number of queries to the unknown target model to further minimize perturbation magnitude. We evaluate HORNET empirically by integrating it with 41 existing attack implementations and testing it against 9 different models, resulting in a total of 1700 unique configurations. Our results demonstrate that HORNET outperforms the state of the art in generating minimally perturbed yet highly transferable adversarial examples across all tested models. Code available at: https://github.com/louiswup/HORNET .

Sponge examples are test-time inputs optimized to increase energy consumption and prediction latency of deep networks deployed on hardware accelerators. By increasing the fraction of neurons activated during classification, these attacks reduce sparsity in network activation patterns, worsening the performance of hardware accelerators. In this work, we present a novel training-time attack, named sponge poisoning , which aims to worsen energy consumption and prediction latency of neural networks on any test input without affecting classification accuracy. To stage this attack, we assume that the attacker can control only a few model updates during training — a likely scenario, e.g., when model training is outsourced to an untrusted third party or distributed via federated learning. Our extensive experiments on image classification tasks show that sponge poisoning is effective, and that fine-tuning poisoned models to repair them poses prohibitive costs for most users, highlighting that tackling sponge poisoning remains an open issue. • We propose the first poisoning attack to increase energy consumption in DNNs while preserving their prediction accuracy. • We formulate a novel objective function to target energy consumption in Hardware ASIC accelerators. • We inspect the model activations of the models to detect the most vulnerable layers against sponge poisoning attacks. • We show that the proposed attack can be adapted to avoid violating specific energy consumption requirements. • We show how to repair models targeted by sponge attacks, revealing an alternative path toward building energy-saving DNNs.

Adversarial reprogramming allows repurposing a machine-learning model to perform a different task. For example, a model trained to recognize animals can be reprogrammed to recognize digits by embedding an adversarial program in the digit images provided as input. Recent work has shown that adversarial reprogramming may not only be used to abuse machine-learning models provided as a service, but also beneficially, to improve transfer learning when training data is scarce. However, the factors affecting its success are still largely unexplained. In this work, we develop a first-order linear model of adversarial reprogramming to show that its success inherently depends on the size of the average input gradient, which grows when input gradients are more aligned, and when inputs have higher dimensionality. The results of our experimental analysis, involving fourteen distinct reprogramming tasks, show that the above factors are correlated with the success and the failure of adversarial reprogramming.

Adversarial reprogramming allows stealing computational resources by repurposing machine learning models to perform a different task chosen by the attacker. For example, a model trained to recognize images of animals can be reprogrammed to recognize medical images by embedding an adversarial program in the images provided as inputs. This attack can be perpetrated even if the target model is a black box, supposed that the machine-learning model is provided as a service and the attacker can query the model and collect its outputs. So far, no defense has been demonstrated effective in this scenario. We show for the first time that this attack is detectable using stateful defenses, which store the queries made to the classifier and detect the abnormal cases in which they are similar. Once a malicious query is detected, the account of the user who made it can be blocked. Thus, the attacker must create many accounts to perpetrate the attack. To decrease this number, the attacker could create the adversarial program against a surrogate classifier and then fine-tune it by making a few queries to the target model. In this scenario, the effectiveness of the stateful defense is reduced, but we show that it is still effective.

Pattern classification systems are commonly used in adversarial applications, like biometric authentication, network intrusion detection, and spam filtering, in which data can be purposely manipulated by humans to undermine their operation. As this adversarial scenario is not taken into account by classical design methods, pattern classification systems may exhibit vulnerabilities, whose exploitation may severely affect their performance, and consequently limit their practical utility. Extending pattern classification theory and design methods to adversarial settings is thus a novel and very relevant research direction, which has not yet been pursued in a systematic way. In this paper, we address one of the main open issues: evaluating at design phase the security of pattern classifiers, namely, the performance degradation under potential attacks they may incur during operation. We propose a framework for empirical evaluation of classifier security that formalizes and generalizes the main ideas proposed in the literature, and give examples of its use in three real applications. Reported results show that security evaluation can provide a more complete understanding of the classifier's behavior in adversarial environments, and lead to better design choices.