Assessing data quality is crucial to knowing whether and how to use the data for different purposes. Specifically, given a collection of integrity constraints, various ways have been proposed to quantify the inconsistency of a database. Inconsistency measures are particularly important when we wish to assess the quality of private data without revealing sensitive information. We study the estimation of inconsistency measures for a database protected under Differential Privacy (DP). Such estimation is nontrivial since some measures intrinsically query sensitive information, and the computation of others involves functions on underlying sensitive data. Among five inconsistency measures that have been proposed in recent work, we identify that two are intractable in the DP setting. The major challenge for the other three is high sensitivity: adding or removing one tuple from the dataset may significantly affect the outcome. To mitigate that, we model the dataset using a conflict graph and investigate private graph statistics to estimate these measures. The proposed machinery includes adapting graph-projection techniques with parameter selection optimizations on the conflict graph and a DP variant of approximate vertex cover size. We experimentally show that we can effectively compute DP estimates of the three measures on five real-world datasets with denial constraints, where the density of the conflict graphs highly varies.

Existing secure data outsourcing systems offer users ways to select from different cryptographic primitives supported by the system to encrypt their data to strike a balance between data confidentiality and query performance. Though prior work have identified the danger of mixing cryptographic primitives, they fall short of providing a systematic approach to guide users to prevent such cross-cryptographic leakages. Inspired by the database design theory, we envision Secure Normal Form, a new approach to normalize encrypted databases such that the leakages of the partitioned databases are limited to the users' specifications. In this work, we propose a new architecture to support secure normal form. This system includes several new components for secure data outsourcing: (i) an inference mechanism that reasons about additional leakages from weaker encryption techniques, based on semantic data properties (e.g., dependence between attribute values); (ii) a normalization mechanism that converts relational data into secure normal forms, so that the information leaked by the representation is limited to that specified by the user; and (iii) a secure query execution approach over encrypted data in secure normal forms. Our initial experimental results validate the performance improvement over naïve baseline and show that a careful data representation can be allowed without compromising security. We believe that our paper opens a new direction in secure data management.

Despite several works that succeed in generating synthetic data with differential privacy (DP) guarantees, they are inadequate for generating high-quality synthetic data when the input data has missing values. In this work, we formalize the problems of DP synthetic data with missing values and propose three effective adaptive strategies that significantly improve the utility of the synthetic data on four real-world datasets with different types and levels of missing data and privacy requirements. We also identify the relationship between privacy impact for the complete ground truth data and incomplete data for these DP synthetic data generation algorithms. We model the missing mechanisms as a sampling process to obtain tighter upper bounds for the privacy guarantees to the ground truth data. Overall, this study contributes to a better understanding of the challenges and opportunities for using private synthetic data generation algorithms in the presence of missing data.

Simply restricting the computation to non-sensitive part of the data may lead to inferences on sensitive data through data dependencies. Prior work on preventing inference control through data dependencies detect and deny queries which may lead to leakage, or only protect against exact reconstruction of the sensitive data. These solutions result in poor utility, and poor security respectively. In this paper, we present a novel security model calledfull deniability. Under this stronger security model, any information inferred about sensitive data from non-sensitive data is considered as a leakage. We describe algorithms for efficiently implementing full deniability on a given database instance with a set of data dependencies and sensitive cells. Using experiments on two different datasets, we demonstrate that our approach protects against realistic adversaries while hiding only minimal number of additional non-sensitive cells and scales well with database size and sensitive data.

Recent years have witnessed the adoption of differential privacy (DP) in practical database systems like PINQ, FLEX, and PrivateSQL. Such systems allow data analysts to query sensitive data while providing a rigorous and provable privacy guarantee. However, the existing design of these systems does not distinguish data analysts of different privilege levels or trust levels. This design can have an unfair apportion of the privacy budget among the data analyst if treating them as a single entity, or waste the privacy budget if considering them as non-colluding parties and answering their queries independently. In this paper, we propose DProvDB, a fine-grained privacy provenance framework for the multi-analyst scenario that tracks the privacy loss to each single data analyst. Under this framework, when given a fixed privacy budget, we build algorithms that maximize the number of queries that could be answered accurately and apportion the privacy budget according to the privilege levels of the data analysts.

This paper studies privacy in the context of decision-support queries that classify objects as either true or false based on whether they satisfy the query. Mechanisms to ensure privacy may result in false positives and false negatives. In decision-support applications, often, false negatives have to remain bounded. Existing accuracy-aware privacy preserving techniques cannot directly be used to support such an accuracy requirement and their naive adaptations to support bounded accuracy of false negatives results in significant privacy loss depending upon distribution of data. This paper explores the concept of minimally-invasive data exploration for decision support that attempts to minimize privacy loss while supporting bounded guarantee on false negatives by adaptively adjusting privacy based on data distribution. Our experimental results show that the MIDE algorithms perform well and are robust over variations in data distributions.

