Source location privacy (SLP) protection is an emerging research topic in wireless sensor networks. Because the source location represents the valuable information of the target being monitored and tracked, it is of great practical significance to achieve a high degree of privacy of the source location. Although many studies based on phantom nodes have alleviates the protection of SLP to some extent. It is urgent to solve the problems, such as complicate the ac path between nodes, improve the centralized distribution of phantom nodes near the source nodes and reduce the network communication overhead. In this paper, protection scheme based on sector phantom routing (PSSPR) routing is proposed as a visible approach to address SLP issues. We use the coordinates of the center node V to divide sector domain, which act an important role in generating a new phantom node. The phantom nodes perform specified routing policies to ensure that they can choose various locations. In addition, the directed random route can ensure that data packets avoid the visible range when they move to the sink node hop by hop. Thus, the source location is protected. Theoretical analysis and simulation experiments show that this protocol achieves higher security of source node location with less communication overhead.

Selfish mining attacks get a high prize due to the additional rewards unproportionate to their mining power (mining pools have particular advantages). Generally, this category of attacks stresses decreasing the threshold to maximize the rewards toward the view of attackers. Semi-selfish mining falls into the family of selfish mining attacks, where the threshold value is approximately 15%. However, it gets little attention to implement these attacks in practical. In this paper, we focus on the validity of semi-selfish mining attacks considering the probability of being detected. More specifically, we discuss mining strategies through backward deduction. That is to say that the attacking states derived from the observable states, which with normal forking rate, just as without semi-selfish mining attacks, toward the view of the honest miners. Rewards distribution is further investigated concerning these strategies. The simulation results indicate that it does not necessarily bring rewards advantage over large pools. Instead, the small pools have an advantage over the additional rewards. However, the probability for small pools to successfully implement these strategies is pretty low. That is, it is impossible for the pools, although profitable for them, to sponsor semi-selfish mining attacks without being detected.