In multi-stakeholder recommender systems (RS), users and providers operate as two crucial and interdependent roles, whose interests must be well-balanced. Prior research has demonstrated the importance of guaranteeing both provider fairness and user accuracy to meet their interests. However, when balancing the two objectives, another critical factor emerges: individual fairness, which manifests as a significant disparity in individual recommendation accuracy, with some users receiving high accuracy while others are left with notably low accuracy. This oversight severely harms the interests of users and exacerbates social polarization. How to guarantee individual fairness while ensuring user accuracy and provider fairness remains an unsolved problem. To bridge this gap, this article proposes a method called BankFair+, which extends BankFair with two steps: (1) introducing a non-linear function from regret theory to ensure individual fairness while enhancing user accuracy; (2) formulating the re-ranking process as a regret-aware fuzzy programming problem to meet the interests of both individual users and providers, therefore balancing the tradeoff between individual fairness and provider fairness. Experiments on two real-world recommendation datasets demonstrate that BankFair+ outperforms all baselines regarding individual fairness, user accuracy, and provider fairness, indicating its ability to guarantee two-sided fairness and accuracy in RS.

In modern information retrieval (IR), going beyond accuracy is crucial for maintaining a healthy ecosystem, particularly in meeting fairness and diversity requirements. To address these needs, various datasets, algorithms, and evaluation methods have been developed. These algorithms are often tested with different metrics, datasets, and experimental settings, making comparisons inconsistent and challenging. Consequently, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive IR toolkit, enabling standardized assessments of fairness- and diversity-aware algorithms across IR tasks. To address these issues, we introduce an open-source standardized toolkit called FairDiverse. First, FairDiverse provides a comprehensive framework for incorporating fairness- and diversity-aware approaches, including pre-processing, in-processing, and post-processing methods, into different pipeline stages of IR. Second, FairDiverse enables the evaluation of 29 fairness, and diversity algorithms across 16 base models for two fundamental IR tasks-search and recommendation-facilitating the establishment of a comprehensive benchmark. Finally, FairDiverse is highly extensible, offering multiple APIs to enable IR researchers to quickly develop their own fairness- and diversity-aware IR models, and allows for fair comparisons with existing baselines. The project is open-sourced on GitHub:~ https://github.com/XuChen0427/FairDiverse.

Maintaining the long-term sustainability of recommender systems (RS) is crucial.Traditional RS evaluation methods primarily focus on the user's immediate feedback (e.g., click), however, they often overlook the long-term effect involved by the content creators.In the real world, content creators can strategically create and upload new items to the platform by analyzing users' feedback and preference trends.Although previous studies have attempted to model creator behaviors, they often overlook that such behaviors are under conditions of information asymmetry.This asymmetry arises because creators mainly access the user feedback on the items they produce, while the platform has access to the full spectrum of feedback data.However, existing RS simulators often fail to consider such a condition, making the long-term RS evaluation inaccurate.To bridge this gap, we propose a Large Language Model (LLM)empowered creator simulation agent named CreAgent.By utilizing the belief mechanism from game theory and the fast-and-slow thinking framework, we can simulate the creator's behaviors well under information asymmetry.Furthermore, to enhance CreAgent's simulation ability, we utilize Proximal Policy Optimization to fine-tune CreAgent.Our credibility validation experiments demonstrate that our simulation environment effectively aligns with the behaviors of real-world platforms and creators, thereby enhancing the reliability of long-term evaluations in RS.Furthermore, leveraging this simulator, we can examine whether RS algorithms, such as fairnessand diversity-aware methods, contribute to improving long-term performance for different stakeholders.

Multi-stakeholder recommender systems involve various roles, such as users and providers. Previous work pointed out that max-min fairness (MMF) is a better metric to support weak providers. However, when considering MMF, the features or parameters of these roles vary over time, and how to ensure long-term provider MMF has become a significant challenge. We observed that recommendation feedback loops (RFL) will influence the provider MMF greatly in the long term. RFL means that recommender systems can only receive feedback on exposed items from users and update recommender models incrementally based on this feedback. When utilizing the feedback, the recommender model will regard the unexposed items as negative. In this way, the tail provider will not get the opportunity to be exposed, and its items will always be considered negative samples. Such phenomena will become more and more serious in RFL. To alleviate the problem, this article proposes an online ranking model named Long-Term Provider Max-min Fairness (LTP-MMF). Theoretical analysis shows that the long-term regret of LTP-MMF enjoys a sub-linear bound. Experimental results on three public recommendation benchmarks demonstrated that LTP-MMF can outperform the baselines in the long term.

Out of sustainable and economical considerations, two-sided recommendation platforms must satisfy the needs of both users and providers. Previous studies often show that the two sides' needs show different urgency: providers need a relatively long-term exposure demand while users want more short-term and accurate service. However, our empirical study reveals that previous methods for trading off fairness-accuracy often fail to guarantee long-term fairness and short-term accuracy simultaneously in real applications of fluctuating user traffic. Especially, when user traffic is low, the user experience often drops a lot. Our theoretical analysis also confirms that user traffic is a key factor in such a trade-off problem. How to guarantee accuracy and fairness under fluctuating user traffic remains a problem. Inspired by the bankruptcy problem in economics, we propose a novel fairness-aware re-ranking approach named BankFair. Intuitively, BankFair employs the Talmud rule to leverage periods of abundant user traffic to offset periods of user traffic scarcity, ensuring consistent user service at every period while upholding long-term fairness. Specifically, BankFair consists of two modules: (1) employing the Talmud rule to determine the required fairness degree under varying periods of user traffic; and (2) conducting an online re-ranking algorithm based on the fairness degree determined by the Talmud rule. Experiments on two real-world recommendation datasets show that BankFair outperforms all baselines regarding accuracy and provider fairness.

Fair re-ranking aims to redistribute ranking slots among items more equitably to ensure responsibility and ethics. The exploration of redistribution problems has a long history in economics, offering valuable insights for conceptualizing fair re-ranking as a taxation process. Such a formulation provides us with a fresh perspective to re-examine fair re-ranking and inspire the development of new methods. From a taxation perspective, we theoretically demonstrate that most previous fair re-ranking methods can be reformulated as an item-level tax policy. Ideally, a good tax policy should be effective and conveniently controllable to adjust ranking resources. However, both empirical and theoretical analyses indicate that the previous item-level tax policy cannot meet two ideal controllable requirements: (1) continuity, ensuring minor changes in tax rates result in small accuracy and fairness shifts; (2) controllability over accuracy loss, ensuring precise estimation of the accuracy loss under a specific tax rate. To overcome these challenges, we introduce a new fair re-ranking method named Tax-rank, which levies taxes based on the difference in utility between two items. Then, we efficiently optimize such an objective by utilizing the Sinkhorn algorithm in optimal transport. Upon a comprehensive analysis, Our model Tax-rank offers a superior tax policy for fair re-ranking, theoretically demonstrating both continuity and controllability over accuracy loss. Experimental results show that Tax-rank outperforms all state-of-the-art baselines on two ranking tasks.