Differential privacy (DP) allows data analysts to query databases that contain users' sensitive information while providing a quantifiable privacy guarantee to users. Recent interactive DP systems such as APEx provide accuracy guarantees over the query responses, but fail to support a large number of queries with a limited total privacy budget, as they process incoming queries independently from past queries. We present an interactive, accuracy-aware DP query engine, CacheDP , which utilizes a differentially private cache of past responses, to answer the current workload at a lower privacy budget, while meeting strict accuracy guarantees. We integrate complex DP mechanisms with our structured cache, through novel cache-aware DP cost optimization. Our thorough evaluation illustrates that CacheDP can accurately answer various workload sequences, while lowering the privacy loss as compared to related work.

We study the problem of answering queries when (part of) the data may be sensitive and should not be leaked to the querier. Simply restricting the computation to non-sensitive part of the data may leak sensitive data through inference based on data dependencies. While inference control from data dependencies during query processing has been studied in the literature, existing solution either detect and deny queries causing leakage, or use a weak security model that only protects against exact reconstruction of the sensitive data. In this paper, we adopt a stronger security model based on full deniability that prevents any information about sensitive data to be inferred from query answers. We identify conditions under which full deniability can be achieved and develop an efficient algorithm that minimally hides non-sensitive cells during query processing to achieve full deniability. We experimentally show that our approach is practical and scales to increasing proportion of sensitive data, as well as, to increasing database size.

Computing technology has enabled massive digital traces of our personal lives to be collected and stored. These datasets play an important role in numerous real-life applications and research analysis, such as contact tracing for COVID 19, but they contain sensitive information about individuals. When managing these datasets, privacy is usually addressed as an afterthought, engineered on top of a database system optimized for performance and usability. This has led to a plethora of unexpected privacy attacks in the news. Specialized privacy-preserving solutions usually require a group of privacy experts and they are not directly transferable to other domains. There is an urgent need for a generally trustworthy database system that offers end-to-end security and privacy guarantees. In this tutorial, we will first describe the security and privacy requirements for database systems in different settings and cover the state-of-the-art tools that achieve these requirements. We will also show challenges in integrating these techniques together and demonstrate the design principles and optimization opportunities for these security and privacy-aware database systems. This is designed to be a three hour tutorial.

Differential privacy has become an appealing choice for analyzing sensitive data while offering strong privacy protection, even for complex data types like graphs. Despite a decade of academic efforts in designing differentially private algorithms for graph analysis, few works have been used in practice. This is due to their complexity in the choice of privacy guarantees and parameter/environmental configurations, or due to their scalability issues for large datasets.

Organizations are increasingly relying on data to support decisions. When data contains private and sensitive information, the data owner often desires to publish a synthetic database instance that is similarly useful as the true data, while ensuring the privacy of individual data records. Existing differentially private data synthesis methods aim to generate useful data based on applications, but they fail in keeping one of the most fundamental data properties of the structured data --- the underlying correlations and dependencies among tuples and attributes (i.e., the structure of the data). This structure is often expressed as integrity and schema constraints, or with a probabilistic generative process. As a result, the synthesized data is not useful for any downstream tasks that require this structure to be preserved. This work presents KAMINO, a data synthesis system to ensure differential privacy and to preserve the structure and correlations present in the original dataset. KAMINO takes as input of a database instance, along with its schema (including integrity constraints), and produces a synthetic database instance with differential privacy and structure preservation guarantees. We empirically show that while preserving the structure of the data, KAMINO achieves comparable and even better usefulness in applications of training classification models and answering marginal queries than the state-of-the-art methods of differentially private data synthesis.

Policy-aware differential privacy (DP) frameworks such as Blowfish privacy enable more accurate query answers than standard DP. In this work, we build the first policy-aware DP system for interactive data exploration, BlowfishDB, that aims to (i) provide bounded and flexible privacy guarantees to the data curators of sensitive data and (ii) support accurate and efficient data exploration by data analysts. However, the specification and processing of customized privacy policies incur additional performance cost, especially for datasets with a large domain. To address this challenge, we propose dynamic Blowfish privacy which allows for the dynamic generation of smaller privacy policies and their data representations at query time. BlowfishDB ensures same levels of accuracy and privacy as one would get working on the static privacy policy. In this demonstration of BlowfishDB, we show how a data curator can fine-tune privacy policies for a sensitive dataset and how a data analyst can retrieve accuracy-bounded query answers efficiently without being a privacy expert.

Differential privacy (DP) is currently the de-facto standard for achieving privacy in data analysis, which is typically implemented either in the "central" or "local" model. The local model has been more popular for commercial deployments as it does not require a trusted data collector. This increased privacy, however, comes at the cost of utility and algorithmic expressibility as compared to the central model. In this work, we propose, Cryptε, a system and programming framework that (1) achieves the accuracy guarantees and algorithmic expressibility of the central model (2) without any trusted data collector like in the local model. Cryptε achieves the "best of both worlds" by employing two non-colluding untrusted servers that run DP programs on encrypted data from the data owners. In theory, straightforward implementations of DP programs using off-the-shelf secure multi-party computation tools can achieve the above goal. However, in practice, they are beset with many challenges like poor performance and tricky security proofs. To this end, Cryptε allows data analysts to author logical DP programs that are automatically translated to secure protocols that work on encrypted data. These protocols ensure that the untrusted servers learn nothing more than the noisy outputs, thereby guaranteeing DP (for computationally bounded adversaries) for all Cryptε programs. Cryptε supports a rich class of DP programs that can be expressed via a small set of transformation and measurement operators followed by arbitrary post-processing. Further, we propose performance optimizations leveraging the fact that the output is noisy. We demonstrate Cryptε's practical feasibility with extensive empirical evaluations on real world datasets.

Local sensitivity of a query Q given a database instance D, i.e. how much the output Q(D) changes when a tuple is added to D or deleted from D, has many applications including query analysis, outlier detection, and differential privacy. However, it is NP-hard to find local sensitivity of a conjunctive query in terms of the size of the query, even for the class of acyclic queries. Although the complexity is polynomial when the query size is fixed, the naive algorithms are not efficient for large databases and queries involving multiple joins. In this paper, we present a novel approach to compute local sensitivity of counting queries involving join operations by tracking and summarizing tuple sensitivities. We give algorithms for the sensitivity problem for full acyclic join queries using join trees, that run in polynomial time in both the size of the database and query for an interesting sub-class of queries, which we call 'doubly acyclic queries' that include path queries, and in polynomial time in combined complexity when the maximum degree in the join tree is bounded. Our algorithms can be extended to certain non-acyclic queries using generalized hypertree decompositions. We evaluate our approach and show applications of our algorithms to obtain better results for differential privacy by orders of magnitude.

Organizations are increasingly interested in allowing external data scientists to explore their sensitive datasets. Due to the popularity of differential privacy, data owners want the data exploration to ensure provable privacy guarantees. However, current systems for answering queries with differential privacy place an inordinate burden on the data analysts to understand differential privacy, manage their privacy budget, and even implement new algorithms for noisy query answering. Moreover, current systems do not provide any guarantees to the data analyst on the quality they care about, namely accuracy of query answers. We present APEx, a novel system that allows data analysts to pose adaptively chosen sequences of queries along with required accuracy bounds. By translating queries and accuracy bounds into differentially private algorithms with the least privacy loss, APEx returns query answers to the data analyst that meet the accuracy bounds, and proves to the data owner that the entire data exploration process is differentially private. Our comprehensive experimental study on real datasets demonstrates that APEx can answer a variety of queries accurately with moderate to small privacy loss, and can support data exploration for entity resolution with high accuracy under reasonable privacy settings.

Differential privacy is considered a de facto standard for private data analysis. However, the definition and much of the supporting literature applies to flat tables. While there exist variants of the definition and specialized algorithms for specific types of relational data (e.g. graphs), there isn't a general privacy definition for multi-relational schemas with constraints, and no system that permits accurate differentially private answering of SQL queries while imposing a fixed privacy budget across all queries posed by the analyst. This work presents PrivateSQL, a first-of-its-kind end-to-end differentially private relational database system. PrivateSQL allows an analyst to query data stored in a standard database management system using a rich class of SQL counting queries. PrivateSQL adopts a novel generalization of differential privacy to multi-relational data that takes into account constraints in the schema like foreign keys, and allows the data owner to flexibly specify entities in the schema that need privacy. PrivateSQL ensures a fixed privacy loss across all the queries posed by the analyst by answering queries on private synopses generated from several views over the base relation that are tuned to have low error on a representative query workload. We experimentally evaluate PrivateSQL on a real-world dataset and a workload of more than 3, 600 queries. We show that for 50% of the queries PrivateSQL offers at least 1, 000x better error rates than solutions adapted from prior work.

A private data federation is a set of autonomous databases that share a unified query interface offering in-situ evaluation of SQL queries over the union of the sensitive data of its members. Owing to privacy concerns, these systems do not have a trusted data collector that can see all their data and their member databases cannot learn about individual records of other engines. Federations currently achieve this goal by evaluating queries obliviously using secure multiparty computation. This hides the intermediate result cardinality of each query operator by exhaustively padding it. With cascades of such operators, this padding accumulates to a blow-up in the output size of each operator and a proportional loss in query performance. Hence, existing private data federations do not scale well to complex SQL queries over large datasets. We introduce Shrinkwrap, a private data federation that offers data owners a differentially private view of the data held by others to improve their performance over oblivious query processing. Shrinkwrap uses computational differential privacy to minimize the padding of intermediate query results, achieving up to a 35X performance improvement over oblivious query processing. When the query needs differentially private output, Shrinkwrap provides a trade-off between result accuracy and query evaluation performance.

Differential privacy has emerged as an important standard for privacy preserving computation over databases containing sensitive information about individuals. Research on differential privacy spanning a number of research areas, including theory, security, database, networks, machine learning, and statistics, over the last decade has resulted in a variety of privacy preserving algorithms for a number of analysis tasks. Despite maturing research efforts, the adoption of differential privacy by practitioners in industry, academia, or government agencies has so far been rare. Hence, in this tutorial, we will first describe the foundations of differentially private algorithm design that cover the state of the art in private computation on tabular data. In the second half of the tutorial we will highlight real world applications on complex data types, and identify research challenges in applying differential privacy to real world applications.

The release of detailed taxi trips has motivated numerous useful studies, but has also triggered multiple privacy attacks on individuals' trips. Despite these attacks, no tools are available for systematically analyzing the privacy risk of released trajectory data. While, recent studies have proposed mechanisms to publish synthetic mobility data with provable privacy guarantees, the questions on -- 1) how to explain the theoretical privacy guarantee to non-privacy experts; and 2) how well private data preserves the properties of ground truth, remain unclear. To address these issues, we propose a system --- VisDPT that provides rich visualization of sensitive information in trajectory databases and helps data curators understand the impact on utility due to privacy preserving mechanisms. We believe VisDPT will enable data curators to take informed decisions while publishing sanitized data.

Differential privacy has emerged as an important standard for privacy preserving computation over databases containing sensitive information about individuals. Research on differential privacy spanning a number of research areas, including theory, security, database, networks, machine learning, and statistics, over the last decade has resulted in a variety of privacy preserving algorithms for a number of analysis tasks. Despite maturing research efforts, the adoption of differential privacy by practitioners in industry, academia, or government agencies has so far been rare. Hence, in this tutorial, we will first describe the foundations of differentially private algorithm design that cover the state of the art in private computation on tabular data. In the second half of the tutorial we will highlight real world applications on complex data types, and identify research challenges in applying differential privacy to real world applications.

GPS-enabled devices are now ubiquitous, from airplanes and cars to smartphones and wearable technology. This has resulted in a wealth of data about the movements of individuals and populations, which can be analyzed for useful information to aid in city and traffic planning, disaster preparedness and so on. However, the places that people go can disclose extremely sensitive information about them, and thus their use needs to be filtered through privacy preserving mechanisms. This turns out to be a highly challenging task: raw trajectories are highly detailed, and typically no pair is alike. Previous attempts fail either to provide adequate privacy protection, or to remain sufficiently faithful to the original behavior. This paper presents DPT, a system to synthesize mobility data based on raw GPS trajectories of individuals while ensuring strong privacy protection in the form of ε-differential privacy. DPT makes a number of novel modeling and algorithmic contributions including (i) discretization of raw trajectories using hierarchical reference systems (at multiple resolutions) to capture individual movements at differing speeds, (ii) adaptive mechanisms to select a small set of reference systems and construct prefix tree counts privately, and (iii) use of direction-weighted sampling for improved utility. While there have been prior attempts to solve the subproblems required to generate synthetic trajectories, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first system that provides an end-to-end solution. We show the efficacy of our synthetic trajectory generation system using an extensive empirical evaluation.

Privacy definitions provide ways for trading-off the privacy of individuals in a statistical database for the utility of downstream analysis of the data. In this paper, we present Blowfish, a class of privacy definitions inspired by the Pufferfish framework, that provides a rich interface for this trade-off. In particular, we allow data publishers to extend differential privacy using a policy, which specifies (a) secrets, or information that must be kept secret, and (b) constraints that may be known about the data. While the secret specification allows increased utility by lessening protection for certain individual properties, the constraint specification provides added protection against an adversary who knows correlations in the data (arising from constraints). We formalize policies and present novel algorithms that can handle general specifications of sensitive information and certain count constraints. We show that there are reasonable policies under which our privacy mechanisms for k-means clustering, histograms and range queries introduce significantly lesser noise than their differentially private counterparts. We quantify the privacy-utility trade-offs for various policies analytically and empirically on real datasets.